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Abstract 
 
      
 
The escalating use of contractors on the battlefield in highly critical operational 
areas is a trend that is increasing across the DoD.  Contractors have a vital role 
supporting CONUS missions, but they are also on the battlefield in defense of our nation, 
supporting the warfighter and their weapon systems.  As the use of contractors on the 
battlefield continues to gain favor within the DoD, and as contractor’s roles continue to 
expand and become more critical, it is imperative to improve the current way that the 
DoD, and specifically Air Force acquisition professionals, procure such services.  This 
research analyzes inputs from DoD Policy Experts, Contractor Policy Experts, Army 
Policy Experts, Air Force Policy Experts, and 13 Air Force Program Offices that use 
contractors on the battlefield to support, maintain, and/or troubleshoot their weapon 
systems.  Content analysis and pattern matching were used to determine the current status 
of battlefield acquisition, draw conclusions, and make recommendations.  Several 
problem areas in this area of acquisition were identified as well as best practices and 
lessons learned.   
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GOING TO WAR WITH DEFENSE CONTRACTORS:  A CASE STUDY 
ANALYSIS OF BATTLEFIELD ACQUISITION  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Background 
 A transformation is occurring within the Department of Defense (DoD) which 
calls for looking at new and better ways of conducting business, doing more with less, 
and downsizing.  Caterinichhia (2002) states, “As its ongoing transformation changes 
everything from battlefield strategies to business processes, the Defense Department must 
overcome the challenges of . . . acquisition reform,” among other things.  Our acquisition 
processes must adapt and become more efficient in these changing times of terrorist 
hijackers and suicide bombers.  However, as Darleen Druylun, former principal deputy 
assistant secretary for acquisition management, stated, “If there's a consensus on anything 
in the area of acquisition reform, it is that there's been more than enough study.  It's time 
for action” (AFMC News Service, 2002).  This research is an “action” that attempts to fill 
the knowledge gap of efficiently and effectively acquiring and managing the services of 
contractors on the battlefield that support Air Force weapon systems.   
 Consonant with both available resources and the ongoing transformation 
initiative, DoD is turning increasingly to outsourcing non-critical activities to contractors.   
From the time of the first Gulf War in 1991, military forces have declined by 500,000 
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personnel (Wayne, 2002), and continued force reductions are undoubtedly possible 
(Garcia-Perez, 1999).  As outsourcing gains in popularity, the DoD is expanding the 
scope of outsourcing beyond simply base support, reaching outward towards the 
privatization of core military operational functions such as weapon systems maintenance 
(Zamparelli, 1999:13).  Zamparelli (1999:13) argues that “functions previously felt to be 
sacrosanct are now candidates for transition to contractors.”  Buhler (2000:1) states, 
“[C]ontractors are deploying in direct support of combat weapon systems and are 
performing operational combat roles.”  As weapon systems and military hardware 
become progressively more complex, the military has become ever more dependent on 
contractors on the battlefield (Schwartz, 2003:102).  The General Accounting Office 
(2003:2) studied this human capital problem and states “DOD’s lack of attention to force 
shaping . . . has resulted in a workforce that is not balanced by age or experience and that 
puts at risk the orderly transfer of institutional knowledge.” 
 One important aspect of this ongoing transformation is the escalating use of 
contractors on the battlefield both generally and specifically in highly critical operational 
areas.  Buhler (2000:3-4) observes, “The cuts in military personnel coupled with the 
increasing complexity of military weapon systems has led to the use of contractors as a 
viable source of skilled labor.”  Contractors on the battlefield provide combat service 
support that includes such tasks as maintenance, troubleshooting, and logistics support.   
 Contractors have a vital role supporting CONUS missions, but they are also on 
the battlefield in defense of our nation, supporting the warfighter and their weapon 
systems.  Air Force Pamphlet 10-231, the Federal Civilian Deployment Guide, states 
“With distinction, they [contractors on the battlefield] perform critical duties in virtually 
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every functional area of combat support and combat service support, both at home and 
abroad” (Hamontree, 2002:64).  Today, contractors from Northrop Grumman are 
supporting the Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) in classified battlefield 
locations around the world.  Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and Boeing systems contractors 
have also supported Air Force weapon systems on or near the forward edge of the battle 
area (Munoz, 2001:Slide 7). 
 Contractors on the battlefield are a critical piece of DoD’s total force structure 
that includes active duty, national guard, civilian, and contractor personnel; however, 
contractors on the battlefield are not a recent phenomenon.  In fact, contractors on the 
battlefield have been used since the birth of our nation.  Contractors have supported our 
troops and weapon systems in every war and conflict our country has waged (Buhler, 
2000:2).  Today, DoD depends on contractor personnel more than ever before.  One 
estimate suggests that Pentagon spending on contractors providing support on the 
battlefield could surpass $30 billion, tallying 8% of its overall budget (Schwartz, 
2003:102). 
 As the use of contractors on the battlefield continues to gain favor within the DoD 
and as the contractor’s roles continue to expand and become more critical, it is imperative 
to improve the current way that the DoD, and specifically Air Force acquisition 
professionals, procure such services.  Hamontree (2002:69) states, “If any facet of 
contractor support is not planned for, such as how they get to the battlefield, their 
positioning on the battlefield, medical and life support systems, or force protection, the 
commander faces a potential loss of combat effectiveness.”  The manner in which wars 
are fought today is much different than they were fought ten or twenty years ago.  The 
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DoD’s military doctrine has adapted to advancements in technology, changing global 
relationships, and evolving threats around the world.  The DoD’s military doctrine studies 
the past and reaches beyond the present.  Joint Vision 2020 states: 
The joint force of 2020 must be prepared to ‘win’ across the full range of 
military operations in any part of the world, to operate with multinational 
forces, and to coordinate military operations, as necessary, with 
government agencies and international organizations.  (JV 2020, 2003:4)   
 
Hamontree (2002:68) states that as the traditional concept of the battlefield is replaced 
with asymmetrical warfare, contractors, which are a crucial facet of this “joint force,” 
will be in the midst of battle, “. . . ever closer to opposing forces.”   
As battlefield tactics, strategy, and doctrine change, the DoD’s business 
infrastructure has remained rather stagnant.  Hamontree (2002:68) stated, “Contractors 
who support and operate systems armed with weapons in a hostile environment need a 
change in regulations that incorporates consideration of the evolving role of [Civilians 
Accompanying the Force] CAF.”  The nature of warfare has changed, and yet the way 
DoD conducts business has not kept pace with these operational changes.    
 The government contracting officer plays a critical role in acquiring the services 
of contractors on the battlefield.  They are the only ones with the authority to obligate the 
government according to law and federal regulations.  According to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR 1.601a), “Contracts may be entered into and signed on 
behalf of the Government only by contracting officers [emphasis added].”  Contracting 
officers construct, negotiate, and execute the contract and its terms and conditions.  The 
contracting officer and the contract are vital to the successful employment of contractors 
on the battlefield.  Fortner (2000) succinctly summarizes this point that “. . . contractors 
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are managed, and the management mechanism is the contract itself.”  The contract’s 
terms and conditions and Statement of Work (SOW) are legal documents that 
communicate expectations of the business arrangement between both parties—the United 
States Government (USG) and contractor.  FAR 2.101 states that a contract “means a 
mutually binding legal relationship obligating the seller to furnish the supplies or services 
and the buyer to pay for them.”  The contractor is only required to do what is stated in the 
contract.  However, as Garcia-Perez (1999) notes, “Contractors providing essential 
services are expected to use all means at their disposal to continue to provide such 
services according to the terms and conditions of the contract. . .” 
 Battlefield weapon system contracts are different from normal DoD CONUS 
service and systems contracts because of the variety of issues that must, or should be 
addressed with regards to battlefield support.  Garcia-Perez (1999) states, “The 
consequences of using contractors on the battlefield go beyond the impact on the armed 
forces that are required to protect them during hostilities.  It also affects the commanders, 
their planning staffs, and their risk assessment procedures.”  These battlefield weapon 
system contracts must address the management, deployment, protection, and sustainment 
issues regarding contractors on the battlefield (Fortner, 2000).  The contracting officer 
must write a thorough, yet flexible contract to ensure that changes can be easily made to 
the contract in the time of war.  Orsini and Bublitz (1999) argue that commanders have to 
be able to make changes to the contract quickly to adapt to the changing needs on the 
battlefield.  They argue that, “Consequently, the art and science of writing contracts will 
become extremely critical to ensuring flexibility, sustainability, and survivability on the 
battlefield.”  This flexibility is critical to the DoD’s overall mission success.   
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The need for comprehensive but flexible contracts makes the contracting officer’s 
role more critical to overall mission success.  It is the contracting officer and not the 
commander or warfighter who has the authority to modify the contract, change the USG’s 
requirements, and direct the contractor to perform work in accordance with these 
modifications.  Fortner (2000) states,  
A commander who wants to change the performance of requirements of a 
contractor’s employees must work through the contracting officer to 
change the terms and conditions of the contract.  Managing contractors 
involves planning, visibility, and control, which is unlike commanding and 
controlling soldiers. 
 
 
Problem 
 Contractors have been on the battlefield essentially as long as United State’s 
military forces (Buhler, 2000:2), and they continue to support United State’s forces today 
in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  However, as Zamparelli 
(1999:11) notes, “[W]hat makes this issue worthy of research is not the fact that 
contractors are supporting these operations but the scope, locality and criticality of that 
support.”  This study will focus primarily on the issues involved with battlefield 
acquisition—acquiring the services of contractors on the battlefield and subsequently 
constructing, negotiating, and enforcing the terms and conditions of a battlefield contract.  
Figure 1 summarizes the issues that a contracting officer must be aware of and possibly 
address in the contract.  
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Figure 1.  Contractors on the Battlefield—The Contracting Officer’s Perspective 
 
Research Questions 
 For the most part, there is no standardization for acquiring the services of 
contractors on the battlefield.  This research will analyze the various issues of battlefield 
contracts, examine methods used to acquire services of contractors on the battlefield, 
gather best practices and lessons learned, and use the results of that analysis to draw 
conclusions and provide recommendations.  Future research could later culminate into a 
comprehensive, standardized contracting structure for battlefield contractor support.  This 
thesis examines the current approach of acquiring the services of contractors on the 
battlefield for Air Force weapon system support and/or maintenance.  By identifying all 
of the issues that arise with regard to the use of defense contractors on the battlefield and 
by analyzing the various methods currently used within the DoD to support these 
contractors, this research seeks to assist contracting officers by identifying problem areas 
as well as better ways of conducting business. 
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The six Research Questions that this study will attempt to answer are: 
Research Question 1:  What Air Force programs have used or are using contractors on 
the battlefield to support their weapon systems?   
 
Research Question 2:  What support obligations do the government and the contractor 
have prior to deployment and during deployment? 
 
Research Question 3:  What contractual language, clauses, supplements, and/or 
documentation are required to effectively structure contracts with defense contractors on 
the battlefield?   
 
Subsidiary Question 3a:  What attachments to the contracts have been used to 
provide support and training to defense contractors on the battlefield? 
 
Subsidiary Question 3b:  How have past contracts been structured and/or 
negotiated to acquire the services of defense contractors on the battlefield? 
 
Subsidiary Question 3c:  What attachments to the contracts have been used to 
clarify defense contractors’ roles and responsibilities on the battlefield? 
 
Research Question 4:  What are the lessons learned from these programs using 
contractors on the battlefield?   
 
Research Question 5:  Historically, how have these contracts performed from start to 
finish (cost, schedule, performance, and responsiveness)? 
 
Research Question 6:  What are the acquisition “best practices” for acquiring and 
managing the services of systems contractors on the battlefield?   
 
 
Summary of Current Knowledge 
 The study of contractors on the battlefield and the acquisition and management of 
such services is a narrowly focused topic.  Thus, most of the literature found was from 
Department of Defense journals, magazines, briefing papers, newspapers, policy and 
guidance, e-mails, and theses.  Although no articles were found in scholarly journals, 
relevant articles appeared in general interest magazines and other publications.  
Comparable case studies to this research, specific to battlefield weapon system support 
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acquisition using multiple case studies, have not been found.  However, many other 
studies have been conducted on contractor battlefield logistics support contracts and 
battlefield acquisition, and these sources have been analyzed and summarized in Chapter 
2, the literature review.   
 Contractors have been used on the battlefield by the U.S. since its birth as a 
nation.  These contractors helped U.S. armies throughout history from the Revolutionary 
War (Maples, 2001:3) to, most recently, Operation Enduring Freedom (Schwartz, 
2003:102).  These contractors provide basic logistical support, but have taken more of an 
operational role due to the downsizing of military personnel (Zamparelli, 1999:13) and 
privatization, enabling “. . . the military . . . to focus on its core competency: fighting” 
(Schwartz, 2003:102).  These battlefield contractors fill these manpower and knowledge 
gaps that continue to expand as weapon systems become increasingly complex.  The ratio 
of contractors on the battlefield to uniformed personnel is increasing (Ross, 2003:4A), 
and many experts believe that these contractors act as force multipliers and are an 
essential part of the DoD’s total force structure (Garcia-Perez, 1999; Wayne, 2002; 
Friedman, 2002:22). 
 The use of contractors on the battlefield carries along with it many issues that 
need clarification and resolution—their legal status, pre-deployment preparation, life 
support issues, command and control, and protection issues.  The contracting officer 
plays a vital role in communicating, clarifying, and resolving the USG’s expectations to 
these contractors.  The contract must be written in a thorough and flexible fashion.  The 
terms and conditions must be articulated clearly to the contractor in order for them to 
perform their mission effectively.  There are several contractual clauses that must be 
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made part of these battlefield contracts, including Capture and Detention (DFARS 
252.228-7003), the Defense Base Act (FAR 52.228-3), and the War Hazards 
Compensation Act (FAR 52.228-4).    
Experts have made several recommendations and findings about using contractors 
on the battlefield.  Friedman (2002:23) highlights the importance of contracts, the 
contracting system, and the use of contractors on the battlefield in the time of war.  He 
states that the DoD must understand how these contractors work in order “. . . have the 
success we seek on that battlefield of the future.”  Buhler (2000) makes a similar 
recommendation and states that commanders and their staffs should receive initial 
contracting and acquisition training.  He argues, “To ensure contractor expectations are 
understood, both groups of personnel need to receive in depth training on the scope of the 
contract, mission, and purpose.”  Friedman (2002:9-10) states that the cost 
reimbursement type contract is most effective for acquiring the services of contractors on 
the battlefield as it provides flexibility to both the USG and contractor in managing and 
performing the contract.  Finally, Thomas (2003) states that control of contractors on the 
battlefield should reside with a single focal point, possibly the Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA).  He argues that this “systematic approach for 
management and control of contractors on the battlefield is needed” and “. . . would be of 
tremendous value.”  
 
Assumptions 
 
 Based on the arguments of Ross (2003), Friedman (2002), Garcia-Perez (1999), 
and Zamparelli (1999), three assumptions were made when conducting this study.  First, 
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the use of contractors on the battlefield will persist, and the ratio of contractors on the 
battlefield to military personnel will continue to increase.  Second, contractors on the 
battlefield provide benefits to the DoD and act as force multipliers.  Third, a 
comprehensive contracting approach for acquiring and managing the services of 
contractors on the battlefield would enhance contractor performance and consequently 
overall mission success.  Figure 2 depicts these assumptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Assumptions – Comprehensive Contracting Approach 
 
Proposed Methodology 
All of the Research Questions can be answered through case study and content 
analysis of structured interviews with key DoD Policy Experts, Contractor Policy 
Experts, Army Policy Experts, Air Force Policy Experts, and Air Force Program Offices 
that use contractors on the battlefield to support and/or maintain their weapon systems.  
Interviews with Policy Experts and Program Offices would also prove useful in 
determining effective contract structure, lessons learned, best practices, and overall 
contractor performance.  An interview instrument will be constructed of Investigative 
Questions that map directly to the Research Questions.  Data analysis will be conducted 
through content analysis, pattern matching, and frequency counts for each specific 
Comprehensive Contracting Approach 
Better Contractor Performance 
Better Program Performance 
Overall Mission Success 
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interview and for each respective Investigative Question.  The data analysis will provide 
the basis for the conclusions and recommendations presented in Chapter 5.   
This study employs the use of a case study methodology because the research is 
exploratory in nature.  “Case studies . . . [explore] in depth a program, an event, an 
activity, a process, or one or more individuals” (Creswell, 2003:15).  Leedy (2001:149) 
states, “A case study may be especially suitable for learning more about a little known or 
poorly understood situation.”  The goal of this research is to build theory—analyzing the 
current acquisition environment and processes for acquiring the services of contractors on 
the battlefield, drawing conclusions, and offering recommendations.  The case study 
method provides at least three advantages.  First, the case study analysis allows collection 
and comparison of data on current acquisition practices, recommendations, lessons 
learned, and best practices from various case study groups.  There is no database 
currently that holds such information.  Second, there is no foundational data, and case 
study analysis allows the researcher to gather data from a variety of Air Force programs 
that have experience working with contractors on the battlefield and from Policy Experts 
that have some experience with this subject.  Third, the case study method allows one to 
categorize and interpret data, identify patterns and underlying themes, and draw 
conclusions and make generalizations (Leedy, 2001:150).   
 
Scope of Research 
 This research focuses solely on providing recommendations to United States Air 
Force program offices and acquisition personnel that use systems contractors to support 
Air Force weapon systems and/or sub-systems on the battlefield.  This research addresses 
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specific issues and develops a recommended contracting approach for Air Force 
contracting officers and program offices to follow.  There are many cultural, legal, and 
conceptual differences between the approaches of the various Armed Services when 
acquiring and supporting weapon systems on the battlefield.  Furthermore, the missions 
of the various Armed Services are distinct from each other, so one contracting approach 
for the Air Force might not suffice for the Army and vice versa.  Thus, the results of this 
study are limited to Air Force programs; however, the exploratory research does reach 
beyond Air Force personnel and program offices.  Hogan (1999:16) recommended that   
“. . . joint doctrine must standardize techniques, procedures, and contract terms for all 
Services and contractors.”  Army Policy Experts and DoD Policy Experts will also be 
interviewed in order to gain a better understanding from a Joint perspective. 
 
Overview 
Chapter I provides some background, stipulates the overall problem and research 
questions, and addresses assumptions, the proposed methodology, and the scope of the 
research.  Chapter II is a literature review that not only summarizes the history of 
contractors on the battlefield, but also addresses its current status in DoD acquisition.  
Chapter III presents the methodology used for this research, and Chapter IV discusses 
results and patterns that emerged from the data collected from the interviews.  Chapter V 
provides conclusions, recommendations, best practices, and lessons learned, as well as 
limitations of the research and possible areas for future research.  Finally, there is a 
glossary of technical terms attached as an appendix at the end of this thesis. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
Prior to conducting interviews with Policy Experts and Program Offices, many 
risks and complicated issues associated with using contractors on the battlefield must be 
identified and analyzed.  Chapter II, the literature review, is an assessment of current 
knowledge regarding the use of contractors on the battlefield.  This chapter reviews 
research that has already been conducted and analyzes results and findings.  Also, this 
literature review establishes that contracting on the battlefield has been used throughout 
history and the trend of using contractors on the battlefield is increasing, that there are 
different categories of contractors on the battlefield supporting a variety of missions, and 
that there are more complex legal and contracting issues present than ever before.  Buhler 
(2000:16) argues that “By better understanding the history of contractors supporting 
military operations, modern day efforts, and potential problems, operational commanders 
will be able to use contractors as force multipliers.”  As noted in Chapter I, this study 
focuses on systems contractors on the battlefield; accordingly, this literature review 
maintains the same focus.  
 
The History of Contractors on the Battlefield 
Throughout history, armies—including those of Alexander the Great and Genghis 
Khan—have used contractors on the battlefield (Friedman, 2002:1).  In United States 
history, contractor-provided logistical support can be traced back to General 
Washington’s Continental Army during the Revolutionary War (Cahlick, 2002:1; 
Zamparelli, 1999:12).  Historically, contractors were used for logistical tasks in non-
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combat roles up until the Vietnam War (Zamparelli, 1999:12).  Beginning with Vietnam, 
however, contractors moved beyond solely providing logistics and generic base support 
to executing more battlefield-related tasks such as supporting weapon systems on or near 
the forward edge of the battlefield (Zamparelli, 1999:12; Buhler, 2002:1).     
Civilian contractors deployed in major theater wars including WWI, WWII, 
Korea, and Vietnam (Buhler, 2000:2).  The ratio of contractors on the battlefield to 
military personnel during Operation Desert Storm was approximately 1 contractor per 11 
military personnel (Friedman, 2002:1), and these battlefield contractors took a more 
operational role during the Gulf War.  Buhler (2000:7) states, “During Desert Storm, 
contractors flew on operational Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) 
missions and transmitted targeting data directly to weapon shooters.”  Other battlefield 
systems that these contractors supported were TOW and Patriot missiles, nuclear, 
biological, and chemical detection vehicles, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, M1 Tanks, and 
OH-58D helicopters (Buhler, 2000:7).  The role of the contractor expanded from merely 
providing basic logistical support to providing technical expertise on the forward edge of 
the battlefield. 
Scwhartz (2003:104) states that big business, “. . . is hardly a stranger to the 
battlefield.”  Although the statistics are not readily available for contractors on the 
battlefield for recent conflicts such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, the historical record suggests contractors are on the ground supporting our 
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  History further suggests that DoD’s use of contractors on 
the battlefield will continue in the future, and that usage rates seem likely to increase.  
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Paul Lombardi, CEO of DynCorp, states, “You could fight without us, but it would be 
difficult” (Schwartz, 2004:102). 
 
Increasing Use of Contractors on the Battlefield 
The ratio of contractors on the battlefield from the Revolutionary War up to the 
Vietnam War has remained somewhat constant (Friedman, 2002:1).  However, since the 
Vietnam War, this ratio and the tasks that these contractors were asked to perform have 
steadily increased (Cahlick, 2002).  Friedman (2002:6) argues: 
The Gulf War was just the beginning of the trend toward increasing 
numbers of civilian personnel in a combat theater to support logistics and 
combat operations.  Most analysts and planners feel that these numbers 
will continue to increase as more and more functions are turned over to the 
private sector through competitive outsourcing, new technologies, 
increased shelf life of equipment, and changing logistics doctrine. 
 
The Desert Storm ratio of contractors to military personnel grew dramatically to 1.5:1 in 
Bosnia (Ross, 2003:4A).  The contractors actually outnumbered the military personnel.  
Milton Ross (2003:4A), the senior contracting official at Aeronautical Systems Center’s 
(ASC), states, “The contractor has become a key component in our master deployment 
plan.  Combat units are no longer self-sustaining entities and must deploy with significant 
contractor support.”  DoD’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a planning 
roadmap updated every four years, expressed these same sentiments.  The 2001 QDR 
suggests that “. . . the contractor-to-soldier ratio will continue to rise and that contracting 
out battlefield services will become as common as hiring private companies to build 
tanks” (Cahlick, 2002).  Furthermore, Garcia-Perez (1999) states, “. . . [T]he degree to 
which we plan future use of contractors is increasing steadily.”   
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Experts have suggested many reasons for the increasing use of contractors on the 
battlefield, including cuts in military personnel, increased privatization, and increased 
reliance on overall contractor support for increasingly complex weapon systems 
(Zamparelli, 1999:13; Brooke, 1998:3).  After the Cold War ended, the Department of 
Defense focused on getting more efficient, stripping away jobs and cutting over 700,000 
active duty personnel (Zamparelli, 1999:13).  “Military end-strengths were reduced by 
33% from their 1987 peak levels” (Friedman, 2002:6), and “[s]ince 1985 . . . the force 
structure was reduced by 33 percent and DoD procurement programs reduced by 63 
percent” (McKenna, 2002:iii).  Since the Cold War, initiatives to maintain cost 
effectiveness known by catch phrases such as doing more with less, faster, better, 
cheaper, smarter, and transformation have led to further personnel and budget cuts 
(McKenna, 2002:3). 
At this same time, operations tempo has increased dramatically and deployments 
have increased to a growing number of “hotspots” around the world, especially since the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and President Bush’s War on Terrorism began.   
(Faggard, 2003).  Operations tempo, budget decreases, and personnel cuts continue to put 
more stress on military personnel.  Pentagon officials believe that using contractors on 
the battlefield can fill this gap and “. . . have maintained that contractors are a cost-
effective way of extending the military’s reach when Congress and the American public 
are reluctant to pay for more soldiers” (Wayne, 2002).  These contractors can be used to 
augment the declining force structure and fill this void (Garcia-Perez, 1999).  McKenna 
(2002:iii) summarizes, “In an effort to maximize its allotted budget DoD has significantly 
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downsized its workforce, eliminated government jobs and subsequently increased the 
number of contracts to civilian providers.” 
Privatization, another acquisition reform initiative within the DoD, is another 
reason for the increased use of contractors on the battlefield.  The reductions in budgets 
and manpower coupled with the goal of cutting costs without cutting services (McKenna, 
2002:9) are forcing “. . . the Department of Defense to look at demilitarizing large areas 
of core functions through privatization or contracting out” (Zamparelli, 1999:13).  
McKenna (2002:9) suggests, “. . . the military has been forced to reengineer and turn to 
competitive sourcing, and privatization of increased numbers of military functions.”  
Some of these military functions that are being privatized include depot and weapon 
system maintenance, software maintenance, sub-system management, and information 
and communications.  Zamparelli (1999:13) argues that the use of contractors on the 
battlefield will continue to increase “. . . as more functions are being turned over to the 
private sector through competitive sourcing, privatization, and changing logistics 
practices such as lifetime contractor logistics support.”   
Finally, with ever-increasingly sophisticated weapon systems being used on the 
battlefield, contractors on the battlefield offer an advantage that is critical to the overall 
effectiveness of the total force structure—their knowledge and experience.  Mr. Ross 
(2003:4A) states, “Contractor personnel bring years of experience since many are 
veterans having prior combat duty.  Contractors have technical skills the combat services 
cannot easily train or duplicate.”  The contractor offers stability and experience that often 
times the “. . . soldiers cannot gain during their half-year tours” (Cahlick, 2002).   As 
technology continues to rapidly change, it becomes uneconomical and unfeasible “. . . to 
 
 19
keep soldiers technologically capable of maintaining, troubleshooting, and in some cases, 
employing sophisticated weapons” (Zamparelli, 1999:14).  As budgets and manpower 
decline, contractors act as force multipliers, filling this knowledge gap for the 
Department of Defense by providing “. . . capabilities for which no military capability 
exists” (Fortner and Jaeckle, 1998).  Friedman (2002:18) summarizes the point:  
“Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines will have . . . to share the battlefield with civilians 
in greater numbers than ever before considered.” 
 
Categories of Contractors on the Battlefield 
Based on the services they provide, contractors on the battlefield can be grouped 
into three main categories: theater support, external support, and systems contractors 
(Hamontree, 2002:66).  This study focuses on one of these categories of contractors on 
the battlefield—systems contractors. 
Systems contractors support and/or maintain deployed material systems, sub-
systems, and components such as “. . . vehicle weapon systems, aircraft, command and 
control infrastructure, and communications equipment” (Fortner, 2000).  Contractors 
work in conjunction with military personnel to provide life-cycle management and 
technical and maintenance support of these material systems during peacetime and 
wartime (Garcia-Perez, 1999).  This contractor support “. . . usually extends over long 
periods” (Buhler, 2000:2-3).  Systems contractors perform such tasks as item 
management, maintenance, and troubleshooting.  Hamontree (2002:67-68) states, “Most 
system contractors enhance the readiness and continuity in training on advanced or 
 
 20
recently fielded systems; however, some system contractors perform maintenance and 
operations that are unique to the military.” 
There are two categories of system contractors—mission-enhancing and mission-
essential.  Mission-enhancing systems contractors “. . . provide assistance to equipment 
that is newly fielded, has been modified, and is technically challenging or maintenance-
intensive” (Hamontree 2002:68).  These contractors carry the title, “Field Service 
Representatives” (FSR), and usually have extensive knowledge and/or experience with 
the equipment (Hamontree, 2002:68).  The Global Hawk UAV has deployed several 
times over the past three years in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.  Each time, a contractor team from Northrop Grumman Integrated Sensor 
Systems has deployed with the assets and assigned military personnel in order to provide 
technical assistance and maintenance troubleshooting.  The Global Hawk UAV is one 
example of a weapon system that utilizes mission-enhancing system contractors.  Other 
examples of mission-enhancing system contractors include Lockheed Martin’s technical 
support for F-16s and Boeing’s technical support for KC-10s (Munoz, 2001:Slide 7). 
Mission-essential systems contractors “. . . don’t augment organic capabilities or 
provide assistance with a system—they are the only support for the system” (Hamontree 
2002:68).  These mission-essential contractors solely operate or maintain highly 
technological material systems which the DoD has either chosen not to operate or simply 
could not maintain it (Hamontree, 2002:68).  There are several good DoD examples of 
mission-essential system contractors.  In the war against drugs in Colombia, P.W. Singer, 
a Brookings Institution scholar, comments that “[a]t least a half-dozen companies, 
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including Airscan, Northrop Grumman, and DynCorp, receive up to $1.2 billion a year 
from the Pentagon and State Department to fly the planes that spray suspected coca fields 
and to monitor smugglers from remote radar sites” (Schwartz, 2003:103).  Another 
example of a mission-essential systems contractor is Raytheon.  Raytheon contractors 
performed maintenance of C-21 aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia (Munoz, 
2001:Slide 7).  Finally, back in 1997, Boeing and Lockheed Martin submitted proposals 
to provide support for the Army’s Apache helicopter (Garcia-Perez, 1999).  Orsini and 
Bublitz (1999) state, “Apache Prime Vendor Support and other fleet management 
concepts currently suggest that contractor support will be available from the factory to the 
foxhole.  This means that contractor support will be the primary source of support.” 
 
Operational Issues  
There are many legal, pre-deployment, deployment, and life support issues that 
the contracting officer has to understand and should address in the contract’s terms and 
conditions.  The DoD, the contractor, and ultimately the contracting officer are all 
responsible for ensuring contractors have met all of their obligations as stipulated in the 
contract and ensuring the contractors are fully supported in the area of operations.  A 
poorly written contract can affect the contractors’ performance, resulting in increased 
costs and having an adverse mission impact.  The operational issues that must be 
addressed within the contract include the contractors’ legal status, force protection, 
deployment, sustainment, and command and control. 
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Contractor’s on the Battlefield Legal Status.  Buhler (2000:7) states that “[t]he 
laws of warfare that govern the status of personnel in combat are known as the laws of 
armed conflict.”  The 1907 Hague Convention and the 1949 Geneva Convention set the 
foundation for the international laws of armed conflict (Zamparelli, 1999:12).  Under the 
laws of armed conflict, contractors on the battlefield are neither combatants nor non-
combatants, but are given the title civilians authorized to accompany the force.  Fortner 
(2000) contends that “As such, they are entitled to some, but not all of the protections 
afforded combatants and some, but not all, of the protections afforded noncombatants.”  
It is a confusing issue to say the least. 
Systems contractors “. . . cannot engage in activities inconsistent with their status.  
They cannot perform any purely military functions.  They cannot participate in attacks on 
the enemy, nor can they occupy defensive positions to secure the unit perimeter” 
(Fortner, 2000).  Furthermore, if contractors kill during wartime and are captured by the 
enemy, they can be tried and punished as war criminals by their captors (Fortner, 2000).  
It is important that these contractors do not violate their legal status as civilians 
authorized to accompany the force.  By acting within their legal status, they are given the 
same rights as lawful combatants and entitled to the same ethical treatment afforded to 
prisoners of war (Fortner, 2000). 
 The lines between combatants, non-combatants, and civilians authorized to 
accompany the force continue to “blur” as more and more contractors are working on the 
battlefield supporting both offensive and defensive weapon systems (Zamparelli, 
1999:11).  Zamparelli (1999:18) states, “. . . [C]ontractor numbers are increasing in 
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theater and on the front lines, and their support is directly related to combat operations.”  
Fortner, (2000) clearly articulates the concern:   
A system contractor employee who travels to the area of operations to 
perform minor technical maintenance on a weapon system that is still 
operational and capable of performing its intended mission may be 
violating the constraint against support to hostile operations.  On the other 
hand, the same person performing the same maintenance on the same item 
in a maintenance facility in a safe area may not be in violation of the 
constraint.  
 
Protecting Contractors on the Battlefield.  According to the laws of armed 
conflict, systems contractors cannot be legitimately targeted by the enemy; however, they 
can be collateral casualties of a legitimate attack on the system they support (Fortner, 
2000).  As the status of contractors on the battlefield becomes increasingly blurred, force 
protection becomes a major issue.   
Force protection issues must be resolved prior to the contractors being deployed 
to the battlefield.  Fortner (2000) states, “Contractors are not soldiers, and they cannot 
specifically and deliberately be exposed to the same risks as soldiers.”  Thus, 
commanders must make several decisions based on the security situation for the 
contractors.  Garcia-Perez (1999:41) argues that the commanders must execute a risk 
assessment and determine whether or not to provide security to the contractors on the 
battlefield, and can recommend not using contractors if the risk is too high.  Providing 
security for contractors on the battlefield is often a difficult decision for commanders to 
make.  However, Turner (2001) states, “They [the contractors] should be protected from 
attack when they directly support the effort of the military. . ..”  There are a variety of 
problems associated with force protection from the government side.  Garcia-Perez 
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(1999) addresses one of them:  “Aside from the planning requirements, the commander 
also may have to give up soldiers to augment the additional security mission.” 
 Another issue with protecting contractors on the battlefield is the contractors’ 
rights to carry a weapon for defensive purposes.  In order for a contractor to carry a 
weapon, the commander must approve it, the contractor’s company must approve it, and 
contractor personnel must agree to carry the firearm (Fortner, 2000).  Contractors must be 
trained to use the weapon properly and must take a class in the Laws of Armed Conflict.  
These weapons and training must be provided by the DoD, costing money and taking the 
time from personnel that could be training uniformed soldiers.  Furthermore, the 
contracting officer should capture this support in the terms and conditions of the contract 
because as Croft (2001:24) states, “. . . command and control is dependent upon the terms 
and conditions of the contract.”  
Deploying Contractors to the Battlefield.  Contracts for battlefield support should 
generally require the contractors to be self-sufficient (Young, 1998:7).  However, 
preparing to deploy and actually deploying to the battlefield is something that contractors 
cannot easily do alone.  Contractor’s actions need to be synchronized with their 
associated military units.  Fortner (2000) states, 
Contractors may impact force projection.  For example, if a weapon  
system requires contractor support, deploying the system will mandate 
near-simultaneous deployment of the contractor’s personnel and 
equipment.  This must be accommodated on the time-phased force 
deployment list (TPFDL) and personnel and equipment. 
 
The TPFDL prioritizes individuals and units that must be deployed to the battlefield.  If 
contractors cannot self-deploy, they are placed on the TPFDL.  “This can be difficult; 
many commanders are less than enthusiastic about putting civilian personnel and 
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equipment into the deployment flow ahead of soldiers and warfighting equipment” 
(Fortner, 2000).   
 Prior to deployment, like soldiers, contractors are required to complete a series of 
activities in preparation (Fortner, 2000).  These activities include such things as updating 
medical and dental records, physical exams, passports, next-of-kin information, 
completing theater-specific training, chemical warfare protective gear training, and 
acquiring identification tags and cards.  These pre-deployment activities are another set 
of important issues when constructing contractual language and negotiating the terms and 
conditions of the contract.  It is the DoD’s responsibility to assist and ensure that these 
contractors have met all of their pre-deployment obligations.  The contracting officer is 
the DoD’s primary point of contact for making sure that these obligations are met and for 
coordinating the efforts of various Armed Services, various DoD Agencies, and the 
contractor in this endeavor.  Croft (2001:24) states, “The contracting officer is the only 
government official with the authority to modify a contract.”  Finally, the contracting 
officer must properly capture the requirements and obligations of the contractor in the 
terms and conditions of the contract (e.g., in the Statement of Work).  Fortner (2000) 
urges, “This support should be specified in the terms and conditions of their contract.” 
Sustaining Contractors on the Battlefield.   Sustaining contractors on the 
battlefield is another important issue for commanders and contracting officers.  Garcia-
Perez (1999) states, “When planning for a military mission, commanders must now 
consider and anticipate the support requirements of contractor personnel.”  It takes time, 
money, and personnel to provide life support services to contractors on the battlefield.  
Fortner (2000) describes life support as such things as “. . . mail service, field services, 
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medical support, morale support, religious support, legal services, and mortuary affairs 
support.”  Contractor’s needs should be planned for and specified in the contract (Fortner, 
2000:6).  This life support is usually addressed in the contract’s Statement of Work, and 
these contractors should be afforded the same privileges as the military personnel in the 
specific area of operation.  In fact, these contractors on the battlefield “. . . normally 
obtain life support along with the soldiers in the unit” (Fortner, 2000:6).  Young (1998:8) 
concludes that “[r]egardless of contract type (fixed price or cost reimbursement) it is 
feasible and legal for the government to provide meals, lodging and medical care.”   
 Another issue that must be taken into consideration by both the commander and 
contracting officer is space—working and living facilities for the contractors on the 
battlefield.  “In an area where facilities are limited contractors may be competing with the 
military for facilities” (Young, 1998:8).  The contracting officer and commander are 
forced to make a strategic decision.  Fortner (2000) states,  
Contractors must have operating and living facilities.  One of the frequent 
problems associated with contractor living facilities is that the contractors 
compete with the Government for limited available resources, thereby 
driving up the costs.  Contracts must be written carefully to ensure that 
this does not happen.  In some cases, it may be necessary to write terms 
and conditions into the contract to house contractor personnel with 
supported military units.  In other cases, the Government may contract 
with host nation or local national providers for facilities and permit 
contractor personnel to use them at no cost.  
 
Distribution and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) are two other issues 
which are important to consider when using contractors on the battlefield.  Logistics is 
critical for waging and winning a war.  Any interruption in the distribution system may 
have catastrophic effects for the warfighters on the battlefield.  Fortner (2000) concludes 
that “[c]ontracts should be written to encourage maximum contractor use of commercial 
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distribution capabilities consistent with the military operation the contractor is 
supporting.  This minimizes the contractor’s impact on the distribution network.”  
Furthermore, if contractors are provided with GFE, they should rely less on reaching 
back to CONUS for supplies and potentially encumbering the distribution system.  
However, contracting officers must take into consideration the tradeoff between 
supplying contractors with equipment and having the contractors purchase their own 
equipment.  If contractors are required to purchase their own equipment, the Government 
is responsible for paying the contractor accordingly.  However, Fortner (2000) states that 
when GFE is provided to the contractor, “. . . contracting officers should ensure that the 
Government receives appropriate considerations and contract cost reductions.”   
Command and Control of Contractors on the Battlefield.   Another issue that 
commanders and contracting officers must be aware of when constructing the contract 
and working with contractors on the battlefield is command and control.  Commanders 
can only exercise indirect command and control with the contractor.  Wayne (2000) 
states, “In the battlefield, a commander cannot give orders to a contractor as he can a 
soldier . . . Their [the contractor’s] legal obligation is solely to an employment contract, 
not to their country.”  The contractor has direct supervisory authority over contractor 
personnel and is responsible for disciplining its work force (Garcia-Perez, 1999).   
Commanders can exercise indirect command and control by withdrawing the 
contractor’s facility access, revoking contractor’s employment status, and/or removing 
the contractor from the area of operation (Garcia-Perez, 1999).  Fortner (2000) states 
commanders can exercise indirect control over contractors on the battlefield “. . . through 
contract terms and conditions, assimilation of command directives into employer-
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employee agreements, and attachment of contractor personnel (with special reporting 
procedures) to specific military units.”  The contract’s terms and conditions and 
statement of work are legally binding and are the instruments most often used by DoD 
personnel to enforce command and control.  “Contractors are not subject to the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice” and “. . . can only be compelled to perform tasks that are listed 
in the statement of work of the contract they support” (Buhler, 2000:13).  McCullough 
and Pafford (2002:13) state,  
. . . [M]anagement of contracting activities is to be accomplished through 
the command’s contracting structure, including the CO and the CO’s 
Representative.  While reliance on the contracting structure to direct 
contractor activities is the standard approach used for all Government 
contracts, this approach may create unique concerns when it is used in the 
context of directing overseas support for combat or contingency 
operations.  These concerns may affect contract performance in a number 
of ways.  
 
Contracting officers and commanders alike must take into consideration 
command and control issues when acquiring the services of contractors on the battlefield.  
Thomas (2001) concludes that “[t]he government must be very meticulous in designing 
management controls and proprietary measures for contractors on the battlefield, 
especially when there are opportunities for mutual support and shared data.”  Again, the 
terms and conditions of the contract govern the contractor’s relationship with the 
government and “. . . the Commander must ‘manage’ contractor personnel through the 
contracting process” (Campbell, 2000:4).  These terms and conditions are extremely 
critical to the overall support that the contractor provides and to mission accomplishment.  
Gutierrez (2001:68) concludes that “[t]he end result could ultimately be a serious 
disintegration of the mission and in the most extreme cases result in loss of life.” 
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Contracting and Contractors on the Battlefield 
As the use of contractors on the battlefield has gained favor within the DoD, 
improvement of procurement practices becomes ever more critical.  The use of 
contractors on the battlefield must be thoroughly planned by contracting officers and 
commanders in order to maintain combat effectiveness and efficiencies.   
Writing Contracts for Contractors on the Battlefield.  Within the DoD 
acquisition community, there is no standardization of processes, methods, clauses, or 
contract formats when acquiring the services of contractors who perform their jobs on the 
forward edge of the battle area.  Hamontree (2002:64) states that one of the biggest issues 
when planning for the use of battlefield contractors “. . . boils down to a fundamental lack 
of understanding about contractor deployment, force protection, and support 
requirements.”   
McKenna (2002:9) states, “According to Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for 
Logistics Support of Joint Operations, ‘the warfighter’s link to the contractor is through 
the contracting officer’—not the commander.”  Thus, the role of the contracting officer is 
extremely important in wartime when negotiating and constructing a contract’s terms and 
conditions when acquiring the services of contractors on the battlefield.   
The bilateral contract is the vehicle used to solidify the business arrangement 
between the DoD and the contractor personnel.  It is critical that all issues be sufficiently 
addressed with regards to the contractor and his or her deployment to the battlefield.  Any 
thing that is ambiguously stated or left out of the contract’s terms and conditions is open 
to the interpretation by both parties.  Orsini and Bublitz (1999) state,  
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Therefore, a clear understanding must exist between the contractor and the 
Government to ensure that the contractor will be held accountable for 
service regardless of the threat level and that the contractor has adequately 
trained personnel available to meet all contingencies. 
 
The contracting officer is responsible for making sure that the DoD is acquiring exactly 
what it wants and for ensuring that the contractor understands specifically what is 
expected of them.  Contracting officers attempt to clarify the contract in order to reduce 
ambiguity and confusion and minimize extraneous costs that result from wasted and 
misdirected effort.  Hamontree (2002:64) states that in order to determine the continuity 
of contractor support on the battlefield, the DoD should ask these battlefield contractors 
this question, “What provisions are in your contract to deploy with my unit to combat, 
and how are you getting there?”  Again, the contract is the critical link between effective 
contractor support, costs, and, ultimately, combat effectiveness on the battlefield. 
Modifications to the Contract.  If mission requirements change, the contracting 
officer has to modify the contract and associated Statement of Work (SOW) to capture 
these changes; often, a cost is associated with such changes (Orsini and Bublitz 1999).  
McKenna (2002:12) concludes that modifications to the contract merely slowed the 
acquisition process and put the commander and warfighters at risk.  He suggests that 
contracting officers attempt to write contracts that are flexible and broad enough to 
capture any possible situation, thus, averting the need to write any modifications to the 
baseline contract.  McKenna (2002:12-13) states, 
To pause during wartime . . . to rewrite or renegotiate a contractor’s 
obligations would severely limit a commander’s ability to accomplish the 
mission.  Writing comprehensive contracts that take into account every 
possible combat situation will become extremely important, thus may 
eventually require every field commander to not only study operational art 
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but art of writing contracts, and contract law itself.  Anything less will 
place both the commander and his or her command at risk. 
 
However, this suggestion by McKenna is often difficult for the DoD acquisition 
community to execute during peacetime, let alone during a time of war.   
The contract vehicle and subsequent modifications are extremely important to the 
effective and efficient execution of work by contractors on the battlefield.  As previously 
mentioned, there is no standard process within DoD for acquiring such services, and the 
results are sub-optimal.  With regards to battlefield systems contractors for the Army, for 
example, Fortner (2000) states, “Coordinating and controlling their activities and 
executing changes to their contracts are significantly more complicated.  Currently, the 
Army does not have a good mechanism to resolve this issue.”  It appears that the Air 
Force does not have a good mechanism either. 
The Contract and Standards of Performance.  Contractor performance is 
critical to the success of our Armed Forces on the battlefield because “[c]ontractors 
accompany the military into war zones and even into battle—that is a foregone 
conclusion” (Castillo, 2000:26).  The acquisition decisions the government make and the 
contracts that contracting officers author, culminate into whether we succeed on the 
battlefield or not.  Foster (1998:29) states, “The way we succeed with these critical 
decisions can mean the difference in contractor support being a force multiplier or a 
detractor—decisions that could tip the scale in the favor of the enemy.”   
In order to hold contractors to definitive standards and performance, Friedman 
(2002:9-10) recommends using the cost reimbursement type contract.  Contracting 
officers can also use incentives and performance-based contracts to reward contractors 
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for excellent performance.  In the Balkans, the logistical support contractor Brown and 
Root was evaluated and subsequently rewarded for excellent performance in three areas: 
performance, cost controls and funds management, and coordination, flexibility and 
responsiveness (McKenna, 2002:18-19).  Aeronautical Systems Center’s Global Hawk 
UAV Program used an award fee contract for their contractors supporting Operation 
Enduring Freedom.  The Global Hawk Program Office rated the contractor on their cost 
control, responsiveness to the Air Force’s needs, and overall performance.  Friedman 
(2002:22) also recommends that acquisition regulations be amended to allow for longer 
contracts, and that contracting officers should monitor the contractor’s readiness, develop 
“. . . better Statements of Work and establish quality control measures such that low-cost 
is not the only, sole, or outweighing factor in awarding the contract.”  
Battlefield Clauses and Planning.  Negotiating and writing contracts for 
contractors on the battlefield is not a standardized process within DoD or specifically 
within the Air Force.  This type of contract is unique and requires special terms and 
conditions to deploy, protect, manage, and sustain contractors on the battlefield.  Young 
(1998:4) states “Contracts awarded during crises planning contain much higher risk 
factors than those which are carefully planned and developed prior to deployment.”  The 
contracting officer must be aware of the FAR clauses that apply to contingency and 
overseas environments so that all liabilities, support obligations, and legal implications 
are addressed upfront with the contractor, prior to them deploying to the battlefield.   
Schenck (2001:12) concludes that “As doctrine continues to evolve in such areas 
as accountability, management, and criminal jurisdiction, ad hoc systems will continue to 
be exercised.”  Through this literature review, it seems as if DoD and contracting 
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officer’s were taking an ad hoc approach to these battlefield contracts.  Policy appears to 
be lacking as does a detailed listing of standard clauses for these overseas, battlefield 
contracts while executing this literature review.  If the contracting squadron, “. . . one of 
the most critical support organizations on an Air Force base” (Floyd et al, 1999:9), does 
not have policy and/or standardized processes in place, it could lead to inefficiencies on 
the battlefield for the contractor and ultimately the warfighter.  In fact, Lloyd (1996:21) 
cites studies that concluded that the lack of a streamlined acquisition process was a major 
“. . . hindrance to effective support of wars or other contingency operations.”  This 
problem has existed for a long time. 
Harris (2000:13) recommends, “Peacetime preparation is vital to using contractors 
successfully.  Military senior leaders must begin to think of both systems and 
contingency contractors as part of the revolution in military affairs.”  This 
recommendation appears valid today, as there is no standardization of our acquisition 
processes for battlefield acquisition.  Senior leaders have not provided the acquisition 
profession with any all-encompassing, clarified guidance or policy to facilitate these 
battlefield contracts.  Almas et al (1992:24) state, “One thing a CO does not have in a 
contingency is time.”  These fixes should begin now, so that the next time a contingency 
comes up, the process would be more efficient and effective for the government, 
contractor, and warfighter, and “time” will not be a problem.  Finally, Nelson (2000:29) 
provides some additional recommendations, stating, “Along with improved training and 
education, a review of the existing laws and regulations and their applicability to the new 
strategic environment is required.” 
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Summary 
This chapter served as an overview of the literature on the topic of contractors on 
the battlefield.  In summary, the United States has used contractors on the battlefield 
since its birth and the trend in usage is increasing.  The roles of these battlefield 
contractors are expanding from providing merely logistical support to providing weapon 
system maintenance and technical support on the leading edge of the battlefield.  As the 
nature of warfare becomes more asymmetrical and the operational issues of using 
battlefield contractors increase in scope and complexity, acquiring the services of 
contractors on the battlefield becomes both more complex and ever more critical to the 
effective and efficient prosecution of war.  The contracting officer must be aware of the 
various issues involved with using contractors on the battlefield, and must construct a 
contract that is thorough, yet flexible in order to successfully communicate DoD’s 
expectations to the contractor.   
Building on this review of the literature, Chapter III will describe the 
methodology used to conduct this research.  It will address such issues as the overall case 
study approach as well as efforts to ensure both reliability and validity. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
 This chapter describes the research objectives and the research methodology that 
will be employed to reach those objectives.  First, Chapter III begins with a discussion of 
this study’s research objectives, and narrows this research paradigm from business 
research, to qualitative research, to case study research, and finally to multiple case study 
research.  Second, this chapter discusses case selection and the approval processes.  
Third, this chapter summarizes the data collection principles used in this research—
interviewing and transcription.  Fourth, this chapter then discusses subject matter experts, 
the protocol for recording information, data analysis, coding, pattern matching, and 
triangulation.  Fifth, this chapter discusses validity and reliability and the researcher’s 
efforts taken to maximize both.  Finally, Chapter III ends with a summary of the chapter 
and a brief look into Chapters IV and V.   
 
Research Objectives 
 
The primary objective of this research is to assess how the United States Air 
Force acquires the services of contractors on the battlefield and offer recommendations 
for enhancing the acquisition and warfighting experience.  This study includes an 
analysis of programmatic, contractual, and legal issues of battlefield contracts, examines 
methods used to acquire services of contractors on the battlefield, and identifies best 
practices and lessons learned from program offices using contractors on the battlefield to 
support, maintain, and/or operate United States Air Force weapon system platforms.  This 
research seeks to uncover patterns in how program offices successfully acquire, support, 
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and manage such contractors, ultimately resulting in quality support to the warfighter.  
Dr. Marvin R. Sambur, assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, states, “Only 
by transforming our acquisition process, we will be able to provide the warfighters with 
the expected capability in the expected amount of time and at the expected cost” (Bosker, 
2003).  If acquisition reform and DoD’s transformation is about supporting our 
warfighters, thinking in different ways, and streamlining processes and procedures, then 
identifying the best way to acquire such battlefield services will surely help the United 
States Air Force.  The results of this research and analysis will be synthesized into 
conclusions and recommendations for the acquisition and warfighting communities.  
 
Research Paradigm 
  
Cooper and Emory (1995:11) define business research “. . . as a systematic 
inquiry that provides information to guide business decisions.”  This specific business 
research will apply a qualitative approach, using case study analysis, content analysis, 
pattern theory, and triangulation to guide future USAF business decisions and processes 
regarding contractors on the battlefield.   
 
Qualitative Research  
 
 Qualitative research is much different than quantitative research and is 
appropriate for collecting open-ended data with the goal of discovering themes in the data 
(Cresswell, 2003:133); it is thus associated more with theory building (Leedy and 
Ormrod, 2001:102,147-148).  As discussed in Chapter 2, general research on the topic of 
contractors on the battlefield does exist.  However, this specific research focuses solely 
on the acquisition, management, and support of Air Force systems contractors on the 
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battlefield, and research in this specific area appears to be somewhat undeveloped.  The 
data gathered from this research will be used to build theory on this fairly unexplored 
topic, and the results will be synthesized into conclusions and recommendations for 
acquiring, supporting, and managing the services of contractors on the battlefield. 
 “Qualitative research uses multiple methods that are interactive and humanistic” 
and usually involves such things as “. . . open-ended observations, interviews, and 
documents” (Cresswell, 2003:181) and “. . . making an interpretation of the larger 
meaning of the data” (Cresswell, 2003:190).  The qualitative research method is the 
correct method for this investigation.  This qualitative research design enables Policy 
Experts from DoD, Defense Contractor companies, Army, and Air Force as well as 
various Program Offices to share their opinions, observations, lessons learned, and 
experiences with respect to acquiring, supporting, and managing contractors on the 
battlefield.  Leedy and Ormrod (2001:147) cite Cresswell (1998) and Lincoln and Guba 
(1998) and state, “. . . [T]here may be multiple perspectives held by different individuals, 
with each of these perspectives having equal validity, or truth.”   
 In addition, the qualitative approach allowed the researcher to capture rich data 
from various interviewees which could not have been captured by using a quantitative 
study.  Leedy and Ormrod (2001:102) stated, “Qualitative researchers seek a better 
understanding of complex situations.”  A qualitative study provided the ability to dig 
deeper where needed, exploit data as it became available, and develop themes (Leedy and 
Ormrod, 2001: 103).  Now, the question that must be answered is:  “What is the most 
appropriate qualitative research design for this investigation?” 
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Qualitative Research Design 
  
 Research designs link research questions to data collection and ultimately to the 
study’s conclusions (Yin, 1984:28).  There are a wide variation in qualitative research 
methods (Cresswell, 2003:186-187; Miles and Huberman, 2002; Patton, 2002).  The case 
study research design was the method chosen for this particular research. 
 
Qualitative Method Selected:  The Case Study 
 
The topic of contractors on the battlefield has been studied, but again, the research 
if fairly limited.  Qualitative case study research is appropriate for providing description, 
testing theory, or generating theory (Miles and Huberman, 2002:9), and answers “how” 
or “why” questions (Yin, 1984:13)  by exploring in depth a specific case or cases, 
whether they be a program, an event,  an activity, or a process (Cresswell, 2003:15).  
Flexibility is needed when studying this topic because of the topic’s “newness” to the 
academic arena.  Thus, case study research has been selected for the investigation 
because of its inherent flexibility.  Although qualitative case study research provides 
flexibility in the design and execution of the research, one must thoroughly plan the 
design so that the results will provide correct conclusions (Ellram, 1996:114).  
Case study research has been an important tool for business researchers in part 
because it draws conclusions from a variety of facts and pieces of information (Cooper 
and Emory, 1995:117).  This research is based on multiple case study groups including 
DoD Policy Experts, Contractor Policy Experts, Army Policy Experts, Air Force Policy 
Experts, and Air Force Program Offices that acquire and utilize the services of 
contractors on the battlefield to support their systems.  Each of these Policy Experts have 
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different experiences with the topic of contractors on the battlefield, and each of the 
Program Offices support different weapon systems and acquire the use of contractors on 
the battlefield in different ways, using different contractual vehicles, procedures, and 
protocols.  The case study design is able to “. . . accommodate these differences” in the 
data (McDonnell, Myfanwy, and Read, 2000:385). 
Cooper and Emory (1995:117) stated that the case study emphasizes detail that 
allows the researcher the ability to evaluate and strategize.  “This detail is secured from 
multiple sources of information.  It allows evidence to be verified and avoids missing 
data” (Cooper and Emory, 1995:116-117).  Patton (2002:447) stated, “Case analysis 
involves organizing the data by specific cases for in-depth study and comparison.”  This 
research uses multiple sources of information that allows for verification through a 
process called triangulation.  Triangulation will be discussed later on in this chapter. 
Despite its strengths, the single case study has one major weakness—its narrow 
focus that threatens generalizability (Patton, 2002:583).  Patton (2002:583) cited 
Cronbach (1975), and states that conclusions from case study research should be treated 
as “. . . hypotheses for future applicability and testing rather than definitive.”  To mitigate 
against this threat, a multiple case study design was selected for this research.   
 
Multiple Case Study Design 
  
This research uses the multiple case study design, otherwise known as 
comparative case method, integrating the findings of several independent case studies and 
executing cross-case comparisons to develop “underlying themes and other patterns” 
(Leedy and Ormrod, 2001:150; McDonnell, Myfanwy, and Read, 2000:385).  
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Generalizability is a significant concern for case study research (Leedy and Ormrod, 
2001:150); however, the use of multiple cases offers potentially greater generalizability 
than a study of a single case (Ellram, 1996:114).     
The cases for this research are groups of Policy Experts from a variety of different 
fields and services, and Program Offices supporting different weapon systems and 
acquiring contractors in different ways to provide battlefield support.  Comparative, 
qualitative case study analysis is the appropriate and valid research design for this 
research because the “. . . the purpose of this report was not to portray any single case, 
but to synthesize lessons from all cases, organized around key topics. . .” (McDonnell, 
Myfanwy, and Read, 2000:388).   
 The major disadvantage in multiple case study analysis is the time and money 
needed to conduct such research.  It takes a lot of time and money to identify 
interviewees, conduct the interview, transcribe the interview, and analyze the written 
results.  On the other hand, evidence shows that the many advantages of multiple case 
study analysis far outweigh its disadvantages.  “The richness of the data obtained through 
the adoption of multiple perspectives is without doubt the strength of this method” 
(McDonnell, Myfanwy, and Read, 2000:389).  The comparative case study analysis 
allows the researcher to “. . . reveal that happenings in one case are not wholly 
idiosyncratic, but that there are commonalities across cases once the researcher can get 
beyond the specific local contextual variations” (Ritchie, 2001 referencing Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  Yin (1984:48) also reports on the benefits of multiple case study 
analysis and states, “The evidence from multiple cases is often considered more 
compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust.”   
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 It has been determined that qualitative multiple case study design is appropriate 
for this research.  Now, the proper cases must be selected for the study. 
 
Case Selection 
 
 The first step in the process of case selection was to actually identify which Air 
Force Program Offices use or have used the services of contractors on the battlefield.  In 
order to do so, the researcher interviewed 53 Policy Experts throughout the DoD.  
Thomas (1997) referencing Patton (1990) states, “To find information-rich cases, Patton 
suggests simply asking the right questions of the right people.”  From these inquiries, 
several Air Force Program Offices were highlighted.  Next, a thorough literature review 
was also conducted to identify USAF programs that use contractors on the battlefield to 
support, maintain, and/or operate their weapon systems. 
After conducting research through a literature review and discussing the matter 
with several key acquisition personnel throughout DoD, a database was created.  This 
database identified seventeen Air Force Program Offices that used contractors on the 
battlefield and captured primary contact information.  13 Air Force program offices were 
selected by the researcher. 
Case selection is very important to a study’s relevance and generalizability across 
other cases.  Cooper and Emory (1995:201) stated, “The ultimate test of a sample design 
is how well it represents the characteristics of the population it purports to represent.”  
Ellram (1996:99) discussed case studies and stated that they have or should have             
“. . . boundaries of interest, such as an organization, a particular industry, or a particular 
type of operation.”  Darke, Shanks, and Broadbent (1998:281) state that “there is no ideal 
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number of cases” to study, and they referenced Eisenhardt (1989), who suggested 
studying between four and ten cases.  This multiple case study analyzes four different 
Policy Expert groups (comprised of 53 people total) and 13 Air Force program offices.  
By collecting data from 17 total groups, or cases, this study seeks to achieve some degree 
of generalizability. 
 The 53 Policy Experts were divided up as follows: 
• 4 DoD Policy Experts 
• 8 Contractor Policy Experts 
• 10 Army Policy Experts 
• 31 Air Force Policy Experts 
 
The program offices selected for analysis support different weapon systems, and 
each use the services of different defense contractors on the battlefield.  Each program 
office is somewhat unique in its physical location, methodological acquisition practices, 
personnel makeup, and locations on or near battlefields across the world.  Ellram 
(1996:102) stated, “Thus, multiple case design should be used to either predict similar 
results among replications, or to show contrasting results, but for predictable, explainable 
reasons.”  This exploratory research attempts to do this through cross-case comparison 
(Darke, Shanks, & Broadbent, 1998:281).   
The research design and case studies have been selected.  Next, approvals were 
sought in order to actually conduct the investigation. 
 
Survey and Protocol Approval 
Prior to conducting any research, measures were taken to protect interview 
subjects, execute an ethical investigation per USAF research standards, and review and 
approve the survey protocol and interview instrument.  The researcher received three 
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clearances for conducting this study—Air Force Personnel Center, the base union office, 
and the Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
These three survey and protocol reviews and approval processes acted as external 
validations by outside sources which determined that the research was proper in design 
and ethical in practice.  Cooper and Emory (1995:97) stated, “The goal of ethics in 
research is to ensure that no one is harmed or suffers adverse consequences from research 
activities.”  Also, all interviewees were told of the interview was by volunteer basis only 
and that they, and their program, would remain totally anonymous.  Now that the study 
and protocol was developed and approved, data collection could begin. 
 
Data Collection 
 
Now that the research design has been established and the cases have been 
selected and analyzed, the data must be collected.  Data was collected using semi-
structured interviews.  64 interviews were conducted over the phone, while two were 
conducted via e-mail correspondence.  Only one potential interviewee chose not to be 
interviewed.  Verbal informed consent was granted by the interviewees, and the 
interviews were taped and transcribed.  The interviews were sent to each interviewee for 
review and a follow-up informed consent document was provided as well.  All 
respondents were given complete anonymity. 
 
Interviewing 
 
Collecting data through interviewing is a fundamental source of information for 
case study research (Patton, 2002:340; Yin, 1984:19).  As previously mentioned, 
qualitative research must be flexible, and the semi-structured interview is a flexible data 
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gathering instrument.  Cooper and Emory (1995:271) state, “The greatest value lies in the 
depth and detail of the information that can be secured.” 
This research has executed semi-structured interviews to gather data.  There are 
many advantages and disadvantages of using interviews while conducting case study 
research.  Cresswell (2003:186) states that some advantages of interviewing are that it 
allows participants to provide historical data and allows the researcher to control the 
questioning.  Cresswell (2003:186) mentions that some disadvantages of interviews are 
that they provide a filtered view of the situation, the researcher’s presence may bias the 
response, and some people may not be able to properly articulate the situation.  Patton 
(2002:306) mentions some limitations of interviewing being “personal bias, anxiety, 
politics, and simple lack of awareness. . ..”   
There are advantages and disadvantages for conducting interviews to gather data, 
but according to Cooper and Emory (1995:270), “. . . if the interview is carried off 
successfully, it is an excellent data collection technique.”  Furthermore, each of the 
Policy Experts and Program Offices were involved in some way with the research area of 
contractors on the battlefield.  Darke, Shanks, and Broadbent (1998:) state, “If the 
research area is particularly relevant to an organization and the specific research question 
is one which the organization needs or wishes to address, then it is more likely that they 
will provide access to their people and resources.”  The interviewees understood their 
role, were excited about being interviewed, and appeared to be interested in the results of 
this analysis. 
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Mapping Investigative Questions to the Research Questions 
  
The execution of the interviews is divided into two distinct phases.  Phase I is the 
initial research provided by semi-structured interviews with Policy Experts from the 
DoD, Contractor, Army, and Air Force.  Phase II is the interviews with the 13 Program 
Offices.  The phases are outlined as follows: 
 Phase I – Policy Experts from DoD, Contractor, Army, and Air Force 
 
 Phase II – Air Force Program Offices that use battlefield systems contractors 
 
Prior to execution of the interviews, the Investigative Questions for each phase 
were developed and mapped directly to the six Research Questions.  RQ 1 (and IQ 1) was 
asked only of the Policy Experts, while the other 15 questions were asked of all 
interviewees. 
This mapping of the Investigative Questions to the Research Questions is as 
follows: 
Research Question 1 asked (Policy Experts Only) “What Air Force programs have used 
or are using contractors on the battlefield to support their weapon systems?”  This 
question was answered through the following investigative question. 
 
 IQ 1:  What programs, if any, are you aware of that use contractors on the 
battlefield? 
 
Research Question 2 asked (Policy Experts and Program Offices) “What support 
obligations do the government and the contractor have prior to deployment and during 
deployment?”  This question was answered through a series of investigative question. 
 
 IQ 2:  What support obligations do the USG and the contractor have prior to and 
during deployment? 
 IQ 3:  How has the AF handled these obligations in the past?  Please explain. 
 IQ 4:  What legal implications are present when hiring contractors on the 
battlefield? 
 IQ 5:  How have we addressed these legal implications in the past? 
 IQ 6:  What other recommendations do you have to address these implications? 
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Research Question 3 asked (Policy Experts and Program Offices) “What contractual 
language, clauses, supplements, and/or documentation are required to effectively 
structure contracts with defense contractors on the battlefield?  This Research Question 
was broken down into three separate, subsidiary questions, and answered by several 
investigative questions. 
 
 Subsidiary Question 3a asked “What attachments to the contracts have been 
used to provide support and training to defense contractors on the battlefield?”  
This question was answered through the following three investigative 
questions. 
 
 IQ 7-1:  From a contractual standpoint, please explain how 
standard FAR Clauses are used in a battlefield contract. 
 IQ 7-2:  From a contractual standpoint, please characterize the 
nature of these battlefield SOWs. 
 IQ 8:  What attachments to the contracts have been used to provide 
support and training to defense contractors on the battlefield? 
 
 Subsidiary Question 3b asked “How have past contracts been structured 
and/or negotiated to acquire the services of defense contractors on the 
battlefield?  This question was answered through the following two 
investigative questions. 
 
 IQ 9-1:  How have past contracts been structured to acquire the 
services of defense contractors on the battlefield? 
 IQ 9-2:  How have past contracts been negotiated to acquire the 
services of defense contractors on the battlefield? 
 
 Subsidiary Question 3c asked “What attachments to the contracts have been 
used to clarify defense contractors’ roles and responsibilities on the 
battlefield?”  This question was answered through the following investigative 
question. 
 
 IQ 10:  What attachments to the contracts have been used to 
clarify defense contractors’ roles and responsibilities on the 
battlefield?  In other words, who does/should the contractor report 
to in the field? 
 
Research Question 4 asked (Policy Experts and Program Offices) “What are the lessons 
learned from these programs using contractors on the battlefield?  This question was 
answered through a series of investigative questions. 
 
 IQ 11:  What are the lessons learned from these programs using contractors on 
the battlefield? 
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 IQ 12-1 and 12-2:  When drafting a battlefield contract, what contract type would 
be most suitable and why? 
 IQ  13:  If you could give the CO and PM any advice prior to acquiring the 
services of contractors on the battlefield, what would it be? 
 
Research Question 5 asked “Historically, how have these contracts performed from start 
to finish (cost, schedule, performance, and responsiveness)?”  This question was 
answered through the following investigative question. 
 
 IQ 14:  Historically, how have these contracts performed from start to finish 
(cost, schedule, performance, and responsiveness)? 
 
Research Question 6 asked “What are the acquisition “best practices” for acquiring and 
managing the services of systems contractors on the battlefield?”  This question was 
answered through a series of investigative questions. 
 
 IQ 15:  What are the acquisition “best practices” for acquiring and managing the 
services of systems contractors on the battlefield? 
 IQ  16:  Is there anything else you would like to add?      
 
 
Setting Boundaries for the Interviews 
There are potential hazards of conducting too many interviews and/or asking too 
many questions during the interviews, thus, costing too much money and/or taking too 
much time to transcribe.  The interviews asked open-ended questions based on both the 
respondent’s subjective and objective answers.  The open-ended nature of the interview 
has both its advantages and disadvantages—it provides a rich data source, but can also 
provide extraneous data that can otherwise be burdensome to the researcher.  In order to 
conduct an effective and efficient research investigation, it is imperative not only to select 
representative case studies, but also to select the right individuals within each case to 
interview.  This is a significant strength of qualitative research, which allows the 
researcher “. . . to purposefully select participants or sites (or documents or visual 
material) that will best help the researcher understand the problem and the research 
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question (Creswell, 2003:185).”  The individuals selected for interview were key 
acquisition Policy Experts and Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield to 
support and/or maintain their weapon systems.  
  
Who will be interviewed?  Subject Matter Experts 
 
As noted above, it is essential that the correct people are interviewed within each 
of the respective case studies.  Much like Hudgens (1997), this research studies Air Force 
acquisition processes utilizing case study research and subject matter experts (SME) for 
this multiple case study analysis.  Throughout this research, many SMEs in many 
organizations participated in the interviews and provided responses to the Investigative 
Questions.  The following is a general list of Government SME positions that were 
interviewed for this study: 
• System Program Office (SPO) Personnel 
o Contracting Officers, Program Managers, Logisticians  
• Staff Personnel 
o General Counsel, Command Legal Counsel, Center Legal Counsel, 
DCMA Commanders, Contracting Directors, Chiefs of 
Contracting, SAF/AQ, Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE) 
Directors and Members, Chiefs of Contracting, AFIT Instructors, 
AF JAG School Instructors, JCS J4 Staff, AFMC Staff, Army and 
Air Force Command Staff,  Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
• Deployed Acquisition Personnel 
o Baghdad and Northern Iraq 
 
Also, there were contractor personnel interviewed.  However, any mention of job 
positions would void the anonymity promised to these individuals. 
 
Protocol for Recording Information 
  
Prior to every interview, informed consent was provided by each interviewee, as 
each subject was informed about the research and its objectives and that the interview 
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would be taped and transcribed.  Also, anonymity was promised to each SME and 
Program Office.  Cooper and Emory (1995:99) state, “Securing informed consent from 
respondents is a matter of fully disclosing the procedures of the proposed survey or other 
research design before requesting permission to proceed with the study.”  Finally, during 
the interview, interviewees were asked to participate in the interview if they so choose.  
Leedy and Ormrod (2001:107), state, “Research participants should be told the nature of 
the study to be conducted and be given the choice of either participating or not 
participating” and “[a]ny participation in a study should be strictly voluntary.”  Once the 
interviews were conducted, they were transcribed by the researcher verbatim.   
 
Pilot Study 
 A pilot study was conducted after the first Policy Expert interview and after the 
first Program Office interview.  As previously mentioned, qualitative case study research 
design and data collection are flexible and must be able to adapt to changes or conditions 
in the field.  Yin (1984:74) states, “The pilot case study helps investigators to refine their 
data collection plans with respect to both the content of the data and the procedures to be 
followed.”  Cooper and Emory (1995:66) also bolsters the use of a pilot study and state 
that one is used “. . . to detect weaknesses in design and instrumentation.”  Cresswell 
(2003:181), in reference to qualitative studies, states, “The research questions may 
change and be refined as the inquirer learns what to ask and to whom it should be asked.”  
It should be noted that after both interviews were conducted, the data was transcribed 
right away.  The results of the pilot tests were that the data collection content and 
procedures seemed to work well, and nothing was changed for the other 64 interviews. 
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Data Analysis 
  
The qualitative narrative found in Chapters 4 and 5 resulting from this research 
will be an objective account across the multiple case studies.  This narrative will provide 
emerging patterns, conclusions, and recommendations.  Once the data was collected, it 
had to be analyzed. 
The data will be gathered, analyzed, and reported.  Cresswell (2003:181-182) 
referencing the work of Rossman and Rallis (1998), states that qualitative data analysis  
“. . . involve[s] active participation by participants” and the “. . . general pattern of 
understanding will emerge as it begins with initial codes, develops into broad themes, and 
coalesces into . . . broad interpretation.”  This case study research is exactly as Rossman 
and Rallis explained.  Cresswell (2003:191) also references Stake (1995) and Wolcott 
(1994), stating, “Case study . . . research  involve[s] a detailed description of the setting 
or individuals, followed by an analysis of the data for themes or issues.”  Again, this case 
study research closely mimics this assertion. 
After the interviews were conducted and transcribed, an analysis of the data was 
conducted.  Cresswell (2003) offers an excellent overview of how such research should 
be conducted, which also represents the research analysis per this investigation:   
Researchers seek to identify and describe patterns and themes from the 
perspective of the participant(s), then attempt to understand and explain 
these patterns and themes (Agar, 1980).  During data analysis the data will 
be organized categorically and chronologically, reviewed repeatedly, and 
continually coded.  A list of major ideas that surface will be chronicled (as 
suggested by Merriam, 1988).  Taped interviews and participant’s taped 
diary will be transcribed verbatim. (Cresswell, 2003:203). 
 
The information transcribed from the taped interviews will be analyzed using content 
analysis, coding, and pattern matching, of which each will be described in detail.   
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Content Analysis 
  
There was a large amount of textual data to sort through after the interviews were 
executed and transcribed.  The data analysis approach chosen for this research was 
content analysis.  Cooper and Emory (1995:385) state, “Content analysis measures the 
semantic content or the ‘what’ aspect of a message.  Its breadth makes it a flexible and 
wide-ranging tool that may be used as a methodology or as a problem-specific 
technique.”  Accordingly, the data was coded and consistent categories were established 
across cases for each specific investigative question.   
 Part of content analysis is coding or categorizing the data and then executing 
pattern matching and developing common themes (with frequency analysis counts) from 
the data for each case study, across the case studies, and for the accumulated responses of 
all cases.  Leedy and Ormrod (2001:150) state, “The data and their interpretations are 
scrutinized for underlying themes and other patterns that characterize the case more 
broadly than a single piece of information can.”  After pattern matching has been 
executed, “[a]n overall portrait of the case is constructed.  Conclusions are drawn that 
may have implications beyond the specific case that has been studied” (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2001:150).  However, before pattern matching can be conducted and conclusions and 
recommendations can be made, coding was executed. 
Coding 
  
Coding was used to categorize the large amount of data that was collected from 
the interviews.  Cresswell (2003:192) states that coding “. . . involves taking text data or 
pictures, segmenting sentences or images into categories, and labeling those categories 
with a term, often a term based in the actual language of the participant.”  Ellram 
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(1996:108) states, “Open coding . . . refers to methods used to breakdown case study data 
in order to analyze, conceptualize, and develop categories for data.”  Patton (2002:463) 
states, “This essentially means analyzing the core content of interviews . . . to determine 
what’s significant.”  Finally, Cooper and Emory (1995:381) state, “Coding helps the 
researcher to reduce several thousand replies to a few categories containing the critical 
information needed for analysis.”  With the huge amount of textual data gathered from 
this research, pattern matching could not be executed unless some type of coding was 
performed to group the data.  Much research (see, e.g., Cresswell, 2003; Patton, 2002) 
has been conducted on the execution of proper coding, and it is paramount in properly 
executing pattern matching and producing accurate, valid, and reliable results.   
 
Pattern Matching 
  
Cresswell (2003:133) defines pattern theories as generalizations that “. . . 
represent interconnected thoughts or parts linked to a whole.”  From this research, the 
interconnected thoughts are opinions, best practices, and lessons learned from the various 
case studies in answer to the specific investigative questions.  It is this researcher’s goal 
to interconnect the Policy Expert’s and Program Office’s opinions into conclusions and 
recommendations for acquiring the services of contractors on the battlefield.  Yin 
(1984:100) states that the ultimate goal of data analysis is “. . . to treat the evidence 
fairly” and to “. . . produce compelling analytic conclusions.”  Yin (1984:119) 
recommends “[playing] with the data.”  Ellram (1996:113) states, “Searching for patterns 
among case study data is a key strategy in providing explanation and validity of results.”  
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Pattern matching is a critical phase in the extrapolation and interpretation of the data 
gathered by all of the case studies. 
First, the categories were selected in the coding phase, and pattern matching was 
executed to categorize the data.  Second, pattern matching was used to make connections 
and assertions from the data across the case studies.  Cresswell (2003:194) states, 
“Sophisticated qualitative studies go beyond description and theme identification and into 
complex theme connections” and go “. . . across different cases.”  In this research, pattern 
matching was used to link information gained from the interviews from the multiple case 
studies to the Investigative Questions and ultimately the Research Questions.  After 
analyzing these associations, emerging themes, and prioritizing results, conclusions were 
drawn and recommendations were made, all which can be found in the following 
chapters. 
  
Triangulation 
 
After the data was coded and pattern matching was executed, the next step is data 
verification through a technique called triangulation.  Patton (2002:247) defines 
triangulation as “. . . using several kinds of methods or data” and/or employing “. . . 
multiple methods, measures, researchers, and perspectives.”  Miles and Huberman 
(2002:14) state, “[T]riangulation…provides stronger substantiation of constructs and 
hypotheses.”  Triangulation was used in this research to neutralize researcher bias and 
misinterpretation of data. 
Triangulation is a powerful research tool to ensure quality results from one’s 
research.  Leedy and Ormrod (2001:105) report, “Multiple sources of data are collected 
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with the hope that they all converge to support a particular hypothesis or theory.”  The 
research design of this particular study uses interview data from a variety of sources 
including DoD Policy Experts, Contractor Policy Experts, Army Policy Experts, Air 
Force Policy Experts, and Air Force Program Offices.  The data gathered seems to be 
inherently triangulated not only due to the number of responses, but also due to the vast 
array of responses from different case study groups.  The use of a multiple case study 
methodology is a form of triangulation and McDonnell, Jones, and Read (2000:387) 
confirm this and conclude that “Using the accounts of different participants draws upon 
multiple perspectives – this is an important feature of the case studies and can be seen as 
a form of triangulation.” 
Finally, triangulation was used in developing themes.  First, the researcher 
developed themes manually.  Second, another individual developed themes as a pilot test 
for the first investigative question.  This pilot test displayed that the themes presented by 
the researcher were accurate for the transcribed data.  
 
The Researcher’s Role – Bias, Validity, and Reliability 
  
 Cresswell (2003:184) states that the role of the qualitative researcher as the data 
gathering instrument “introduces a range of strategic, ethical, and personal issues. . ..”  
The researcher has worked in the acquisition career field for approximately eight years 
and brings certain personal biases to the research due to experiences in the field.  
However, precautions were taken to eliminate potential biases by the researcher into the 
research process.  Triangulation and the use of outside sources to independently review 
the data, conclusions, and recommendations put forth from this research were critical in 
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alleviating any researcher bias.  Also, data was transcribed verbatim from the Policy 
Expert and Program Office interviews.  All transcribed data was analyzed through 
content analysis and pattern matching, and themes emerged from the entire data set.  
Now that the researcher’s role has been addressed, validity and reliability have to be 
addressed from a much broader and more in-depth perspective. 
 
Validity and Reliability 
 
Validity and reliability are critical to conducting research that produces quality 
results.   
Validity.  Validity is a strength of qualitative research, and as Cresswell 
(2003:195-196) verifies, “. . . is used to suggest determining whether the findings are 
accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, the participant, or the readers of an 
account.”  There are three different types of validity that will be addressed in this 
research—external validity, internal validity, and construct validity.   
External Validity and Transferability.  The first type of validity that is 
addressed in this research is external validity, or transferability.  Cooper and Emory 
(1995:149) state, “The external validity of research findings refers to their ability to be 
generalized across persons, settings, and times.”  Transferability is the term used for more 
naturalistic studies, such as this one, and it asks the question, “[A]re there similarities 
between the original study and its context and any other settings where this conclusion is 
possible?” (Isaac and Michael, 1997).  External validity and transferability are important 
to establish because it allows the researcher to go the next step—to draw conclusions and 
make recommendations for the various Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on 
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the battlefield.  Leedy and Ormrod (2001:105) report, “The external validity of a research 
study is the extent to which its results apply to situations beyond the study itself—in 
other words, the extent to which the conclusions drawn can be generalized to other 
contexts.”  They go on to say that conducting research in a real life setting and the use of 
a representative example are techniques in which a researcher can employ to “enhance 
the external validity of a research project” (Leedy & Ormrod, 1985:105-106).  This 
research was conducted in a real-life setting and the sample of Policy Experts and 
Program Offices was a truly representative sample.   
Internal Validity and Credibility.  Internal validity and credibility are the 
second type of validity that is addressed.  Internal validity is “. . . the ability of a research 
instrument to measure what it is purported to measure” (Cooper and Emory, 1995:149).  
Leedy and Ormrod (2001:103-104) define internal validity as “. . . the extent to which its 
design and the data that it yields allow the researcher to draw accurate conclusions about 
cause-and-effect and other relationships within the data.”  Credibility is the criteria used 
in naturalistic studies and asks the question, “Will the methodology and its conduct 
produce findings that are believable and convincing?” (Isaac and Michael, 1997).  The 
pilot studies conducted was a check on the internal validity of the interview instrument 
with respect to the six overall Research Questions. 
Construct Validity.  The third type of validity that is addressed is 
construct validity.  Yin (1984:36) references (Kidder, 1981) and defines construct 
validity as “establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied.”  
Ellram (1996:105-106) also states that using “multiple data sources,” establishing a 
logical flow and “chain of evidence,” and having “key informants review the overall case 
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study” is important to increase research construct validity.  All three of these 
recommendations have been included in the research design and will be addressed later in 
this chapter. 
Reliability and Dependability.  The final aspect of this research that must be 
addressed is reliability which “. . . is a contributor to validity and is necessary but not 
sufficient condition for validity” (Cooper and Emory, 1995:153).  Yin (1984:36) defines 
reliability as “. . . demonstrating that the operations of a study . . . can be repeated, with 
the same results.”  Dependability is the criteria used in naturalist studies and asks the 
question, “. . . if it were done over again, would one arrive at essentially the same 
findings and conclusions?” (Isaac and Michael, 1997).  The methodology section of this 
research is detailed and documented in a way so that the process can be repeated.  This 
action ensures reliability and dependability.   
Furthermore, many other steps were taken within this research in order to protect 
the reliability and dependability of its results.  Ellram (1996:104) states that the two keys 
of reliability for a qualitative case study are the use of a case study protocol and the 
development of a database.  This study adopted both techniques.  Cooper and Emory 
(1995:155) report, “One can improve reliability if external sources of variation are 
minimized and the conditions under which the measurement occurs are standardized.”  
As previously mentioned, three reviews were executed prior to conducting the research.  
The protocol for this case study was approved by various organizations at Wright-
Patterson AFB, Ohio.  Also, the case study protocol did not change, remaining constant 
for the execution of all 66 interviews and subsequent data analysis.  Also, several 
databases were created using Microsoft Excel ®, in order to conduct content analysis, 
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pattern matching, and frequency counts.  The development of consistent patterns and 
emerging themes for each Investigative Question, is, in itself, a form of reliability and 
dependability check.  Chapter IV will discuss the themes that emerged from this research, 
while Chapter V discusses conclusions and recommendations.   
Strategies to Determine Validity/Reliability.  Now that validity and reliability 
have been defined and strategies have been outlined, it is time to discuss more in depth 
the plan that was utilized in this research.  Trustworthiness is what this researcher sought 
to achieve in the extrapolation and analysis of the data and in the culmination of this 
research into conclusions and recommendations. 
The first step that was taken in this research to assure reliability and validity was 
conducting multiple case studies at once.  Kervin (1992:) states, “The validity of 
statistical conclusions is generally greater with a larger number of cases, and in particular 
small number of cases or observations can provide only very tentative conclusions.”  
Triangulation was another technique used to assure reliability and validity.  Cresswell 
(2003:196) states, “Triangulate different data sources of information by examining 
evidence from the sources and using it to build a coherent justification for themes.”  Data 
was collected through multiple interviews across several DoD organizations and Air 
Force Program Offices.   
Next, member-checking was executed to assure reliability and validity of the 
research.  Cresswell (2003:196) reports, “Use member-checking to determine the 
accuracy of the qualitative findings through taking the final report or specific descriptions 
or themes back to participants and determining whether these participants feel that they 
are accurate.”  First, the interviewees received the opportunity to review the transcript 
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from the respective interview and provide feedback.  Second, the data and its subsequent 
analysis was member-checked using two officers with PhDs, and one doctoral student on 
the Air Force Institute of Technology’s teaching staff.   
Next, the interviews were transcribed verbatim and all of the data that was 
collected and analyzed was presented in this research—even data that did not fall into a 
category or went against the findings.  Cresswell (2003:196) states, “Also present 
negative or discrepant information that runs counter to the themes,” as this adds 
credibility to the research.  Finally, after the pilot test was conducted, the interview 
questions were standardized, meaning each of the interviewees was asked the same 
questions.  Patton (2002:353) states that this standardization of questions is mandatory 
because “How a question is worded and asked affects how the interviewee responds.” 
There was a massive effort made in this research to build validity and reliability 
much like the research conducted by Knipper (2003).  He states, “It is the goal of my 
research to build a bridge from each validity type.  The effect is cumulative.  Attempts 
are made to minimize validity threats in sequence.” 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Study 
 
After analyzing the data and developing themes across all of the case studies, 
conclusions were drawn and recommendations were made.  This research not only 
attempts to draw conclusions and present its results, but to formulate those results into 
recommendations that can be used by USAF program offices that use contractors on the 
battlefield.  The recommendations put forth can help program offices that are already 
using contractors on the battlefield and also can help program offices that are 
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contemplating using contractors on the battlefield.  Cresswell (2003:194) states, “A final 
step in data analysis involves making an interpretation or meaning of the data.”  This is 
exactly the intent of the recommendations for acquiring, sustaining, and managing 
contractors on the battlefield, as presented in Chapter V.   
 
Summary of Selected Approach 
  
Ellram (1996:102) states, “Multiple cases…represent replications that allow for 
development of rich, theoretical framework.”  This qualitative multiple case study 
research will attempt to do create theory by drawing conclusions on the current state of 
battlefield acquisition and by providing recommendations using insights gained from the 
multiple interviews and emerging themes stemming from those interviews.  Furthermore, 
using the techniques of coding, content analysis, pattern matching, and triangulation, this 
researcher’s findings will prove to be valid and reliable.    
 The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter IV presents the 
analysis of the data gained from the interviews, and Chapter V draws conclusions, makes 
recommendations, summarizes limitations of the study, and recommends areas for future 
research. 
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IV.  Case Study Results and Analysis 
 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter IV analyzes the fifteen investigative questions (IQ) asked of all Subject 
Matter Experts (SME) case study groups including DoD Policy Experts, Contractor 
Policy Experts, Army Policy Experts, Air Force Policy Experts, and Program Offices.  
Also, this Chapter analyzes one additional question asked of the Policy Experts (IQ 1) 
and two additional questions asked of the different program offices (IQ 17 and IQ 18)..  
The results of the Policy Experts are first examined independently, case by case, for 
patterns and themes, and then the case studies are merged to produce an overall result for 
that specific Investigative Question.  Next, the results from the Policy Experts are 
compared with the patterns that emerged from the Program Offices that use contractors 
on the battlefield to support their weapon systems.  For each Investigative Question, the 
results of pattern matching and frequency analysis and a discussion of the analysis and 
themes that emerged from the data are presented.  Specific examples from the interviews 
are provided as supporting rationale.  Further discussion, conclusions, and 
recommendations are presented in Chapter V. 
A total of 66 interviews were conducted for this thesis.  64 were conducted over 
the telephone, while two were conducted via e-mail.  The break-out for the interviews is 
as follows: 
 4 DoD Policy Expert Interviews:    SMEs #1 - #4 
 8 Contractor Policy Expert Interviews:   SMEs #5 - #12 
 10 Army Policy Expert Interviews:  SMEs #13 - #22 
 31 Air Force Policy Expert Interviews:  SMEs #23 - #53 
 13 Air Force Program Office Interviews:  POs #1 - #13 
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Case Study Results 
 
IQ 1. (Policy Experts Only)  What programs, if any, are you aware of 
that use contractors on the battlefield? 
   
Results – All Policy Experts.   
 
 
Table 1.  Frequency Analysis for Programs that use COB (IQ 1). 
 
All Policy Experts – Programs that use COB  
Frequency Program Name % 
16 Global Hawk 30% 
15 LOGCAP 28% 
13 Predator 25% 
11 AFCAP 21% 
9 JSTARS 17% 
8 N/A 15% 
6 U-2 11% 
6 Communications 11% 
5 Stryker 9% 
4 CONCAP 8% 
4 Fox  Vehicle 8% 
4 Patriot 8% 
4 Apache 8% 
2 Coalition Provisional Authority 4% 
2 Intelligence Gathering Programs 4% 
2 USAID 4% 
2 4th ID 4% 
2 Tank Units 4% 
2 F-117 4% 
2 F-22 4% 
2 C-130 Commando Solo 4% 
2 C-130 Gunship 4% 
1 C-21 2% 
1 Air Operations Center  2% 
1 DCGS 2% 
1 AWACS 2% 
1 RIO - Restore Iraqi Oil 2% 
1 RIE - Restore Iraqi Electricity 2% 
1 A/C Sub-systems 2% 
1 F-16 2% 
1 RC-135 2% 
1 C-130 Compass Call 2% 
1 B-2 2% 
1 Combat Scent 2% 
1 FPAS 2% 
 
 63
The answers to this question provided direction to the researcher for the selection 
of appropriate Air Force Program offices for further analysis.  Coding was executed, 
based primarily on program office name, weapon system platform, and/or service to be 
provided.  The answers from all four groups were analyzed, coded, grouped, and counted, 
as presented in Table 1.  Forty weapon system platforms and/or services were highlighted 
by the Policy Experts.  For this question, the main objective was to highlight as many 
different program offices that use contractors on the battlefield, however, a frequency 
count was also executed.  The question was open-ended and did not restrict the Policy 
Experts from providing information on any known program, whether it was system 
contractors on the battlefield or logistics support contractors on the battlefield.  Again, 
the answers provided a good baseline from which the researcher could select appropriate 
cases to study. 
  Global Hawk, LOGCAP, Predator, AFCAP, and JSTARS were the programs 
that were identified the most times by the Policy Experts as having used contractors on 
the battlefield to support, maintain, and/or manage weapon systems or provide services.  
However, there were sixteen programs highlighted by only one person.  The diverse 
answers that were provided for this Investigative Question highlight several critical 
findings.   
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  First, the use of contractors on the 
battlefield is used by a diverse group of program offices, across the services, providing 
different support, on various weapon systems with different missions, and in various 
stages of their acquisition life cycle. 
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Several Policy Experts commented on the long list of programs that use 
contractors on the battlefield.  SME #7, a Contractor Policy Expert, stated, “Virtually 
every program where the military is providing support overseas is using contractors on 
the battlefield from Iraq to Afghanistan to Kuwait,” while SME #17, an Army Policy 
Expert, stated, “Practically any weapon system now-a-days [is supported by contractors 
on the battlefield].”  SME #19, an Army Policy Expert, stated that he traveled throughout 
Iraq, gathering data on over 150 different contractors working in the AOR for 
accountability purposes and SME #20, another Army Policy Expert, stated, “There are 
numerous, dozens and dozens, of them” (SME #20, Army Interview, 2004).  SME #22, 
an Army Policy Expert, stated, “It is a much shorter list to say what systems on the 
battlefield don’t use some sort of contractor support.”   
Also, as previously mentioned, these contractors provide various types of service 
for DoD.  Several Policy Experts commented on this as well.  SME #27, an Air Force 
Policy Expert, stated, “You have got the whole range of things.  You’ve got your system 
contractors, you’ve got the theater contractors, and of course you have the local 
contractors.”  Another Air Force Policy Expert, SME #32, stated, “I think that across the 
board, the Air Force relies on contractors for a lot of the traditional maintenance kinds of 
activities.”   
Second, the frequency count highlights the fact that there are some programs that 
are well known for using contractors on the battlefield, while there are some programs 
that are not well known for using this external, commercial support.  The Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) working in Iraq right now is not well known across the 
DoD.  In fact, some individuals might not even recognize the CPA or know about its 
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mission.  This was highlighted by the fact that out of 53 Policy Experts, only two of them 
marked the CPA as using contractors on the battlefield, while SME #1, a DoD Policy 
Expert, stated, “I would tell you that CPA is probably using more contractors [on the 
battlefield] than everybody else that I have ever seen.”     
Again, the use of contractors on the battlefield is vast.  However, the data shows 
that knowledge in this area with respect to specific programs is somewhat 
compartmentalized.  SME #2, a DoD Policy Expert, stated, “You hear these things 
discussed in meetings . . . but I have never actually looked at the contract.”  Some 
individuals had very little knowledge of what programs actually used the support of 
contractors on the battlefield.  SME #45, an Air Force Policy Expert, stated, “I am not 
aware of too many . . . I am not really all that familiar with all the programs here.” 
IQ 2. What support obligations do the USG and the contractor have 
prior to and during deployment? 
   
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are captured in Table 2. 
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Table 2.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #2 
IQ 2.   DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Support Obligations % 
2 Individual Equipment Issue 50% 
2 Medical Issues/Support/Exams 50% 
2 Force Protection 50% 
2 Issue Firearm 50% 
1 Conus Replacement Center  25% 
1 Pay 25% 
1 Wills/Next of Kin 25% 
1 9mm Training 25% 
1 Shots 25% 
1 In-Country Briefing 25% 
1 Contractor Provided 25% 
1 Postal Services 25% 
1 Mortuary Affairs 25% 
1 Cell Phones 25% 
1 Vehicles 25% 
1 Housing 25% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  There are many types of pre-
deployment and sustainment support that the United States Government provides to 
contractors who are supporting DoD weapon systems on the battlefield.  Individual 
Equipment Issue (IEU), Medical Issues and Support, Firearm Issue, and Force 
Protection were the highest coded support obligations by the DoD Policy Experts.  SME 
#1 discussed his personal experience through a CONUS Replacement Center (CRC), 
which is where many contractors process through prior to deploying overseas.  The CRC 
is essentially a deployment line where contractors are taken “. . . through individual 
equipment issue, all of the medical issues” and “. . . any of the required training” (SME 
#1, DoD Interview, 2004).  The issuing of firearms is an issue that is discussed later in 
this report, but DoD Policy Experts addressed this support obligation in their answers 
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several times.  SME #3 stated that “there are a lot of rules surrounding that one,” and 
SME #4 stated that this was a “fuzzy area.”  
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are captured in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #2 
IQ 2. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Support Obligations % 
3 
Conus Replacement Center 
(CRC) 38% 
3 Shots 38% 
3 ID Cards 38% 
2 Medical Issues/Support/Exams 25% 
2 Housing 25% 
2 Food 25% 
2 Chem Gear Training 25% 
2 Travel Orders/Transportation 25% 
1 Individual Equipment Issue 13% 
1 Wills/Next of kin 13% 
1 In-Country Briefing 13% 
1 Contractor Provided 13% 
1 Force Protection 13% 
1 BX 13% 
1 Chem Gear 13% 
1 Letters of Introduction 13% 
1 Badge Requirements 13% 
1 N/A 13% 
0 Pay 0% 
0 9mm Training 0% 
0 Issue Firearm 0% 
0 Postal Services 0% 
0 Mortuary Affairs 0% 
0 Cell Phones 0% 
0 Vehicles 0% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The codes from the previous case 
study group remain, while new codes are listed as needed.  This trend continues 
throughout the report because it makes it easier to compare and contrast amongst the 
various case study groups.  For instance, Pay was a coding used in the DoD Case Study.  
Pay was used again for the Contractor Policy Expert case study even though this support 
obligation was not highlighted by this group.   
The CRC, Shots, and ID Cards were the highest frequency support obligations for 
the Contractor Policy Expert case study group.  This group highlighted several more 
support obligations than the previous DoD group.  The CRC was mentioned by several 
individuals as an important support obligation.  SME #7 stated that the contractors cycle 
through the CRCs, and it has worked “fairly well”, but not all contractors get this 
opportunity.   
Also, a common theme among the Contractor Policy Expert’s answers was that 
support obligations are different, on different tasks within the same program, and from 
program to program.  SME #12 stated that the support “. . . varies tremendously based on 
the task order. . . In some cases, we need virtually no support at all.”  While SME #5 
stated that the government provides the same support to the contractors as they do to 
government personnel, others stated that the government provided limited support to the 
contractors.  In fact, SME #10 stated, “If it happens to be something that we need that is 
solely provided by the government, then they provide . . . if not, then generally they’ll 
have us come up with it, and we’ll bill them for it.”   
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Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question as 
well, and the results are captured in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #2 
IQ 2. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Support Obligations % 
5 Medical Issues/Support/Exams 50% 
4 Individual Equipment Issue (uniforms & misc gear) 40% 
3 Shots 30% 
3 Contractor Provided 30% 
3 Chem Gear 30% 
2 Force Protection 20% 
2 Housing 20% 
2 Food 20% 
1 Conus Replacement Center  10% 
1 9mm Training 10% 
1 In-Country Briefing/Cultural 10% 
1 Issue Firearm 10% 
1 Chem Gear Training 10% 
1 Travel Orders/Transportation 10% 
1 Family Care 10% 
1 Int'l Law and SOFA Awareness 10% 
0 Pay 0% 
0 Wills/Next of kin 0% 
0 Postal Services 0% 
0 Mortuary Affairs 0% 
0 Cell Phones 0% 
0 Vehicles 0% 
0 BX 0% 
0 ID Cards 0% 
0 Letters of Introduction 0% 
0 Badge Requirements 0% 
0 N/A 0% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Medical Issues, IEU, Shots, and 
Chemical Warfare Protective Gear were among the most highly reported support 
obligations by the Army Policy Experts.   
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Also, a common theme among the Army Policy Expert’s answers was that 
support obligations differ quite a bit.  SME #15 stated that these support obligations vary 
“by contract and by where the support is being provided,” be it an exercise, an operation 
in a hostile environment, or for peace enforcement.  SME #16 and SME #17 also stated 
that the range of support varies and “. . . depends on the SOW and government interest”, 
as well as the contract and specific weapon system.  SME #22 stated that the specifics of 
this support would have to be written into the terms of the contract, and that “[y]ou are 
going to find that there are more questions than answers.”   
The question produced very different opinions on the type and quantity of support 
that the government has provided or should be providing to the contractors on the 
battlefield.  SME #13 stated that the military should provide military unique support to 
the contractors such as military gas masks, which provide adequate protection unlike the 
gas masks “available on the commercial market.”  However, other Army Policy Experts 
believed that we should provide all support to the contractors.  SME #14 stated that 
contractors are provided with “whatever is necessary for them to deploy.”  SME #20 
stated that the contractors are “. . . pretty much treated as if they were a soldier in the 
preparation of deployment.”  On the other extreme, some Army Policy Experts stated that 
the contractor was fully responsible for this support.  SME #18 went as far as saying, “I 
don’t think we have an obligation from a government perspective.  I believe the 
obligation is on the contractor.”  SME #21 agreed with SME #18 and stated, “the 
contractor is responsible for meeting preparation for deployment requirements and they 
self-deploy.”  There definitely were more questions than answers.    
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Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are captured in Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #2 
IQ 2. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Support Obligations % 
12 Contract will spell out obligations 39% 
9 Medical Issues/Support/Exams 29% 
9 Shots 29% 
9 Housing 29% 
8 Food 26% 
7 Individual Equipment Issue (uniforms & misc gear) 23% 
7 Chem Gear 23% 
6 Force Protection 19% 
5 ID Cards 16% 
4 Chem Gear Training 13% 
3 N/A 10% 
3 Dental Care 10% 
2 Pay Incentives 6% 
2 Postal Services 6% 
2 Travel Orders/Transportation 6% 
2 Secure Work Area 6% 
2 Insurance 6% 
1 9mm Training 3% 
1 In-Country Briefing/Cultural 3% 
1 Issue Firearm 3% 
1 Cell Phones 3% 
1 BX 3% 
1 Badge Requirements/Access 3% 
1 Self Aid Buddy Care Training 3% 
1 Admin Supplies - Desk, Computer, etc. 3% 
1 Legal Advice 3% 
0 Conus Replacement Center  0% 
0 Wills/Next of kin 0% 
0 Contractor Provided 0% 
0 Mortuary Affairs 0% 
0 Vehicles 0% 
0 Letters of Introduction 0% 
0 Family Care 0% 
0 Int'l Law and SOFA Awareness 0% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  A Well Written Contract, Medical 
Issues, Shots, Housing, Food, and Chemical Warfare Protective Gear were among the 
highest reported support obligations by the Air Force Policy Experts.   
Confusion on the issue of support obligations was also a theme among Air 
Force Policy Experts.  SME #24 stated, “We don’t have this thing figured out,” and SME 
#39 stated, “This has been a problem.”  SME #27 stated, “There is a lot of confusion right 
now on what is the nature of the support we have to give them. . ..”  SME #31 stated that 
there is DoD guidance that gives a “real rough perspective of the obligations that the 
government has.”  SME #36 stated, “A lot of times, operational bases in wartime don’t 
know exactly what to do with contractors.”  SME #37 stated that these support 
“obligations” have sparked “an ongoing debate”, and SME #38 stated, “. . . we are 
struggling in the command right now on what type of support we should give.”   
Just as it did in the other case study groups, this question produced very different 
opinions on the type and quantity of support that the government has provided or should 
be providing to the contractors on the battlefield.  SME #24, SME #33 and SME #41 
stated that the government is supposed to support the contractor just as it would a GI.  
However, several Air Force Policy Experts had quite a different opinion on the subject.   
SME #44 stated, “I think the contractor has to provide as much as possible.”  Others went 
even further and stated that the government has no obligation to support the contractor.  
SME #32 stated, “The short answer is that we don’t have any requirements to support 
them before they come in,” SME #46 stated that “[t]he only obligation that we have is not 
to hinder their performance,” and SME #50 stated that “obligations is the tricky word 
here.”   
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 There is another pattern that has emerged as well that may help Contracting 
Officers deal with this apparent lack of guidance.  Several of the Air Force Policy Experts 
stated that support obligations are contract specific and should be clearly identified in the 
contract.  SME #51 stated, “It would probably be contract specific,” SME #48 stated, “I 
think generally we write all of the conditions and terms into the contract,” and SME #47 
stated, “The contract will spell out each party’s responsibilities.”  Many other Air Force 
Policy Experts agreed that the contract must define the level of support that the 
government is responsible for providing to the contractor prior to their deployment and 
during their stay in the area of operation.  The government should “. . . spell it out as 
specifically as we can up-front in the contract” (SME #34, Air Force Interview, 2004), 
and one of the most important things we can do is “give clear direction to the contractor” 
(SME #28, Air Force Interview, 2004).   
Bottom line, DoD must support the warfighter.   DoD must support the contractor 
in the field that is supporting the warfighter and DoD’s weapon systems.  SME #42 said 
it best when he stated, “I think everything needs to be examined in light of how we best 
support the mission.” 
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are captured 
in Table 6. 
 
 
 
 74
Table 6.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #2 
Times 
Reported Support Obligations % 
8 Contract will spell out obligations 62% 
6 Shots 46% 
5 Chem Gear Training 38% 
4 Medical Issues/Support/Exams 31% 
3 Housing 23% 
3 Passports 23% 
2 Individual Equipment Issue (uniforms & misc gear) 15% 
2 Chem Gear 15% 
2 ID Cards 15% 
2 Dental Care 15% 
2 Don't Get involved/Handled Elsewhere 15% 
1 N/A 8% 
1 9mm Training 8% 
1 BX 8% 
1 Secure Work Area 8% 
1 Insurance 8% 
1 Letters of Introduction 8% 
1 Family Care 8% 
1 Int'l Law and SOFA Awareness 8% 
1 Admin Supplies - Desk, Computer, etc. 8% 
1 Schools 8% 
0 Food 0% 
0 Force Protection 0% 
0 Conus Replacement Center  0% 
0 Contractor Provided 0% 
0 Travel Orders/Transportation 0% 
0 In-Country Briefing/Cultural 0% 
0 Issue Firearm 0% 
0 Pay Incentives 0% 
0 Postal Services 0% 
0 Wills/Next of kin 0% 
0 Cell Phones 0% 
0 Badge Requirements/Access 0% 
0 Mortuary Affairs 0% 
0 Vehicles 0% 
0 Self Aid Buddy Care Training 0% 
0 Legal Advice 0% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The contract will spell out the 
obligations, shots, and chemical warfare protective gear were among the highest rated 
codes for support obligations from the Program Offices (PO).   
Although there did not seem to be as much confusion from the program offices on 
what types of support the government should provide to the contractor, confusion on 
where to address that support was still present.  This question produced very different 
opinions on where this support should be addressed in the contract.  There were several 
different areas within the contract where these program offices captured these support 
obligations.  PO #12 uses a Special H Clause to define the support, while PO #11 used 
their Statement of Work.  Other program offices used Ops Tempo Documents, Letters of 
Introduction, Procuring Contracting Officer Letters, or simply didn’t address the support 
obligations.  PO #3 stated, “We do not specify this in our contract.” 
Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 7 is a side by side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards IQ #2, the 
government’s support obligations to contractors on the battlefield. 
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Table 7.  IQ #2 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts     Total for All Program Offices   
F Support Obligations %  F Support Obligations % 
18 Medical Issues/Support/Exams 34%   8 Contract will spell out obligations 62% 
16 Shots 30%   6 Shots 46% 
14 Individual Equipment Issue  26%   5 Chem Gear Training 38% 
14 Housing 26%   4 Medical Issues/Support/Exams 31% 
12 Food 23%   3 Housing 23% 
12 Contract will spell out obligations 23%   3 Passports 23% 
11 Force Protection 21%   2 Individual Equipment Issue  15% 
11 Chem Gear 21%   2 Chem Gear 15% 
8 ID Cards 15%   2 ID Cards 15% 
7 Chem Gear Training 13%   2 Dental Care 15% 
5 Conus Replacement Center  9%   2 Don't Get involved/Handled Elsewhere 15% 
5 Contractor Provided 9%   1 N/A 8% 
5 Travel Orders/Transportation 9%   1 9mm Training 8% 
4 In-Country Briefing/Cultural 8%   1 BX 8% 
4 Issue Firearm 8%   1 Secure Work Area 8% 
4 N/A 8%   1 Insurance 8% 
3 Pay Incentives 6%   1 Letters of Introduction 8% 
3 9mm Training 6%   1 Family Care 8% 
3 Postal Services 6%   1 Int'l Law and SOFA Awareness 8% 
3 Dental Care 6%   1 Admin Supplies - Desk, Computer, etc. 8% 
2 Wills/Next of kin 4%   1 Schools 8% 
2 Cell Phones 4%      
2 BX 4%      
2 Badge Requirements/Access 4%      
2 Secure Work Area 4%      
2 Insurance 4%      
1 Mortuary Affairs 2%      
1 Vehicles 2%      
1 Letters of Introduction 2%      
1 Family Care 2%      
1 Int'l Law and SOFA Awareness 2%      
1 Self Aid Buddy Care Training 2%      
1 
Admin Supplies - Desk, Computer, 
etc. 2%      
1 Legal Advice 2%      
 
 
Table 8 represents the Policy Expert’s and Program Office’s highest identified 
support obligations. 
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Table 8.  IQ #2 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Support Obligations - 2         
Overall Policy Experts %   Program Offices % 
18 - Medical Issues/Support/Exams 34%   8 - Contract will spell out obligations 67% 
16 - Shots 30%   6 - Shots 46% 
14 - Individual Equipment Issue 26%   5 - Chem Gear Training 38% 
14 - Housing 26%   4 - Medical Issues/Support/Exams 31% 
12 - Contract will spell out obligations 23%   3 - Housing 23% 
12 - Food 23%   3 - Passports 23% 
11 - Chem Gear 21%     
11 - Force Protection 21%     
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Five of the six codings are similar 
for both the Policy Experts and the Program offices.  These include: 
 Contract will spell out obligations 
 Shots 
 Chem Gear Training 
 Medical Issues/Support/Exams 
 Housing 
 
Passports are a subject that the Policy Experts never addressed, while force protection 
obligations and IEU were of very high frequency to the Policy Experts and not to the 
Program Offices. 
IQ 3. How has the AF handled these obligations in the past?  Please 
explain. 
   
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are captured in Table 9. 
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Table 9.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #3 
IQ 3. DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Handling of Obligations % 
3 Force Protection Issues/Problems 75% 
3 Some Problems  75% 
2 Ad hoc/Confusion 50% 
1 In Contract/SOW/Letter of Introduction (LOI) 25% 
1 Need of a standard approach - Joint Guidance 25% 
1 COs did not coordinate forward 25% 
1 Logistical Issues 25% 
1 Very Well 25% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Force Protection Issues/Problems, 
Ad Hoc/Confusion, and Some Problems were the highest ranked responses from the DoD 
Policy Experts with regards to the government’s handling of its support obligations.  The 
majority of respondents reported force protection issues due to unplanned requirements.  
SME #3 stated that force protection was the “biggest bone of contention” in on-going 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Also, half of the DoD Policy Experts reported an ad hoc 
approach to supporting the contractor in the field that often led to confusion.  These 
answers continue the theme that there is much confusion in the area of support 
obligations between the government and the contractors that are performing work in the 
battle area.  SME #2 stated, “In some situations we had a contractor at Location A where 
they were getting support and at Location B they were not getting support.”  He went on 
to say that a standard approach was much needed.   
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are captured in Table 10. 
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Table 10.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #3 
IQ 3. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Handling of Obligations % 
5 Very Well 63% 
4 Some Problems 50% 
2 In Contract/SOW/LOI 25% 
2 Govt Ignored Issues/Silent 25% 
1 Too Much Rotation of Personnel 13% 
1 N/A 13% 
0 Ad hoc/Confusion 0% 
0 Need of a standard approach - Joint Guidance 0% 
0 Force Protection Issues/Problems 0% 
0 COs did not coordinate forward 0% 
0 Logistical Issues 0% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Very Well and Some Problems were 
the highest ranked responses from the Contractor Policy Experts with regards to the 
government’s handling of its support obligations.  These two distinctly different 
responses display the pattern that support obligations are still a problem for the Air Force.  
While several people stated that the government has done a good job “. . . of doing what 
they say they’ll do in the SOW,” (SME #12, Contractor Interview, 2004), there were just 
as many complaints.  SME #11 said the government likes to place an order “. . . and then 
walk away from it,” SME #9 stated, “The government has ignored some of these issues 
or remained silent in some cases,” and SMEs #6 and #8 both stated that there have been 
problems and issues in this area. 
Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are captured in Table 11. 
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Table 11.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #3 
IQ 3. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Handling of Obligations % 
5 N/A 50% 
4 In Contract/SOW/LOI 40% 
4 Very Well 40% 
4 Some Problems 40% 
1 Force Protection Issues/Problems 10% 
1 Govt Ignored Issues/Silent 10% 
0 Ad hoc/Confusion 0% 
0 Need of a standard approach - Joint Guidance 0% 
0 COs did not coordinate forward 0% 
0 Logistical Issues 0% 
0 Too Much Rotation of Personnel 0% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Very Well, Some Problems, and In 
Contract/SOW/LOI were the highest ranked responses from the Army Policy Experts 
with regards to the government’s handling of its support obligations.  Again, like the 
other case study groups, there is a discrepancy amongst the Army.  While some think that 
the Army is handling the obligations well, clearly addressing them in their contracts, 
other Army Policy Experts have identified some problems.  SME #14 stated that 
sometimes not all of the contractors deploying to the battlefield “get the word about 
things that are necessary to be done prior to deployment.”  SME #19 stated that “there are 
many things that can be improved.”  However, almost half of the Army Policy Experts 
interviewed stated that the Army was doing a good job supporting their contractors.  
SME #15 summed it up well when he stated, “People understand when they go into that 
type of environment that things don’t go exactly the way we anticipated…but pretty 
much things get done.”  The problem, it seems, is that the DoD is doing a poor job 
anticipating support obligations for these contractors who deploy to the battle area. 
 
 81
Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are captured in Table 12. 
 
Table 12.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #3 
IQ 3. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Handling of Obligations % 
13 Some Problems 42% 
10 In Contract/SOW/LOI 32% 
9 N/A 29% 
6 Ad hoc/Confusion 19% 
5 Need of a standard approach - Joint Guidance 16% 
3 Force Protection Issues/Problems 10% 
3 C&C Issues 10% 
3 Clarify Emergency Essential 10% 
2 Very Well 6% 
2 Transportation Issues - JFTR Issues 6% 
2 Problems with Shots 6% 
1 COs did not coordinate forward 3% 
1 QAE - Need work here 3% 
1 Contractor Counsel Needs to be educated 3% 
1 Pay Issues 3% 
1 Medical Issues 3% 
0 Logistical Issues 0% 
0 Too Much Rotation of Personnel 0% 
0 Govt Ignored Issues/Silent 0% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Some Problems, In 
Contract/SOW/LOI, and Ad hoc/Confusion were the highest ranked responses from the 
Air Force Policy Experts with regards to the government’s handling of its support 
obligations.  This information clearly depicts a pattern that there is a problem with the 
government handling and/or clarifying our support obligations with respect to the 
contractor. 
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The theme continues as the Air Force Policy Experts discussed the lack of 
specificity in the battlefield contracts for these support obligations, the lack of formal, 
joint guidance, and the lack of training and education in this acquisition area.  SME #27 
says that this support should be detailed in the contract, however, SME #24 said that the 
Air Force puts these support obligations in the contract as a “blanket statement,” while  
SME #31 notes the lack of guidance is a problem.  SME #34 stated, I think all of the 
guidance is out there somewhere but it is so scattered.”  SME #42 stated that guidance is 
needed but with a caveat.  He stated, “One issue that needs to be addressed is that we 
fight in a joint environment so if you write AF level guidance, you are missing the boat.”  
SME #50 stated, “There is a lot of confusion on what we need to do,” while SME #52 
stated, “It has kind of been a challenge.”  Finally, SME #25 stated that there is a lack of 
training and there is no effort put into teaching “. . . what needs to happen in order to get 
systems level and CONUS contractors…into the area of operations.” 
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are captured 
in Table 13. 
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Table 13.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #3 
Times 
Reported Handling of Obligations % 
8 Very Well 62% 
5 Some Problems 38% 
5 N/A 38% 
3 Ad hoc/Confusion 23% 
2 In Contract/SOW/LOI 15% 
2 Need of a standard approach - Joint Guidance 15% 
1 Transportation Issues - JFTR Issues 8% 
1 Problems with Shots 8% 
1 Pay Issues 8% 
1 Covered in Support Agreement 8% 
1 Key is Communication 8% 
0 Force Protection Issues/Problems 0% 
0 COs did not coordinate forward 0% 
0 Logistical Issues 0% 
0 Too Much Rotation of Personnel 0% 
0 Govt Ignored Issues/Silent 0% 
0 QAE - Need work here 0% 
0 C&C Issues 0% 
0 Contractor Counsel Needs to be educated 0% 
0 Clarify Emergency Essential 0% 
0 Medical Issues 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The Program Offices characterized 
the handling of these support obligations as being executed Very Well, Some Problems, 
and/or in an Ad Hoc and Confusing Manner.  These were the three highest coded 
categories amongst the program offices. 
More than half of the Program Offices (PO) said they were handling the support 
obligations very well.  In fact, many of the program offices stated that the contract was 
the proper place to address such requirements.  PO #4, PO #7, PO #8, PO #9, PO #10, 
and PO 12 all stated that their contract clearly defines the support obligations through 
clauses, and attachments to the contract such as base support agreements, SOWs, and/or 
Letters of Introduction.   
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However, several program offices said they were not involved in the handling of 
the support obligations.  PO #1 stated that they were not involved in addressing, 
clarifying, or managing these support obligations because “. . . the guts of our SPO is 
located at the contractor’s plant.”  Program Office #2 stated, “That’s taken care of at the 
base-level,” and Program Office #3 stated, “That is not something that I get involved with 
as a CO.”  Furthermore, PO #11 stated that their Detachment handles a lot of the support 
requirements.    However, PO #5 stated, “Generally it is dependent upon the particular 
program’s situation.”  Again, the general pattern of confusion has been infused even 
down to the program office level.   
Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 14 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #3, the 
government’s handling of its support obligations to contractors on the battlefield.   
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Table 14.  IQ #3 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts      Total for All Program Offices 
F Handling of Obligations %   F Handling of Obligations % 
24 Some Problems 45%   8 Very Well 62% 
17 In Contract/SOW/LOI 32%   5 Some Problems 38% 
15 N/A 28%   5 N/A 38% 
12 Very Well 23%   3 Ad hoc/Confusion 23% 
8 Ad hoc/Confusion 15%   2 In Contract/SOW/LOI 15% 
7 Force Protection Issues/Problems 13%   2 
Need of a standard approach - Joint 
Guidance 15% 
6 
Need of a standard approach - Joint 
Guidance 11%   1 Transportation Issues - JFTR Issues 8% 
3 Govt Ignored Issues/Silent 6%   1 Problems with Shots 8% 
3 C&C Issues 6%   1 Pay Issues 8% 
3 Clarify Emergency Essential 6%   1 Covered in Support Agreement 8% 
2 COs did not coordinate forward 4%   1 Key is Communication 8% 
2 Transportation Issues - JFTR Issues 4%      
2 Problems with Shots 4%      
1 Logistical Issues 2%      
1 Too Much Rotation of Personnel 2%      
1 QAE - Need work here 2%      
1 Contractor Counsel Needs to be educated 2%      
1 Pay Issues 2%      
1 Medical Issues 2%      
 
 
Table 15 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s highest identified support obligations. 
 
Table 15.  IQ #3 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Handling of Obligations - 3         
Overall Policy Experts %   Program Offices % 
24 - Some Problems 45%   8 - Very Well 62% 
17 - In Contract/SOW/LOI 32%   5 - Some Problems 38% 
15 - N/A 28%   5 - N/A 38% 
12 - Very Well 23%   3 - Ad hoc/Confusion 23% 
8 - Ad hoc/Confusion 15%   2 - In Contract/SOW/LOI 15% 
7 - Force Protection Issues/Problems 13%   2 - Need of a standard approach - Joint Guidance 15% 
 
 
Overall Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Five of the six codings are 
similar for both the Policy Experts and the Program offices.  Combining the total 
frequency counts from both the Policy Experts and Program Offices, the top five codings 
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for the government’s handling of support obligations are rank ordered below according to 
frequency count: 
 1.  Some Problems  (32) 
 2.  Very Well  (20) 
 3.  N/A  (20) 
 4.  Ad hoc/Confusion  (11) 
 5.  In Contract/SOW/LOI  (11)  
 
IQ 4. What legal implications are present when hiring contractors on the 
battlefield? 
   
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are captured in Table 16. 
 
Table 16.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #4 
IQ 4. DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Legal Implications % 
3 SOFA 75% 
3 MEJA 2000 & Local Laws & Discipline 75% 
2 Liability - Death/Injury/Equipment 50% 
1 Carrying a Weapon 25% 
1 Geneva Convention 25% 
1 Medical Liability 25% 
1 JAG Liability 25% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Status of Forces Agreement, MEJA 
2000 & Laws and Discipline, and Liability were the most frequent responses from the 
DoD Policy Experts in reference to the legal implications when acquiring the services of 
contractors on the battlefield.  SME #3, in reference to legal implications, stated, 
“There’s a lot.”  Legal implications for contractors on the battlefield are an immense area 
of study.  Not only are there many legal implications, but the severity of these 
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implications make this a noteworthy subject to analyze.  Status of Forces Agreements 
(SOFA) were mentioned several times because they have a direct impact on the 
contractors working overseas in terms of legal issues.  SME #1 stated that there are huge 
legal implications, and specifically mentioned that there was currently no SOFA in Iraq.  
SME #2 stated that “. . . these contractors are not covered by SOFA agreement. . ..”  
Also, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 was mentioned several times.  
This Act allows us to pull back contractor personnel from overseas that commit a felony 
and prosecute them here in the United States.   
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are captured in Table 17. 
 
Table 17.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #4 
IQ 4. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Legal Implications % 
5 Liability - Death/Injury/Equipment 63% 
3 Pay Differentials/Tax Status 38% 
2 MEJA 2000 & Local Laws & Discipline 25% 
1 SOFA 13% 
1 Geneva Convention 13% 
1 Force Protection 13% 
1 N/A 13% 
1 Contract Itself 13% 
0 Carrying a Weapon 0% 
0 Medical Liability 0% 
0 JAG Liability 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Liability, Pay Differentials/Tax 
Status, and MEJA 2000/Local Laws/Discipline were the most frequent responses from the 
Contractor Policy Experts with regards to the legal implications.  The liability issue was 
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the highest reported legal implication.  SME #10 addressed damage to vehicles, while 
SME #12 addressed the humanistic liability.  SME #12 stated, “That is probably the most 
controversial issue is the injury as the result of some terrorist or combat action.”  SME #8 
stated that Public Law 85-804 under FAR 52.250-1 covers the liability for contractors 
and the government, but “. . . getting the risk defined is somewhat more difficult.”   
The other pattern that emerged is pay differentials.  Again, acquiring the services 
of contractors on the battlefield has some nuances that are unique to this type of 
procurement, and Air Force Contracting Officers must be aware and/or educated on these 
nuances.  SME #11 stated, 
I spent last winter in tents in Afghanistan, Kurdistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan 
with the snake eaters over there, the door knockers, Special Forces folks living in 
tents, port-a-potties in the snow, blacked out air strips at night…the people we 
send over there on a one year assignment, the state department has guidance and 
rules on what are danger pay areas what are hazardous duty pay areas, what are 
sub-standard living conditions, and those effect costs to the government because 
those deployed locations aren’t Aviano, Italy.  (SME #11, Contractor Interview, 
2004). 
 
The government has to be aware that every contractor has a different policy on pay 
differentials and/or bonuses as described in their respective company disclosure 
statements.  These pay differentials have a direct impact on the effective management and 
cost control of the contract. 
The third theme, also common among the DoD Policy Experts, which has 
developed, is the implications of local laws and discipline of the contractors on the 
battlefield.  SME #7 stated, “Contractors run the risk to being subject to local laws. . ..”  
MEJA 2000/Local Laws/Discipline is a pattern that continues to develop among the 
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Policy Experts with regards to legal implications of using contractors to support weapon 
systems on the battlefield. 
Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are captured in Table 18. 
 
Table 18.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #4 
IQ 4. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Legal Implications % 
5 MEJA 2000 & Local Laws & Discipline 50% 
4 Geneva Convention/Contractor Status/LOAC 40% 
3 Carrying a Weapon 30% 
3 Force Protection 30% 
3 Support Obligations 30% 
2 N/A 20% 
1 Contract Itself 10% 
1 Visa Requirements 10% 
0 SOFA 0% 
0 Liability - Death/Injury/Equipment 0% 
0 Medical Liability 0% 
0 JAG Liability 0% 
0 Pay Differentials/Tax Status 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  MEJA 2000/Local Laws/Discipline 
and Geneva Convention/Contractor Status/LOAC were the most frequent responses from 
the Army Policy Experts in regards to legal implications.  Again, like the other Policy 
Experts, discipline is a major theme for the Army Policy Experts.  SME #20 stated that 
whatever restrictions are in a specific theater should be clarified and delineated in the 
contract.  SME #18 stipulated that it was difficult to discipline a contractor, but that the 
individual could be removed from theater.  SME #13 references the implications of 
MEJA 2000 for contractors on the battlefield, while SME #17 asks the question, “If you 
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are in an area that has no government, and a contractor commits a crime, how is that 
contractor held accountable?”  Several individuals also addressed the Geneva 
Convention/Contractor Status/LOAC as one of the major legal issues involved with this 
type of contract.  Many state that the Geneva Convention is outdated and that “[t]here is a 
disagreement between the AF and the Army . . . on what a contractor can do and not do” 
(SME #15, Army Interview, 2004).  There seems to be no standardized approach for the 
discipline of contractors, and confusion seems to surround this legal implication.  
Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are captured in Table 19. 
 
Table 19.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #4 
IQ 4. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Legal Implications % 
18 Geneva Convention/Contractor Status/LOAC 58% 
10 Carrying a Weapon 32% 
8 Liability - Death/Injury/Equipment 26% 
8 Contract Itself 26% 
7 MEJA 2000 & Local Laws & Discipline 23% 
3 Force Protection 10% 
3 N/A 10% 
3 Liability for the Commander 10% 
2 SOFA 6% 
2 Pay Differentials/Tax Status 6% 
2 Visa Requirements 6% 
2 Emergency Essential 6% 
2 International Law 6% 
1 Medical Liability 3% 
1 Support Obligations 3% 
1 Funding 3% 
0 JAG Liability 0% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Geneva Convention/Contractor 
Status/LOAC, Carrying a Weapon, and Liability were the most frequent responses from 
the Air Force Policy Experts with regards to the legal implications.   
This information clearly depicts a pattern that there are legal implications tied to 
the Geneva Conventions and the status of the contractor on the battlefield.  This theme 
was present with the Army Policy Experts and is present here with the Air Force Policy 
Experts.  SME #23 stated that the contractors, “really have no status under the Geneva 
Convention,” and SME #37 addressed this issue as being “thorny.”  However, SME #41 
stated that the contractors “. . . are provided provisions under the Geneva Conventions as 
long as they stay a non-combatant.”  SME #44 stated that if a contractor should be 
captured, he or she should be treated humanely, and SME #53 clarified the issue even 
more and stated that if a contractor is captured on the battlefield, he or she should “. . . be 
treated as a POW” according their “equivalent military rank.”  There are issues with 
regards to the Geneva Convention and the status of the contractor on the battlefield.  This 
is a “thorny” issue.  SME #46 stated, “How far they can go before it becomes direct 
participation is a subject for a lot of debate.”  SME #47 questioned, “The law of armed 
conflict can get blurred by the enemy as well.  Are the contractors un-uniformed 
combatants?”  The contractors “. . . have to be very careful that they don’t become quasi-
military” (SME #44, Air Force Interview, 2004). 
The other theme that continued to emerge was the implications with respect to 
liability on the part of the government and contractor.  SME #35 stated, “I would think 
that actually getting shot, injured, or killed is a big one,” and SME #50 questioned, “Can 
families sue?  Does their life insurance suddenly go void because they were killed in 
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combat?”  These liabilities are present not only for the individual and the government, 
but for the company the contractor works for as well.  SME #53 stated that a contractor 
has to have worker’s compensation insurance “. . . but then beyond that they have to have 
coverage for people that get sent overseas.” 
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are presented 
in Table 20. 
 
Table 20.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #4 
Times 
Reported Legal Implications % 
7 Contract Itself 54% 
5 Liability - Death/Injury/Equipment 38% 
4 Emergency Essential 31% 
3 Pay Differentials/Tax Status 23% 
3 N/A 23% 
3 Support Obligations 23% 
2 Geneva Convention/Contractor Status/LOAC 15% 
2 Force Protection 15% 
1 Carrying a Weapon 8% 
1 SOFA 8% 
1 MEJA 2000 & Local Laws & Discipline 8% 
1 Medical Liability 8% 
1 International Law 8% 
1 Command/Discipline of Contractors  8% 
0 JAG Liability 0% 
0 Visa Requirements 0% 
0 Funding 0% 
0 Liability for the Commander 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  These were the three highest coded 
categories amongst the program offices were the Contract Itself, Liability, and 
Emergency Essential Status.   
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The Contract Itself was one of the themes that emerged from the Program 
Office’s responses to the legal implications of using contractors on the battlefield.  
Although this coding did not receive much attention from the DoD, Contractor, or Army 
Policy Experts, it ranked relatively high with the Air Force Policy Experts and now with 
the Program Offices.  It is interesting to note that although this coding had the highest 
frequency, the responses displayed a bit of insecurity in their assurance that the contracts 
were thoroughly written.  PO #3 stated, “I think our contract covers that,” PO #1 stated, 
“We have to make sure that the appropriate clauses are in the contract,” and PO #2 stated, 
“As long as the clauses are in the contract, we’re fine.”  The Contract Itself has certainly 
emerged as a theme among the Program Offices. 
The Liability coding has once again emerged as a pattern amongst interviewees.  
Tying the Contract Itself issue to the Liability issue, PO #11 took a slightly different 
approach to these issues.  She stated, “It is up to the contractor to determine whether they 
have fully satisfied the requirements of the clause . . . [t]he contractor has to ensure that 
they are covered.”  There is confusion and a non-standardized approach with regards to 
the contract, liability issues, and to whom the onus belongs.   
Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 21 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #4, the legal 
implications with respect to contractors on the battlefield.   
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Table 21.  IQ #4 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts      Total for All Program Offices 
F Legal Implications %  F Legal Implications % 
24 
Geneva Convention/Contractor 
Status/LOAC 45%  7 Contract Itself 54% 
17 MEJA 2000 & Local Laws & Discipline 32%  5 Liability - Death/Injury/Equipment 38% 
15 Liability - Death/Injury/Equipment 28%  4 Emergency Essential 31% 
14 Carrying a Weapon 26%  3 Pay Differentials/Tax Status 23% 
10 Contract Itself 19%  3 N/A 23% 
7 Force Protection 13%  3 Support Obligations 23% 
6 SOFA 11%  2 Geneva Convention/Contractor Status/LOAC 15% 
6 N/A 11%  2 Force Protection 15% 
5 Pay Differentials/Tax Status 9%  1 Carrying a Weapon 8% 
4 Support Obligations 8%  1 SOFA 8% 
3 Visa Requirements 6%  1 MEJA 2000 & Local Laws & Discipline 8% 
3 Liability for the Commander 6%  1 Medical Liability 8% 
2 Medical Liability 4%  1 International Law 8% 
2 Emergency Essential 4%  1 Command/Discipline of Contractors  8% 
2 International Law 4%      
1 JAG Liability 2%      
1 Funding 2%      
 
 
Table 22 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s most frequently identified legal implications. 
 
Table 22.  IQ #4 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Legal Implications - 4        
Overall Policy Experts %  Program Offices % 
24 - Geneva Convention/Contractor 
Status/LOAC 45%  7 - Contract Itself 54% 
17 - MEJA 2000 & Local Laws & Discipline 32%  5 - Liability - Death/Injury/Equipment 38% 
15 - Liability - Death/Injury/Equipment 28%  4 - Emergency Essential 31% 
14 - Carrying a Weapon 26%  3 - Pay Differentials/Tax Status 23% 
10 - Contract Itself 19%  3 - N/A 23% 
   3 - Support Obligations 23% 
   2 - Geneva Convention/Contractor Status/LOAC 15% 
   2 - Force Protection 15% 
 
 
Overall Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Three of the eight codings 
are similar for both the Policy Experts and the Program offices.  These include: 
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 Contract Itself 
 Liability – Death/Injury/Equipment 
 Geneva Convention/Contractor Status/LOAC 
 
The pay differentials and support obligations are subjects that the Program Offices 
addressed, while the Policy Experts didn’t have them at such a high priority.  On the 
other hand, the Policy Experts had carrying a weapon and MEJA 2000 as higher 
frequency codings than did the Program Offices. 
Combining the total frequency counts from both the Policy Experts and Program 
Offices, the top three codings for the legal implications are rank ordered below according 
to frequency count: 
 1.  Geneva Conventions/Contractor Status/LOAC  (26) 
 2.  Liability (20) 
 3.  Contract Itself (17) and MEJA 2000/Local Laws/Discipline (17) 
 
IQ 5. How have we addressed these legal implications in the past? 
  
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are captured in Table 23. 
 
Table 23.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #5 
IQ 5. DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Handling of Legal Implications % 
2 Haphazard - Not a Good Job 50% 
2 Need of a FAR/DFARS Clause 50% 
2 N/A 50% 
1 Government Liability Not Solidified 25% 
1 Need a Laundry List/More & Better Guidance 25% 
1 Can't Cover Everything 25% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The DoD Policy Experts selected 
Haphazard and the Need for a FAR/DFARS Clause more frequently than any other 
coding with respect to handling the legal implications.  SME #4 stated that basic policy 
should be written in a FAR and/or DFARS clause to address these legal implications.  
However, he noted, “You can’t cover all the situations.”  Although you may not be able 
to cover all things, it appears that the lack of guidance or contract language is causing 
problems.  SME #2 stated, “To date, it has been very Haphazard how those things are 
addressed.”  This subject matter expert did reference a new DFARS clause that should be 
released in FY04, addressing some of these implications.  However, the need for some 
type of joint, overarching, thorough guidance and specific contract language is the theme 
that continues to emerge. 
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 24. 
 
Table 24.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #5 
IQ 5. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Handling of Legal Implications  
4 Haphazard - Not a Good Job % 
2 N/A 25% 
2 Good Job 25% 
1 Government Liability Not Solidified 13% 
1 Tighten Up the Laws 13% 
1 SOFA 13% 
1 Mission Essential Personnel 13% 
0 Need a Laundry List/More & Better Guidance 0% 
0 Need of a FAR/DFARS Clause 0% 
0 Can't Cover Everything 0% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Haphazard and Good Job were the 
most frequent responses from the Contractor Policy Experts with regards to the handling 
of legal implications.  Several Contractor Policy Experts commented on the poor 
handling and confusion that remains with respect to the handling of these legal 
implications.  SME #7 stated, “We have not done a good job addressing these legal 
implications in the contracts,” while SME #9 stated that sometimes the government has 
“remained silent.”  SME #5 stated, “I think the general spirit of the laws are there now,” 
while SME #12 stated that “. . . it is an area that still remains very grey.”  One individual 
stated that there was a lot of information and guidance already out there available for 
people to study and use within the construction and execution of their contracts.  SME 
#10 stated that these legal implications are addressed in a myriad of places such as a       
“. . . FAR Clause, US Code, Public Law, or part of a regulation.”  Bottom-line, the 
Contractors expressed confusion with regards to the handling of the legal implications, 
which can only negatively impact their performance, costs associated with risk 
assessment, and responsiveness on the battlefield.   
Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 25. 
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Table 25.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #5 
IQ 5. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Handling of Legal Implications % 
4 N/A 40% 
3 Haphazard - Not a Good Job 30% 
3 Good Job 30% 
2 Have A Clause 20% 
1 Need of a FAR/DFARS Clause or H 10% 
1 Tighten Up the Laws 10% 
1 Addressed in Contract/SOW 10% 
1 KOs/ACOs in the field 10% 
1 MEJA 2000 10% 
0 Government Liability Not Solidified 0% 
0 Need a Laundry List/More & Better Guidance 0% 
0 Can't Cover Everything 0% 
0 SOFA 0% 
0 Mission Essential Personnel 0% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Good Job and Haphazard were the 
most frequent responses from the Army Policy Experts with regards to handling the legal 
implications.  This is quite a difference of opinion in how Army Policy Experts express 
the Army’s handling of these legal implications.  SME #13 characterized the Army’s 
handling of these legal implications as “a work in progress,” SME #16 stated, “We don’t 
get into that,” while SME #14 clearly stated that the Army is addressing these legal 
implications thoroughly through the contract.  He stated,  
“We address those via clauses in the contract.  DODI 3020.37 lays the 
groundwork for it, and 5000.2R which is the Acquisition Deskbook also lays 
groundwork for clauses and then I know that there are some AFARS out there that 
should be printed pretty soon that lays some groundwork.”  (SME #14, DoD 
Interview, 2004). 
 
Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
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The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 26. 
Table 26.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #5 
IQ 5. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Handling of Legal Implications % 
22 N/A - Not Sure 71% 
5 Good Job 16% 
5 Addressed in Contract/SOW 16% 
3 Have A Clause 10% 
3 DODI 10% 
2 Haphazard - Not a Good Job 6% 
1 Need a Laundry List/More & Better Guidance 3% 
1 Need of a FAR/DFARS Clause or H 3% 
1 SOFA 3% 
1 Mission Essential Personnel 3% 
0 Government Liability Not Solidified 0% 
0 Can't Cover Everything 0% 
0 Tighten Up the Laws 0% 
0 Kos/ACOs in the field 0% 
0 MEJA 2000 0% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  N/A, Good Job, and Addressed in 
Contract/SOW were the most frequent responses from the Air Force Policy Experts with 
regards to the handling of legal implications.  However, the connotation that there has 
been a positive handling of the legal implications by the Air Force is false.  The majority 
of responses from the Air Force Policy Experts were, in fact, N/A. 
 A lot of Air Force Policy Experts simply did not know how the Air Force was, or 
is, handling the legal implications of having contractors on the battlefield, as represented 
by the N/A codings.  SME #30 and SME #38 stated, “I don’t know,” SME #48 stated, “I 
am not sure,” and SME #46 stated, “Nothing is coming to mind. . ..”  SME #35 stated, “I 
think that where we are at today is significantly better . . . than six months ago when we 
virtually had no policy to cover it.”  Other Air Force Policy Experts stated that more 
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work has to be done to address these legal implications, and make the entire acquisition 
process, including the administration side, smoother.  SME #25 stated, 
“I think at the top-level, a lot of time went into coming up with policy and writing 
directives and regulations that appear to cover the situation.  What it consistently 
fails to address is implementation plans and the full scale logistical effort that it 
takes to do some of these things that are required.”  (SME #25, DoD Interview, 
2004). 
 
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are presented 
in Table 27. 
 
Table 27.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #5 
Times 
Reported Handling of Legal Implications % 
10 N/A - Not Sure 77% 
2 Good Job 15% 
1 Haphazard - Not a Good Job 8% 
1 Can't Cover Everything 8% 
1 Tighten Up the Laws 8% 
0 Government Liability Not Solidified 0% 
0 Need a Laundry List/More & Better Guidance 0% 
0 Need of a FAR/DFARS Clause or H 0% 
0 SOFA 0% 
0 Mission Essential Personnel 0% 
0 Have A Clause 0% 
0 Addressed in Contract/SOW 0% 
0 Kos/ACOs in the field 0% 
0 MEJA 2000 0% 
0 DODI 0% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The three highest coded categories 
amongst the program offices were N/A – Not Sure, Good Job, and Haphazard.  The 
pattern of not being sure how the legal obligations were handled or how they are 
currently being addressed, continues through the program offices.  However, one 
 
 101
program office that was just beginning their acquisition for contractor support on the 
battlefield had an excellent idea.  PO #13 is holding working group meetings and a 
continuing dialogue with the legal community in order to make sure that these legal 
implications are fully addressed as their weapon system becomes operational.  
Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 28 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #5, the 
government’s handling of legal implications of having contractors on the battlefield.   
 
Table 28.  IQ #5 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts    Total for All Program Offices   
F Handling of Legal Implications %  F Handling of Legal Implications % 
30 N/A - Not Sure 57%  10 N/A - Not Sure 77% 
11 Haphazard - Not a Good Job 21%  2 Good Job 15% 
10 Good Job 19%  1 Haphazard - Not a Good Job 8% 
6 Addressed in Contract/SOW 11%  1 Can't Cover Everything 8% 
5 Have A Clause 9%  1 Tighten Up the Laws 8% 
4 Need of a FAR/DFARS Clause or H 8%     
3 DODI 6%     
2 Government Liability Not Solidified 4%     
2 
Need a Laundry List/More & Better 
Guidance 4%     
2 Tighten Up the Laws 4%     
2 SOFA 4%     
2 Mission Essential Personnel 4%     
1 Can't Cover Everything 2%     
1 Kos/ACOs in the field 2%     
1 MEJA 2000 2%     
 
 
Table 29 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s most frequently identified codings for the handling of legal implications. 
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Table 29.  IQ #5 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Handling of Legal Implications - 5         
Overall Policy Experts %   Program Offices % 
30 - N/A - Not Sure 57%   10 - N/A - Not Sure 77% 
11 - Haphazard - Not a Good Job 21%   2 - Good Job 15% 
10 - Good Job 19%   1 - Haphazard - Not a Good Job 8% 
6 - Addressed in Contract/SOW 11%   1 - Can't Cover Everything 8% 
5 - Have A Clause 9%   1 - Tighten Up the Laws 8% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Three of the five codings are 
similar for both the Policy Experts and the Program offices.  Combining the total 
frequency counts from both the Policy Experts and Program Offices, the top three 
codings for the government’s handling of legal implications are rank ordered below 
according to frequency count: 
 1.  N/A – Not Sure  (40) 
 2.  Haphazard – Not a Good Job (12) 
 3.  Good Job (12)  
 
IQ 6. What other recommendations do you have to address these 
implications?  
  
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 30. 
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Table 30.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #6 
IQ 6. DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Other Recommendations % 
3 Need for Joint Doctrine/DFARS Clause/Handbooks/Consistency 75% 
2 Contractor Support is Critical/Clarify this support 50% 
1 Centralized Contracting POC in Theater 25% 
1 CCOs in Theater  Help 25% 
1 Expediting Contracting and Quality 25% 
1 Clarify Force Protection Policy 25% 
1 Accountability of COB 25% 
1 Standardized Contracting Language 25% 
1 Clarify Government Liabilities 25% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The DoD Policy Experts selected 
Need for Joint Doctrine/DFARS Clause/Handbooks/Consistency and Contractor Support 
is Critical/Clarify this Support more frequently than any other codings with respect to 
additional recommendations for handling the legal implications and support obligations.   
Several of the DoD Policy Experts pointed to the lack of solid DoD guidance for 
causing problems in the area of acquiring, managing, and supporting contractors on the 
battlefield.  SME #1 stated, “I think the biggest problem that we have is that we don’t 
have any joint doctrine that talks to contracting and contractors on the battlefield.”  He 
goes on to say that the J4 does not place any emphasis on the contracting function.  Other 
pointed to the disjointed policy in this area of acquisition.  SME #3 stated, “There is a lot 
of disparate policy out there, the Air Force has a different policy than the Army, than the 
Navy.”  Standardization is definitely lacking within the DoD regarding battlefield support 
acquisition.  However, SME #2 stated that there is currently a DFARS clause and a DoD 
Directive being worked on.  He stated that there needs to be standardized contract 
language “. . . so that contractors don’t see twenty different sets of languages addressing 
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this, so that there is a clear understanding in one place, so everyone can gain the clear 
understanding.”   
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 31. 
 
Table 31.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #6 
IQ 6. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Other Recommendations % 
3 Need for Joint Doctrine/DFARS Clause/Handbooks/Consistency 38% 
2 Requirements Definition 25% 
1 Expediting Contracting and Quality 13% 
1 Contractor Support is Critical/Clarify this support 13% 
1 Expedite Mission Essential Designation 13% 
1 Better Govt Oversight 13% 
1 Work on Local Procurement in Theater - Save on Freight/Duty 13% 
1 N/A 13% 
0 Centralized Contracting POC in Theater 0% 
0 CCOs in Theater  Help 0% 
0 Clarify Force Protection Policy 0% 
0 Accountability of COB 0% 
0 Standardized Contracting Language 0% 
0 Clarify Government Liabilities 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Need for Joint Doctrine/DFARS 
Clause/Handbooks/Consistency and Requirements Definition were the most frequent 
responses from the Contractor Policy Experts with regards to additional 
recommendations for handling the legal implications and support obligations.  The theme 
of disjointed policy is present from the Contractor Policy Expert’s point of views as well.  
SME #7 stated that there is a lot of guidance out there to cover these areas, however, he 
stated, “[t]here is no standard DoD-wide or FAR clause on contractors accompanying the 
force.”  SME #9’s recommendation was “consistency across the DoD” while SME #8 
 
 105
stated, “For us to adjust to different services with different requirements, I think that the 
foremost thing would be to get consistency.”  Standardization appears to be lacking 
within each service and across the various services.   
Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are captured in Table 32. 
 
Table 32.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #6 
IQ 6. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Other Recommendations % 
4 Requirements Definition 40% 
4 Good Contract and Associated Clauses for COB 40% 
3 Contractor Support is Critical/Clarify this support 30% 
2 Need for Joint Doctrine/DFARS Clause/Handbooks/Consistency 20% 
2 Clarify Force Protection Policy 20% 
2 N/A 20% 
2 Acq Planning & CLS Considerations 20% 
1 Accountability of COB 10% 
1 Train the Combatant Commander in Acquisition 10% 
1 Awareness - What you are signing up for…& Environ.. 10% 
1 Education and Training 10% 
0 Centralized Contracting POC in Theater 0% 
0 CCOs in Theater  Help 0% 
0 Expediting Contracting and Quality 0% 
0 Standardized Contracting Language 0% 
0 Clarify Government Liabilities 0% 
0 Expedite Mission Essential Designation 0% 
0 Better Govt Oversight 0% 
0 Work on Local Procurement in Theater - Save on Freight/Duty 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Requirements Definition and Good 
Contract and Associated Clauses for COB were the most frequent responses from the 
Army Policy Experts with regards to the handling of legal implications and support 
obligations.  It appears that a clearly written, thorough contract that is understood by all 
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parties is what is important from the Army Policy Experts points of view.  The Army 
Policy Experts stipulated that the various stakeholders to the contract had a problem 
understanding the contract, and this is a problem.  SME #18 addressed the Contracting 
Officer’s contractual knowledge and stated, “It really comes back to the contract . . . We 
need to educate COs to put good language in their contracts.”  SME #21 addressed the 
warfighter’s contractual knowledge and stated that the requiring activity and the people in 
the field “. . . are not familiar with contracting, not familiar with requirements generation, 
legalities, nor the command and control of contractors.”  SME #15 addressed the 
contractor’s contractual knowledge and said that they must understand “what they are 
signing up for.”  Bottom-line, the requirements must be clearly addressed, defined, and 
clarified.  SME #14 stated that the requirements and clauses must be clearly defined in 
the contract and understood by all parties to the contract.  He identified the CO is critical 
link in making this happen and stated,  
“I understand a lot of them are really really busy and you cannot always do 
complete 100% research on clauses and so forth before they get into the contract, 
but it is very important that we get all the COs on the same sheet of music, 
especially those that are handling those type contractors that we end up deploying 
because there are many clauses.”  (SME #14, Contractor Interview, 2004). 
 
Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are captured in Table 33. 
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Table 33.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #6 
IQ 6. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Other Recommendations % 
11 Need for Joint Doctrine/DFARS Clause/Handbooks/Consistency 35% 
10 Requirements Definition 32% 
10 Communication is Critical/Communicating Expectations 32% 
9 Plan Early 29% 
8 Awareness - What you are signing up for…& Environ.. 26% 
7 Contractor Support is Critical/Clarify this support 23% 
7 Good Contract and Associated Clauses for COB/SOW 23% 
6 N/A 19% 
6 Acq Planning & CLS Considerations 19% 
5 Clarify Status of Contractor 16% 
5 Clarify Legal Issues to All Parties 16% 
3 Clarify Force Protection Policy 10% 
3 Accountability of COB 10% 
3 Standardized Contracting Language 10% 
3 Clarify Government Liabilities 10% 
3 Communicate with People in the Theater Where you Are Going 10% 
2 Expedite Mission Essential Designation 6% 
1 More Competition for the contracts 3% 
1 Contractor Cost Improvement 3% 
1 Private Sector Attorneys must be educated 3% 
1 Contractor needs to take more responsibility 3% 
1 Travel in and Out - Fed Travel Regulation 3% 
1 Define Battlefield 3% 
0 Centralized Contracting POC in Theater 0% 
0 CCOs in Theater  Help 0% 
0 Expediting Contracting and Quality 0% 
0 Better Govt Oversight 0% 
0 Work on Local Procurement in Theater - Save on Freight/Duty 0% 
0 Train the Combatant Commander in Acquisition 0% 
0 Education and Training 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Need for Joint Doctrine/DFARS 
Clause/Handbooks/Consistency, Requirements Definition, and Communication were the 
most frequent responses from the Air Force Policy Experts with regards to additional 
recommendation for handling the legal implications and support obligations.   
Need for Joint Doctrine/DFARS Clause/Handbooks/Consistency was the coding 
with the highest frequency for the Air Force Policy Expert case study group.  Several 
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subject matter experts commented on the need for more, better, joint, and consistent 
guidance.  SME #31, among others, stated that good, clear, joint doctrine is critical.  He 
stated, “The guidance doesn’t have a lot of teeth that would enforce a certain level of 
standardization amongst all geographic unified commands.”  SME #46 recommended a 
standard clause with fill-ins.   
Requirements Definition continues to be a pattern in response to this investigative 
question.  SME #26 stated that requirements definition and communication are critical for 
addressing the government’s support obligations and handling any of the legal 
implications.  A clear understanding of this upfront “. . . allows them to get the right 
people to do the job for you” (Air Force Interview, 2004).  SME #51 reiterated the need 
for early communication when he stated, “From an acquisition standpoint, ensure that 
communication between the contractor, acquiring activity, and requiring activity are 
conducted early on.”  There are several ways that this understanding can be facilitated 
“upfront” in the acquisition process.  SME #52 suggested that a pre-proposal conference 
to clarify and address the legal implications and support obligations.  Another 
recommendation for facilitating understanding amongst the stakeholders, was to be 
specific and thorough in detail.  SME #48 recommendation was “Nothing outside of 
being very specific what you expect and what is going to be expected from you . . . 
instead of generalities.”  Again, standardization and thorough guidance and policy appear 
to be the answer in facilitating fast, agile acquisition that clearly defines and addresses 
requirements, support obligations, and legal implications.   
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Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are presented 
in Table 34. 
Table 34.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #6 
Times 
Reported Programs That Use COB % 
10 Contractor Support is Critical/Clarify this support 77% 
10 Communication is Critical/Communicating Expectations 77% 
8 Requirements Definition 62% 
8 Plan Early 62% 
5 Good Contract and Associated Clauses for COB/SOW 38% 
5 Awareness - What you are signing up for…& Environ.. 38% 
5 Education and Training 38% 
4 Need for Joint Doctrine/DFARS Clause/Handbooks/Consistency 31% 
4 Clarify Status of Contractor 31% 
4 Clarify Legal Issues to All Parties 31% 
4 Integration of Contractor into Total Force 31% 
3 Expediting Contracting and Quality 23% 
3 Clarify Force Protection Policy 23% 
3 Acq Planning & CLS Considerations 23% 
3 Contractor needs to take more responsibility 23% 
2 Standardized Contracting Language 15% 
2 Clarify Government Liabilities 15% 
2 Expedite Mission Essential Designation 15% 
2 Better Govt Oversight 15% 
2 Travel in and Out - Fed Travel Regulation 15% 
1 Accountability of COB 8% 
1 N/A 8% 
1 More Competition for the contracts 8% 
0 Centralized Contracting POC in Theater 0% 
0 CCOs in Theater  Help 0% 
0 Work on Local Procurement in Theater - Save on Freight/Duty 0% 
0 Train the Combatant Commander in Acquisition 0% 
0 Communicate with People in the Theater Where you Are Going 0% 
0 Contractor Cost Improvement 0% 
0 Private Sector Attorneys must be educated 0% 
0 Define Battlefield 0% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The three highest coded categories 
among the program offices were Contractor Support is Critical/Clarify this support, 
Communication is Critical/Communicating Expectations, and Requirements Definition.  
The theme and/or pattern of clarifying requirements and good upfront communication are 
present within the Program Offices as well.  PO #10 recommended “addressing these 
issues up front,” while PO #8 recommended that “. . . everything is spelled out . . . and 
incorporated into the contract.”  The contract is critical to addressing support obligations, 
legal implications, and addressing each party’s expectations.  Although these battlefield 
contracts tend to be done expeditiously, PO #3 recommended communication of the 
requirements to the contractor upfront and “that it is spelled out in the contract.”  
Thoroughness and clear communication of expectations is critical in the execution and 
management of these battlefield contracts for all of the stakeholders. 
Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 35 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #6, additional 
recommendation for handling support obligations and addressing any legal implications 
with regards to battlefield contracts.   
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Table 35.  IQ #6 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts       Total for All Program Offices 
F Other Recommendations %   F Other Recommendations % 
19 Need for Joint Doctrine 36%   10 
Contractor Support is Critical/Clarify this 
support 77% 
16 Requirements Definition 30%   10 
Communication is Critical/Communicating 
Expectations 77% 
13 
Contractor Support is Critical/Clarify this 
support 25%   8 Requirements Definition 62% 
11 
Good Contract and Associated Clauses for 
COB/SOW 21%   8 Plan Early 62% 
10 
Communication is Critical/Communicating 
Expectations 19%   5 
Good Contract and Associated Clauses for 
COB/SOW 38% 
9 N/A 17%   5 
Awareness - What you are signing up for…& 
Environ.. 38% 
9 
Awareness - What you are signing up for…& 
Environ.. 17%   5 Education and Training 38% 
9 Plan Early 17%   4 Need for Joint Doctrine 31% 
8 Acq Planning & CLS Considerations 15%   4 Clarify Status of Contractor 31% 
6 Clarify Force Protection Policy 11%   4 Clarify Legal Issues to All Parties 31% 
5 Accountability of COB 9%   4 Integration of Contractor into Total Force 31% 
5 Clarify Status of Contractor 9%   3 Expediting Contracting and Quality 23% 
5 Clarify Legal Issues to All Parties 9%   3 Clarify Force Protection Policy 23% 
4 Standardized Contracting Language 8%   3 Acq Planning & CLS Considerations 23% 
4 Clarify Government Liabilities 8%   3 Contractor needs to take more responsibility 23% 
3 Expedite Mission Essential Designation 6%   2 Standardized Contracting Language 15% 
3 Communicate with People in the Theater  6%   2 Clarify Government Liabilities 15% 
2 Expediting Contracting and Quality 4%   2 Expedite Mission Essential Designation 15% 
1 Centralized Contracting POC in Theater 2%   2 Better Govt Oversight 15% 
1 CCOs in Theater  Help 2%   2 Travel in and Out - Fed Travel Regulation 15% 
1 Better Govt Oversight 2%   1 Accountability of COB 8% 
1 Work on Local Procurement in Theater 2%   1 N/A 8% 
1 
Train the Combatant Commander in 
Acquisition 2%   1 More Competition for the contracts 8% 
1 Education and Training 2%      
1 More Competition for the contracts 2%      
1 Contractor Cost Improvement 2%      
1 Private Sector Attorneys must be educated 2%      
1 Contractor needs to take more responsibility 2%      
1 Travel in and Out - Fed Travel Regulation 2%      
1 Define Battlefield 2%      
 
 
Table 36 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s most frequently identified codings for the handling of legal implications. 
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Table 36.  IQ #6 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Other Recommendations - 6         
Overall Policy Experts %   Program Offices % 
19 - Need for Joint Doctrine/DFARS 
Clause/Handbooks/Consistency 36%   
10 - Contractor Support is Critical/Clarify this 
support 77% 
16 - Requirements Definition 30%   
10 - Communication is Critical/Communicating 
Expectations 77% 
13 - Contractor Support is Critical/Clarify this support 25%   8 - Requirements Definition 62% 
11 - Good Contract and Associated Clauses for COB/SOW 21%   8 - Plan Early 62% 
10 - Communication is Critical/Communicating 
Expectations 19%   
5 - Good Contract and Associated Clauses for 
COB/SOW 38% 
    
5 - Awareness - What you are signing up for…& 
Environ.. 38% 
    5 - Education and Training 38% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Five of the codings are similar for 
both the Policy Experts and the Program offices.  Combining the total frequency counts 
from both the Policy Experts and Program Offices, the top five codings for additional 
recommendations for handling the support obligations and addressing the legal 
implications are rank ordered below according to frequency count: 
 1.  Requirements Definition  (24) 
 2.  Need for Joint Doctrine/DFARS Clause/Handbooks/Consistency  (23) 
 3.  Contractor Support is Critical/Clarify this support  (23) 
 4.  Communication is Critical/Communicating Expectations  (20) 
 5.  Good Contract and Associated Clauses for COB/SOW  (15) 
 
IQ 7-1. From a contractual standpoint, please explain how the following 
are utilized in a battlefield contract:  standard FAR clauses? 
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 37. 
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Table 37.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #7-1 
IQ 7-1. DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Standard FAR Clauses % 
2 N/A 50% 
1 Defense Base Act/Worker's Comp 25% 
1 War Hazards Compensation 25% 
1 New Army FAR Supp Clause 25% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The DoD Policy Experts mentioned 
the Defense Base Act Clause, War Hazards Compensation Clause, as well as a new Army 
FAR clause.  However, the majority of the DoD Policy Experts were not aware of, or 
could not recall at that exact moment, any specific battlefield clauses. 
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are captured in Table 38. 
 
Table 38.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #7-1 
IQ 7-1. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Standard FAR Clauses % 
8 N/A 100% 
0 Defense Base Act/Worker's Comp 0% 
0 War Hazards Compensation 0% 
0 New Army FAR Supp Clause 0% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The Contractor Personnel were not 
aware of, or could not recall at that exact moment, any specific battlefield FAR Clauses 
that needed to be captured in these contracts.  
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Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 39. 
 
Table 39.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #7-1 
IQ 7-1. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Standard FAR Clauses % 
7 N/A 70% 
3 There are many… 30% 
1 New Army FAR Supp Clause 10% 
1 Draft DFARS 10% 
0 Defense Base Act/Worker's Comp 0% 
0 War Hazards Compensation 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The Army Policy Experts did not 
know “specifics” on FAR clauses to be added to these battlefield contracts.  However, 
several individuals mentioned that there were several clauses that needed to be included 
in these battlefield contracts.  A new Army FAR clause was mentioned as well as the 
Draft DFARS clause. 
Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented Table 40. 
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Table 40.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #7-1 
IQ 7-1. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Standard FAR Clauses % 
21 N/A 68% 
7 Defense Base Act/Worker's Comp 23% 
5 War Hazards Compensation (Insurance 52.228-4) 16% 
2 Draft DFARS 6% 
1 There are many… 3% 
1 AFFARS - Pt 28 3% 
0 New Army FAR Supp Clause 0% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Air Force Policy 
Experts did not know the exact FAR clauses that should be captured in these battlefield 
contracts, but some knew that there were specific clauses for this type of acquisition.  
SME #53 stated, “There is a whole gaggle of clauses we use,” while SME #35 stated, “I 
don’t know them off the top of my head.”  Furthermore, the Defense Base Act and War 
Hazards Compensation clause were specifically mentioned several times.  SME #46 
stated, “They should have the Defense Base Act clause in there.  Any contract being 
performed overseas whether it is in support of combat operations or not, it should be in 
there.”  SME #44 knew some specific battlefield clauses and stated,  
The Defense Base Act requires contractors to provides workers compensation 
insurance for its overseas workers, and there are two clauses . . . FAR 52.228-3 
Worker’s Compensation and the other one 52.228-4 Worker’s Comp and War 
Hazard Insurance Overseas.  I know those two clauses have to go in.  I cannot 
recollect that there are other clauses but that does not mean there are none.  (SME 
#44, Air Force Interview, 2004). 
 
One subject matter expert mentioned a general instruction regarding contractor on the 
battlefield.  SME #42 referenced AFFARS 28 “. . . that addresses the requirements of 
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DODI 1320.37 which is the critical mission support requirements that may be contracted 
out.”   
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are captured 
in Table 41. 
 
Table 41.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #7-1 
Times 
Reported Standard FAR Clauses % 
9 N/A 69% 
4 There are many… 31% 
2 War Hazards Compensation (Insurance 52.228-4) 15% 
1 Defense Base Act/Worker's Comp 8% 
1 Capture and Detention 8% 
1 Anti-Terrorism Force Protection Policy 252-225.7043 8% 
0 New Army FAR Supp Clause 0% 
0 Draft DFARS 0% 
0 AFFARS - Pt 28 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The three highest coded categories 
among the Program Offices were N/A, There Are Many, and the War Hazards 
Compensation clause.  PO #4 stated, “I would have to look it up,” PO #10 stated, “I don’t 
know,” while others referenced guidance from the General Counsel’s office.  PO #9 
stated that they use “nothing unique.”  SME #5 stated that the main clauses unique to 
battlefield contracts were War Hazards Compensation, Capture and Detention, and the 
Anti-terrorism Force Protection Policy (252-225.7043).   
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Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 42 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #7-1, standard 
FAR clauses used for battlefield contracts.     
 
Table 42.  IQ #7-1 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts       Total for All Program Offices 
F Handling of Legal Implications %   F Handling of Legal Implications % 
28 N/A 53%   9 N/A 69% 
14 There are many… 26%   4 There are many… 31% 
8 Defense Base Act/Worker's Comp 15%   2 
War Hazards Compensation (Insurance 
52.228-4) 15% 
6 
War Hazards Compensation (Insurance 
52.228-4) 11%   1 Defense Base Act/Worker's Comp 8% 
3 Draft DFARS 6%   1 Capture and Detention 8% 
2 New Army FAR Supp Clause 4%   1 
Anti-Terrorism Force Protection Policy 252-
225.7043 8% 
1 AFFARS - Pt 28 2%   0 New Army FAR Supp Clause 0% 
     0 Draft DFARS 0% 
     0 AFFARS - Pt 28 0% 
 
 
Table 43 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s most frequently identified codings for standard battlefield FAR clauses to be 
inserted into these contracts. 
 
Table 43.  IQ #7-1 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Standard FAR Clauses – 7-1        
Overall Policy Experts %  Program Offices % 
28 - N/A 53%  9 - N/A 69% 
14 - There are many… 26%  4 - There are many… 31% 
8 - Defense Base Act/Worker's Comp 15%  
2 - War Hazards Compensation (Insurance  
52.228-4) 15% 
6 - War Hazards Compensation (Insurance 
52.228-4) 11%  1 - Defense Base Act/Worker's Comp 8% 
3 - Draft DFARS 6%  1 - Capture and Detention 8% 
   
1 - Anti-Terrorism Force Protection Policy 252-
225.7043 8% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Four of codings are similar for both 
the Policy Experts and the Program offices.  Combining the total frequency counts from 
both the Policy Experts and Program Offices, the top four codings for standard battlefield 
contract FAR clauses are rank ordered below according to frequency count: 
 1.  N/A  (37) 
 2.  There are many  (18) 
 3.  Defense Base Act  (9) 
 4.  War Hazards Compensation  (8) 
 
The Program Offices highlighted two other clauses that were not even mentioned 
by the Policy Experts.  These clauses included Capture and Detention and the Anti-
Terrorism clause.  It is also notable that the Policy Experts were aware of the Draft 
DFARS clause, while the Program Offices had no idea that this was being worked. 
IQ 7-2. From a contractual standpoint, please explain how the following 
are utilized in a battlefield contract:  Statement of Work. 
(In other words, how would you characterize these battlefield 
SOWs?) 
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 44. 
 
Table 44.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #7-2 
IQ 7-2. DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Characterization of COB SOWs % 
2 General/Flexible 50% 
2 N/A 50% 
1 Rigid - Very Detailed/Specific 25% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Half of the DoD Policy Experts 
stated that the SOWs were General/Flexible.  SME #1 stated that these battlefield SOWs 
“. . . tend to be very general,” which, in his mind, could cause a problem as the contract is 
being performed. 
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are captured in Table 45. 
 
Table 45.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #7-2 
IQ 7-2. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Characterization of COB SOWs % 
7 General/Flexible 88% 
2 Rigid - Very Detailed/Specific 25% 
1 N/A 13% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Contractor 
Personnel characterized the SOWs as being General/Flexible.  SME #6 stated, “They are 
general . . . there is not a whole lot of detail in them.”  The nature of a general SOW lends 
itself to being flexible and being able to adapt to the dynamic battlefield environment.  
SME #8 stated, “They have to be flexible enough to adjust to what is really going to 
happen,” and SME #12 stated, “They are usually very general with a great deal of 
flexibility built into them because the situation is seldom clearly defined.” 
Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are captured in Table 46. 
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Table 46.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #7-2 
IQ 7-2. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Characterization of COB SOWs % 
6 General/Flexible 60% 
4 It depends 40% 
2 N/A 20% 
1 Rigid - Very Detailed/Specific 10% 
1 Performance Based 10% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Army Policy 
Experts characterized the SOWs as General/Flexible.  SME #14 stated that the SOO was 
the preferred method, allowing “. . . the contractor flexibility to accomplish the mission.”  
SME #21 stated that battlefield contractors provide support in a contingency 
environment, and “contingencies by their very nature need to be flexible.”  Again, the 
theme is that a general SOW allows for much needed flexibility.  SME #17 reiterated this 
point and stated that these SOWs are generic to “give you the flexibility to be able to 
modify it if you need to meet new emerging demands or situations.”  The battlefield is 
ever changing, and it appears that the contractual vehicle is continuously being updated 
and modified in such circumstances. 
Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 47.   
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Table 47.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #7-2 
IQ 7-2. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Characterization of COB SOWs % 
13 General/Flexible 42% 
12 Rigid - Very Detailed/Specific 39% 
10 It depends 32% 
8 N/A 26% 
2 Performance Based 6% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Air Force Policy 
Experts characterized these SOWs as General/Flexible.  The theme is consistent across 
all case study groups.  SME #39 stated that “because of the nature of the work . . . they 
[the SOWs] tend to be flexible.”  However, there were several Air Force Policy Experts 
that purported that these battlefield SOWs should be very much like CONUS contracts, 
providing specific details of the work to be performed.  SME #23 stated, “Make sure you 
don’t miss anything.”  This is an interesting finding in itself.  Although the majority thus 
far have stated that battlefield SOWs should be general and flexible, a number of Air 
Force Policy Experts stated that the requirements should be rigidly defined.  Is there a 
balance that can be met between the two? 
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are captured 
in Table 48. 
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Table 48.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #7-2 
Times 
Reported Characterization of COB SOWs % 
11 General/Flexible 85% 
5 It depends 38% 
4 Rigid - Very Detailed/Specific 31% 
2 Performance Based 15% 
0 N/A 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of the Air Force 
Program Offices stated that their battlefield SOWs are General/Flexible.  SME #5 stated, 
“The more general and broad that you can keep some areas is definitely more benefit 
when you get into a contingency environment.” The pattern continues with the 
acquisition personnel that have current “hands-on” experience with these battlefield 
contracts.  SME #11 stated that their SOW is general “. . . to give them the flexibility to 
do what they need to do” and SME #4 stated, “Ours is pretty general, and it provides 
flexibility to be able to go in and make changes as needed.” 
Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 49 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #7-2, the 
characterization of battlefield SOWs.   
 
Table 49.  IQ #7-2 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts      Total for All Program Offices 
F Characterization of COB SOWS %  F Characterization of COB SOWS % 
28 General/Flexible 53%  11 General/Flexible 85% 
16 Rigid - Very Detailed/Specific 30%  5 It depends 38% 
14 N/A 26%  4 Rigid - Very Detailed/Specific 31% 
14 It depends 26%  2 Performance Based 15% 
3 Performance Based 6%  0 N/A 0% 
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Table 50 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s most frequently identified codings for the characterization of these battlefield 
SOWs.   
 
Table 50.  IQ #7-2 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Characterization of COB SOWS – 7-2        
Overall Policy Experts %  Program Offices % 
28 - General/Flexible 53%  11 - General/Flexible 85% 
16 - Rigid - Very Detailed/Specific 30%  5 - It depends 38% 
14 - N/A 26%  4 - Rigid - Very Detailed/Specific 31% 
14 - It depends 26%  2 - Performance Based 15% 
3 - Performance Based 6%    
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Four of codings are similar for both 
the Policy Experts and the Program offices.  The pattern that emerged was that these 
SOWs tend to be General/Flexible.  Combining the total frequency counts from both the 
Policy Experts and Program Offices, the top four codings for the characterization of 
battlefield SOWs are rank ordered below according to frequency count: 
 1.  General/Flexible  (39) 
 2.  Rigid – Very Detailed/Specific  (20) 
 3.  It Depends  (19) 
 4.  N/A  (14) 
 
IQ 8. What attachments to the contracts have been used to provide 
support and training to defense contractors on the battlefield? 
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are captured in Table 51. 
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Table 51.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #8 
IQ #8. DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Attachments for Support/Training % 
2 SOW 50% 
2 N/A 50% 
1 Clauses 25% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Half of the DoD Policy Experts 
stated that the SOW was the appropriate place to capture the requirements for support and 
training.  SME #1 stated, “It is typically in the SOW.” 
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 52. 
 
Table 52.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #8 
IQ 8. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Attachments for Support/Training % 
4 SOW 50% 
3 N/A 38% 
1 Clauses 13% 
1 Basic Contract/CLINs 13% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Contractor 
Personnel stated that the SOW was the appropriate place within the contract to capture 
support and training requirements.  For example, SME #10 stated, “They are put in the 
SOWs of each task order,” SME #11 stated, “It is usually spelled out specifically in the 
individual task order SOW,” and SME #8 stated that these requirements are in the SOW 
which “is part of the contract.” 
 
 
 125
Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are captured in Table 53. 
 
Table 53.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #8 
IQ 8. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Attachments for Support/Training % 
5 SOW 50% 
4 N/A 40% 
3 Basic Contract/CLINs 30% 
2 Habitual Relationship/CRC 20% 
1 It is a problem 10% 
0 Clauses 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Army Policy 
Experts characterized the SOW as the appropriate place to capture battlefield support and 
training requirements.  However, from their responses that were riddled with uncertainty, 
the investigator determined that these requirements are not being captured in the SOW as 
they should be.  SME #17 stated, “I think it is captured in the SOW for the most part,” 
and SME #21 stated, “of course it can be in the SOW.”  Furthermore, SME #13 stated, 
“They should put this in the SOW,” and SME #19 said that if these requirements were put 
into the SOWs, “. . . it would solve so many problems.” 
Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 54. 
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Table 54.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #8 
IQ 8. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Attachments for Support/Training % 
21 N/A 68% 
4 SOW 13% 
4 Basic Contract/CLINs 13% 
2 Clauses 6% 
2 It is a problem 6% 
2 Misc. Attachments/Handbooks/LOI 6% 
2 Contractor Provides Their Own 6% 
1 Habitual Relationship/CRC 3% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Air Force Policy 
Experts did not know exactly where to put these requirements with a response coding of 
N/A.  The SOW and in the Basic Contract/CLINs were the next most frequent choices 
among this group.  SME #29 and #47 simply stated, “Don’t know,” SME #30, #34, and 
39 stated, “I am not sure,” and SME #38 retorted, “I wouldn’t know that.”  SME #27 said 
that it should be captured somewhere in the contract, but did not add any specificity to his 
answer.   
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are presented 
in Table 55. 
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Table 55.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #8 
Times 
Reported Attachments for Support/Training % 
4 SOW 31% 
4 MOA 31% 
3 N/A 23% 
2 Clauses 15% 
2 Basic Contract/CLINs 15% 
1 Misc. Attachments/Handbooks/LOI 8% 
0 Habitual Relationship/CRC 0% 
0 It is a problem 0% 
0 Contractor Provides Their Own 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of the Air Force 
Program Offices stated that these support and training requirements are either captured in 
their SOWs or Memorandums of Agreements/Understanding with other organizations.  
For example, PO #9 stated, “I know it’s captured in the workload agreement . . . which is 
an agreement between the sponsoring program office and the associated base.”  PO #10 
stated, “it is documented in our Support Agreement,” and PO #11 stated, “This goes back 
to the checklist that the Det and the contractor go through before they deploy these 
people.”  It seems as if these program offices were “hands-off” when it came to support 
and training for their contractors that are deploying or have deployed to the battlefield. 
Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 56 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #8, the 
appropriate place to capture support and/or training requirements for the battlefield 
contractors.   
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Table 56.  IQ #8 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts       Total for All Program Offices 
F Attachments for Support/Training %   F Attachments for Support/Training % 
30 N/A 57%   4 SOW 31% 
15 SOW 28%   4 MOA 31% 
8 Basic Contract/CLINs 15%   3 N/A 23% 
4 Clauses 8%   2 Clauses 15% 
3 Habitual Relationship/CRC 6%   2 Basic Contract/CLINs 15% 
3 It is a problem 6%   1 Misc. Attachments/Handbooks/LOI 8% 
2 Misc. Attachments/Handbooks/LOI 4%   0 Habitual Relationship/CRC 0% 
2 Contractor Provides Their Own 4%   0 It is a problem 0% 
     0 Contractor Provides Their Own 0% 
 
 
Table 57 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s most frequently identified codings for the placement of support and/or training 
clarification and documentation.   
 
Table 57.  IQ #8 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Attachments for Support/Training – 8        
Overall Policy Experts %  Program Offices % 
30 - N/A 57%  4 - SOW 31% 
15 – SOW 28%  4 - MOA 31% 
8 - Basic Contract/CLINs 15%  3 - N/A 23% 
4 – Clauses 8%  2 - Clauses 15% 
3 - Habitual Relationship/CRC 6%  2 - Basic Contract/CLINs 15% 
3 - It is a problem 6%  1 - Misc. Attachments/Handbooks/LOI 8% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Most of the codings are similar for 
both the Policy Experts and the Program offices.  The pattern that emerged was that a lot 
of people did not actually know where these requirements should be captured and the 
ones who thought they knew, believed that the SOW was the best location. 
Four of codings are similar for both the Policy Experts and the Program offices.  
Combining the total frequency counts from both the Policy Experts and Program Offices, 
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the top four codings for the placement of support and/or training obligations are rank 
ordered below according to frequency count: 
 1.  N/A  (33) 
 2.  SOW  (19) 
 3.  Basic Contract/CLINs  (10) 
 4.  Clauses  (6) 
 
IQ 9-1. How have past contracts been structured to acquire the services of 
defense contractors on the battlefield? 
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 58. 
 
Table 58.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #9-1 
IQ 9-1. DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Structure of Contracts % 
3 N/A 75% 
1 BOA 25% 
1 Fixed Price 25% 
1 Cost Reimbursable 25% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of DoD Policy 
Experts did not know how these contracts have been structured with the respective 
coding of N/A.  However, the BOA, Fixed Price Contract, and Cost Reimbursable 
Contract all received equal reportings.   
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 59. 
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Table 59.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #9-1 
IQ 9-1. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Structure of Contracts % 
4 N/A 50% 
3 BOA 38% 
2 Cost Reimbursable 25% 
1 Separate Contracts 13% 
0 Fixed Price 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Contractor 
Personnel stated that they did not know exactly what contract structure was being used 
for these battlefield contracts with a corresponding coding of N/A.  However, the Basic 
Ordering Agreement (BOA) was highlighted more times than any other type of contract 
structure.   
Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 60. 
 
Table 60.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #9-1 
IQ 9-1. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Structure of Contracts % 
6 N/A 60% 
3 It Depends 30% 
2 BOA 20% 
1 Fixed Price 10% 
1 Cost Reimbursable 10% 
1 Separate Contracts 10% 
1 UCAs 10% 
1 IDIQ 10% 
1 MODS/Add CLINS to already existing contracts 10% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Army Policy 
Experts stated that they did not know exactly what contract structure was being used for 
these battlefield contracts with a corresponding coding of N/A.  Some Army Policy 
Experts stated that the contract structure depends on the nature of the acquisition, 
environment, and work to be performed.  However, the Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) 
was highlighted more times than any other type of contract structure.   
Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 61. 
 
Table 61.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #9-1 
IQ 9-1. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Structure of Contracts % 
20 N/A 65% 
7 BOA 23% 
6 Separate Contracts 19% 
4 MODS/Add CLINS to already existing contracts 13% 
1 Cost Reimbursable 3% 
1 UCAs 3% 
1 IDIQ 3% 
1 T&M 3% 
0 Fixed Price 0% 
0 It Depends 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Air Force Policy 
Experts stated that they did not know exactly what contract structure was being used for 
these battlefield contracts with a corresponding coding of N/A.  However, the Basic 
Ordering Agreement (BOA) was highlighted more times than any other type of contract 
structure.  For example, SME #28 stated that the BOA “. . . has provided a lot of 
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flexibility where the basic terms and agreements are already identified and agreed to so if 
we have an emergency issue that comes up, we can just issue an order against the BOA.”  
Also, several Air Force Policy Experts stated that these battlefield support requirements 
should be segregated from the program’s other requirements, with an associated coding 
of Separate Contracts.   
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are presented 
in Table 62. 
 
Table 62.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #9-1 
Times 
Reported Structure of Contracts % 
6 Separate Contracts 46% 
5 BOA 38% 
4 MODS/Add CLINS to already existing contracts 31% 
2 N/A 15% 
2 IDIQ 15% 
0 Fixed Price 0% 
0 Cost Reimbursable 0% 
0 UCAs 0% 
0 It Depends 0% 
0 T&M 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Air Force Program 
Offices stated that this type of contract should be segregated from the program’s other 
programs (Separate Contracts) and that the BOA was the preferred contract structure.  
For example, PO #5 stated, “We established a BOA specifically to support contingencies 
based on our experiences with Operation Enduring Freedom.”  The BOA appears to be 
one of the major themes for this investigative question.  SME #2 stated “We have a BOA 
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against which we place orders.  Each order is a separate entity.”  PO #1 and #4 said that 
they also have a BOA from which they place orders for battlefield support. 
Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 63 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #9-1, the 
preferred contract structure for acquiring and managing the services of contractors on the 
battlefield.     
 
Table 63.  IQ #9-1 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts       Total for All Program Offices 
F Structure of Contracts %   F Structure of Contracts % 
33 N/A 62%   6 Separate Contracts 46% 
13 BOA 25%   5 BOA 38% 
8 Separate Contracts 15%   4 MODS/Add CLINS to existing Ks 31% 
5 Cost Reimbursable 9%   2 N/A 15% 
5 MODS/Add CLINS to existing Ks 9%   2 IDIQ 15% 
3 It Depends 6%      
2 Fixed Price 4%      
2 UCAs 4%      
2 IDIQ 4%      
1 T&M 2%      
 
 
Table 64 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s most frequently identified codings for the preferred battlefield contract structure.   
 
Table 64.  IQ #9-1 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Structure of Contracts - 9-1         
Overall Policy Experts %   Program Offices % 
33 - N/A 62%   6 - Separate Contracts 46% 
13 - BOA 25%   5 - BOA 38% 
8 - Separate Contracts 15%   4 - MODS/Add CLINS to existing Ks 31% 
5 - Cost Reimbursable 9%   2 - N/A 15% 
5 - MODS/Add CLINS to existing Ks 9%   2 - IDIQ 15% 
3 - It Depends 6%     
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The pattern that emerged was that 
Policy Personnel and the Program offices most frequently did not know the exact contract 
structure to use (N/A).  However, of the personnel that submitted a recommendation for 
the preferred battlefield contract structure, the BOA as the preferred method of acquiring 
battlefield services and support.  Also, it can be noted that separate and distinct contracts 
are preferred versus using an already established contract and modifying the language 
and/or adding new CLINs. 
Three of the codings are similar for both the Policy Experts and the Program 
offices.  Combining the total frequency counts from both the Policy Experts and Program 
Offices, the top three codings for the preferred battlefield contract structure are rank 
ordered below according to frequency count: 
 1.  N/A (don’t know)  (35) 
 2.  BOA  (18) 
 3.  Separate Contracts  (14) 
 
IQ 9-2. How have past contracts been negotiated to acquire the services of 
defense contractors on the battlefield? 
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 65. 
 
Table 65.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #9-2 
IQ 9-2 DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Negotiation for COB % 
3 N/A 75% 
1 More Difficult/Complex 25% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of DoD Policy 
Experts did not know how to characterize the negotiations for these battlefield contracts, 
with an associated coding of N/A.  
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 66. 
 
Table 66.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #9-2 
IQ 9-2. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Negotiation for COB % 
6 More Difficult/Complex 75% 
1 N/A 13% 
1 Easier 13% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Contractor 
Personnel stated that these negotiations were more difficult and/or more complex than 
other contracts.  For example, SME #6 stated, “As you drill on down, I think that is 
where it gets difficult because that cost is not known until sometime after engineering is 
developed enough that we can tell you that.”  SME #8 provided another insightful 
example.  He stated that there is “greater complexity” in the negotiations with their sub-
contractors in these types of battlefield contracts versus other standard CONUS systems 
contracts.   
Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 67. 
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Table 67.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #9-2 
IQ 9-2. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Negotiation for COB % 
5 N/A 50% 
4 Easier 40% 
2 More Difficult/Complex 20% 
1 It Depends 10% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Army Policy 
Experts stated that they did not know exactly how the negotiations went for these 
battlefield contracts, with an associated response of N/A.  However, several Army Policy 
Experts did say these battlefield contract negotiations were actually Easier.  SME #14 
stated that “…the negotiations are fairly straight forward.”   
Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 68. 
 
Table 68.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #9-2 
IQ 9-2. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Negotiation for COB % 
21 N/A 68% 
9 More Difficult/Complex 29% 
3 Easier 10% 
2 It Depends 6% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Air Force Policy 
Experts stated that they did not know exactly how the negotiations went for these 
battlefield contracts and had an associated coding of N/A.  Also, the individuals who did 
have insight into these negotiations, stated that they were often difficult and more 
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complex than standard CONUS systems contract negotiations.  Some of the Air Force 
Policy Experts made some general comments about the complexities of these battlefield 
contracts.  For example, SME #52 stated, “I would say that they are complicated,” and 
SME #25 stated, “There are some added complexities.”  However, some of the Air Force 
Policy Experts explained some very specific complexities in regards to these OCONUS 
battlefield contracts.  For example, SME #24 stated that it is not easy to verify “[m]aterial 
costs in particular locations around the world.”  Another specific example of the 
difficulties and complexities of negotiating battlefield contracts revolved around 
contractors getting the required immunizations for the specific area of operation.  SME 
#28 stated, “I know there was some difficulty in negotiating some of the requirements for 
shots, and that was something that we had to negotiate and include in the requirements.”  
Other difficulties arose out of the nature of these expedited contract actions.  SME #30 
explained how expedited contracts and undefinitized contract actions are complicated.  
He stated, “As requirements became available, those NTEs were changed through the 
definitization process, which was long and drawn out.”   
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are presented 
in Table 69. 
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Table 69.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #9-2 
Times 
Reported Negotiation for COB % 
9 More Difficult/Complex 69% 
4 Easier 31% 
1 N/A 8% 
1 It Depends 8% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Air Force Program 
Offices stated that these battlefield contracts have been more difficult to negotiate and 
have added complexities when compared to standard CONUS systems contract 
negotiations.  For example, PO #3 stated, “I think you have to reach an understanding as 
to what sort of additional costs and/or incentives you are going to negotiate to place 
someone in a hazardous area.”  Other Program Offices stated that the added complexities 
came from selecting the unique clauses to put into these battlefield contracts, and the pre-
deployment, logistical, and administrative support obligations that the government must 
provide to the battlefield contractor. 
Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 70 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #9-2, the 
characterization of the negotiations for these battlefield contracts.   
 
Table 70.  IQ #9-2 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts      Total for All Program Offices 
F Negotiation for COB %  F Negotiation for COB % 
30 N/A 57%  9 More Difficult/Complex 69% 
18 More Difficult/Complex 34%  4 Easier 31% 
8 Easier 15%  1 N/A 8% 
3 It Depends 6%  1 It Depends 8% 
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Table 71 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s most frequently identified codings for the characterization of battlefield contract 
negotiations.   
 
Table 71.  IQ #9-2 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Negotiation for COB - 9-2        
Overall Policy Experts %  Program Offices % 
30 - N/A 57%  9 - More Difficult/Complex 69% 
18 - More Difficult/Complex 34%  4 - Easier 31% 
8 - Easier 15%  1 - N/A 8% 
3 - It Depends 6%  1 - It Depends 8% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The pattern that emerged was that 
Policy Personnel had limited insight into the negotiations for the battlefield contracts with 
associated codings of N/A.  However, another pattern emerged between the Policy 
Experts and Program Offices that provided greater insight into battlefield contract 
negotiations.  The majority of the personnel that did have insight into these negotiations 
stated that these negotiations were more difficult and had added complexities than normal 
CONUS systems contracts. 
All four codings are similar for both the Policy Experts and the Program offices.  
Combining the total frequency counts from both the Policy Experts and Program Offices, 
the codings for the characterization of battlefield contracts are rank ordered below 
according to frequency count: 
 1.  N/A (don’t know)  (34) 
 2.  More Difficult/Complex  (27) 
 3.  Easier  (12) 
 4.  It Depends  (4) 
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IQ 10. What attachments to the contracts have been used to clarify 
defense contractors’ roles and responsibilities on the battlefield? 
(In other words, who does the contractor report to in the field?) 
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are captured in Table 72. 
 
Table 72.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #10 
IQ 10. DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported 
Clarification of COB Roles 
and Responsibilities % 
3 COTR 75% 
1 DCMA 25% 
1 N/A 25% 
1 Contracting Officer 25% 
1 Local Commander 25% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of DoD Policy 
Experts stated that if there was a problem in the field, the contractor should report to the 
COTR.  The majority of these individuals stated that this chain of command is unclear 
and a problem in these battlefield contracts, and often there is no COTR in the field to act 
as a liaison between the warfighter, contractor, and acquisition community.  For example, 
SME #1 stated, “There is not a COTR or there is not a trained COTR or someone who is 
designated as a COTR.”  Several others shared the same type of comments among this 
case study group.  SME #2 stated, “This is one of the issues we are trying to work out,” 
and SME #4 stated, “Probably the best bet would be to have a strong contracting officer’s 
representative.” 
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Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 73. 
 
Table 73.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #10 
IQ 10. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported 
Clarification of COB Roles 
and Responsibilities % 
4 DCMA/ACO 50% 
4 Contracting Officer 50% 
3 COTR 38% 
2 N/A 25% 
2 Local Commander 25% 
1 Program Manager  13% 
1 Contractor Interface/Lead 13% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The Contractor Policy Experts 
stated that there were several interfaces that the contractor could report to in the field.  
For instance, SME #10 stated that the ACO, COTR, PCO, and contractor lead would all 
be involved.  However, the CO and the ACO ranked among the highest selected by these 
individuals.  For example, SME #11 stated, We would address problems through the 
contracting community,” and SME #12 stated, “The person that we are responsible to is 
the ACO, actually you can say the PCO.” 
Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 74. 
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Table 74.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #10 
IQ 10. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported 
Clarification of COB Roles and 
Responsibilities % 
9 COTR 90% 
6 DCMA/ACO 60% 
5 Contracting Officer 50% 
4 Contracting Lead in Theater/Coordination Cell 40% 
2 Contractor Interface/Lead 20% 
0 N/A 0% 
0 Local Commander 0% 
0 Program Manager  0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Army Policy 
Experts stated that the COTR is the contractor’s primary means of communicating and/or 
resolving any problems or issues with regards to these battlefield contracts.  Several 
Army Policy Experts, although they highlighted the COTR, reported that this chain of 
command was often unclear for the contractor.  SME #20 identified this as a problem and 
stated, “The unit should have a COR identified and we’re trying to train people on what 
that means and what their roles are.”  SME #13 also stated that “[t]his is definitely an 
area for improvement,” but that the contractor “will usually report to a COR or a COTR.”  
Others stated that the PCO was usually not forward deployed with the troops.  SME #18 
stated, “So if a contractor has a problem, they are naturally going to go to the COR, 
because that is their POC to the government back to the CO.”  SME #22 stated, “Many 
times the CO is not located in theater, so ideally you would want to have a CO’s 
representative in theater.”  Again, the majority of the responses from these Army Policy 
Experts were comprised of several individuals and/or multiple interfaces that the 
contractor could report to.   
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Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are captured in Table 75. 
 
Table 75.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #10 
IQ 10. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported 
Clarification of COB Roles and 
Responsibilities % 
12 N/A 39% 
12 Contracting Officer 39% 
7 DCMA/ACO 23% 
4 COTR 13% 
4 Local Commander 13% 
3 Contractor Interface/Lead 10% 
2 QAE 6% 
2 Attorneys for both sides 6% 
1 Program Manager  3% 
1 MOA - User-Buyer-Ktr 3% 
0 Contracting Lead in Theater/Coordination Cell 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The Air Force Policy Experts had a 
different opinion than the Army Policy Experts.  The majority of Air Force Policy 
Experts stated that the contractors should report back through the CO and the ACO.  For 
example, SME #28 stated, “The chain of command is through the contracting officer 
always,” SME #51 reported, “The chain of command from a legal standpoint would 
reside with the CO that awarded the contract,” and SME #27 stated that the contractor’s 
“first line, they go back to the CO.”  Just as some of the Army Policy Experts pointed 
out, several Air Force Policy Experts explained that the CO was often not forward 
deployed and that this could lead to problems.  SME #32 stated,  
It may very well be a matter of policy that we do not have enough forward-
deployed COs and that that is really one of the answers to this whole thing.  The 
commanders complain that it takes too long, I don’t know who the CO is back in 
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the states, and so on… It may be that rather than trying to solve this by contract 
clauses, we need to think about better staffing methods, and the contractors need 
to think about it too.  (SME #32, Air Force Interview, 2004). 
 
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are presented 
in Table 76. 
 
Table 76.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #10 
Times 
Reported 
Clarification of COB Roles and 
Responsibilities % 
6 Program Manager  46% 
5 Contracting Officer 38% 
5 Contractor Interface/Lead 38% 
4 Habitual Support Relationship/Detachment 31% 
3 COTR 23% 
2 DCMA/ACO 15% 
2 Local Commander 15% 
1 QAE 8% 
0 N/A 0% 
0 Contracting Lead in Theater/Coordination Cell 0% 
0 MOA - User-Buyer-Ktr 0% 
0 Attorneys for both sides 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Air Force Program 
Offices stated that the contractor should come back through the Air Force Program 
Manager and Contracting Officer.  PO #2 stated, “They have never contacted me [a 
CO],” while SME #4 reported, “Actually they go back to the Program Manager and to us 
here into contracting.”  SME #6 highlighted the Program Managers role as liaison.  He 
stated, “The Program Managers also have dialogue with the folks that are out in the field” 
and they take “. . . an active role in trying to resolve those situations.” 
 
 
 145
Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 77 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #10, the 
clarification of the contractor’s chain of command while working on the battlefield.   
 
Table 77.  IQ #10 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts     Total for All Program Offices 
F 
Clarification of COB 
Roles/Responsibilities %   F 
Clarification of COB 
Roles/Responsibilities % 
22 Contracting Officer 42%   6 Program Manager  46% 
19 COTR 36%   5 Contracting Officer 38% 
18 DCMA/ACO 34%   5 Contractor Interface/Lead 38% 
15 N/A 28%   4 Habitual Support Relationship/Detachment 31% 
7 Local Commander 13%   3 COTR 23% 
6 Contractor Interface/Lead 11%   2 DCMA/ACO 15% 
4 
Contracting Lead in 
Theater/Coordination Cell 8%   2 Local Commander 15% 
2 Program Manager  4%   1 QAE 8% 
2 QAE 4%   0 N/A 0% 
2 Attorneys for both sides 4%   0 
Contracting Lead in Theater/Coordination 
Cell 0% 
1 MOA - User-Buyer-Ktr 2%   0 MOA - User-Buyer-Ktr 0% 
     0 Attorneys for both sides 0% 
 
 
Table 78 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s most frequently identified codings for the clarification of the contractor’s chain 
of command while working on the battlefield.   
 
Table 78.  IQ #10 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Clarification of COB Roles and Responsibilities - 10   
Overall Policy Experts %  Program Offices % 
22 - Contracting Officer 42%  6 - Program Manager  46% 
19 - COTR 36%  5 - Contracting Officer 38% 
18 - DCMA/ACO 34%  5 - Contractor Interface/Lead 38% 
15 - N/A 28%  4 - Habitual Support Relationship/Detachment 31% 
7 - Local Commander 13%  3 - COTR 23% 
6 - Contractor Interface/Lead 11%  2 - DCMA/ACO 15% 
   2 - Local Commander 15% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The pattern that emerged was that 
the Contracting Officer should be the primary focal point for the contractor out in the 
field.  Another pattern that emerged from the data is that there appears to be multiple 
interfaces for the contractor, and this complexity in their reporting chain could essentially 
cause some problems.  It was interesting to note that the Air Force Program Offices said 
that the PM was the first person contractors should report to, while the Policy Experts 
thought it only to be a remote possibility. 
Combining the total frequency counts from both the Policy Experts and Program 
Offices, the top three codings for the clarification of the contractor’s chain of command 
are rank ordered below according to frequency count: 
 1.  Contracting Officer  (27) 
 2.  COTR  (22) 
 3.  DCMA/ACO  (20) 
 
IQ 11. What are the lessons learned from these programs using 
contractors on the battlefield? 
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
Each lesson learned should be considered individually no matter where it 
originated from or how frequent of a response from the Policy Experts and Air Force 
Program Offices.  Thus, these lessons learned will be presented and discussed in more 
detail in Chapter V.  However, Table 79 highlights the most frequently identified lessons 
learned from the Policy Experts compared with the Program Offices. 
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Table 79.  IQ #11 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Lessons Learned - 11         
Overall Policy Experts %   Program Offices % 
18 - Clear Communication 34%   11 - Clear Communication 85% 
18 - Requirements Definition 34%   9 - Good Acquisition Planning with All Parties  69% 
14 - Good Acquisition Planning with All Parties  26%   9 - Requirements Definition 69% 
13 - Better support to contractor - Understand our Obligations 25%   8 - Think of everyone as a team - Contractor & Govt 62% 
12 - Don't have any lessons learned/Need to Capture Them 23%   6 - Theater Coordination 46% 
12 - Theater Coordination 23%   6 - Flexibility 46% 
11 - A good contract 21%   
5 - Better support to the contractor - Understand our 
Obligations 38% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Patterns emerged for this category, 
and five of the top recommendations from both the Policy Experts and the Program 
Offices matched.  Combining the total scores, the top five answers for the contractor’s 
appropriate chain of command while working in the battlefield area are rank ordered 
below according to frequency count: 
 1.  Clear Communication  (29) 
 2.  Requirements Definition  (27) 
 3.  Good Acquisition Planning with All Parties  (23) 
 4.  Better Support to Contractor and Theater Coordination  (18) 
 5.  Theater Coordination (18) 
 
IQ 12-1. When drafting a battlefield contract, what contract type would be 
most suitable? 
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 80. 
 
 
 
 
 
 148
Table 80.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #12-1 
IQ 12-1 DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Contract Type % 
3 Cost Reimbursable 75% 
2 Fixed Price 50% 
2 It Depends 50% 
1 CPAF 25% 
1 N/A 25% 
1 Commercial 25% 
1 T&M 25% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of DoD Policy 
Experts stated that a cost reimbursable would be the most suitable contract type for these 
battlefield contracts.  However, several of these individuals also said that it depends on 
the circumstances.  For instance, SME #1 stated, “I would say it would depend upon 
which phase of the conflict that you are in.” 
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 81. 
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Table 81.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #12-1 
IQ 12-1. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Contract Type % 
8 Cost Reimbursable 100% 
3 Fixed Price 38% 
3 It Depends 38% 
2 CPAF 25% 
2 CPFF 25% 
1 Mixed Contract Type 13% 
1 ODC CLINs/Over and Above 13% 
0 N/A 0% 
0 Commercial 0% 
0 T&M 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The Contractor Policy Experts 
stated that the most suitable contract type for these battlefield contracts is cost 
reimbursable.  However, several Contractor Policy Experts offered different contract 
types for different reasons while some individuals stated that it just all depends on the 
situation.  For example, SME #7 stated that in these types of contracts, he “. . . is a big 
fan of a mixed contract.”   
Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 82. 
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Table 82.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #12-1 
IQ 12-1. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Contract Type % 
5 Cost Reimbursable 50% 
3 Fixed Price 30% 
3 It Depends 30% 
3 N/A 30% 
2 CPAF 20% 
1 T&M 10% 
1 CPFF 10% 
1 CPIF 10% 
1 IDIQ 10% 
0 Commercial 0% 
0 Mixed Contract Type 0% 
0 ODC CLINs/Over and Above 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Army Policy 
Experts stated that the appropriate contract type was cost reimbursable.  However, 
several Contractor Policy Experts offered different contract types for different reasons 
while some stated that it just all depends on the situation.  For example,  SME #18 stated, 
“It depends on what they are doing over there,” SME  #17 stated that “. . . is dependent 
on the type of contract you are talking about,” and SME #21 simply stated, “That really 
depends.” 
Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 83. 
 
 
 
 
 
 151
Table 83.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #12-1 
IQ 12-1. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Contract Type % 
20 It Depends 65% 
18 Cost Reimbursable 58% 
16 Fixed Price 52% 
5 T&M 16% 
4 N/A 13% 
3 CPAF 10% 
3 Mixed Contract Type 10% 
3 ODC CLINs/Over and Above 10% 
2 CPFF 6% 
2 IDIQ 6% 
1 Commercial 3% 
1 FPIF 3% 
0 CPIF 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The Air Force Policy Experts 
believed that the contract type truly does depend on the situation, and It Depends was the 
coding with the highest frequency.  Cost Reimbursable was next followed closely by 
Fixed Price, which bolsters the theme of it depends.  The pattern of it depends becomes 
stronger as the Air Force Policy Experts shared their opinions.  SME #42 stated, “I 
wouldn’t tie my hands with a contract type, I would be flexible and depending on the 
situation, write a contract.”  SME #31 stated, “I am not sure there is an absolute answer to 
that question,” and SME#52 stated, “I am not a one size fits all kind of person.”  SME 
#23, #26, #28, #34, #38, #39, and #53 stated that the contract type depends on the actual 
requirement, while SME #37 argued that it depends on the environment in which the 
contractor would be operating in.  Some Air Force Policy Experts took a more standard 
approach to the issue of contract type.  For example, SME #32 stated, “I think that the 
standard analysis should be used on any contract, FAR 16.”  However, the definitiveness 
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of selecting an appropriate contract type for these battlefield contracts was best spoken by 
SME #35.  He stated, “I can see applicability for all of them.” 
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are presented 
in Table 84. 
 
Table 84.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #12-1 
Times 
Reported Contract Type % 
6 Cost Reimbursable 46% 
4 Fixed Price 31% 
2 CPAF 15% 
2 It Depends 15% 
2 N/A 15% 
2 CPFF 15% 
1 T&M 8% 
1 ODC CLINs/Over and Above 8% 
0 Commercial 0% 
0 Mixed Contract Type 0% 
0 CPIF 0% 
0 IDIQ 0% 
0 FPIF 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Air Force Program 
Offices stated that a cost reimbursable contract was the most suitable type for battlefield 
contracts.  Although It Depends had a rather low frequency rating from the Program 
Offices, the variety of responses indicate that one size does not fit all in terms of contract 
type.  For example, PO #5 stated, “Well, again, that is very dependent on what you are 
asking people to do.”  PO #3 stated, “I don’t really know if there would be one that is 
most suitable, you probably have to look at the circumstances.” 
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Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 85 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #12-1, the 
selection of contract type for these battlefield contracts.   
 
Table 85.  IQ #12-1 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts      Total for All Program Offices 
F Contract Type %  F Contract Type % 
34 Cost Reimbursable 64%  6 Cost Reimbursable 46% 
28 It Depends 53%  4 Fixed Price 31% 
24 Fixed Price 45%  2 CPAF 15% 
8 CPAF 15%  2 It Depends 15% 
8 N/A 15%  2 N/A 15% 
7 T&M 13%  2 CPFF 15% 
5 CPFF 9%  1 T&M 8% 
4 Mixed Contract Type 8%  1 ODC CLINs/Over and Above 8% 
4 ODC CLINs/Over and Above 8%  0 Commercial 0% 
3 IDIQ 6%  0 Mixed Contract Type 0% 
2 Commercial 4%  0 CPIF 0% 
1 CPIF 2%  0 IDIQ 0% 
1 FPIF 2%  0 FPIF 0% 
 
 
Table 86 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s most frequently identified codings for the identification of appropriate contract 
type for these battlefield contracts. 
 
Table 86.  IQ #12-1 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Contract Type - 12-1        
Overall Policy Experts %  Program Offices % 
34 - Cost Reimbursable 64%  6 - Cost Reimbursable 46% 
28 - It Depends 53%  4 - Fixed Price 31% 
24 - Fixed Price 45%  2 - CPAF 15% 
8 - CPAF 15%  2 - It Depends 15% 
8 - N/A 15%  2 - N/A 15% 
7 - T&M 13%  2 - CPFF 15% 
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Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  A Cost Reimbursable contract 
seemed to be the most suitable contract type for these battlefield contracts.  However, as 
previously stated, Fixed Price was also mentioned many times by both the Policy Experts 
and the Program Office.  Furthermore, It Depends came in a close second to cost 
reimbursable.   
Patterns emerged for this category, and five of the top recommendations from 
both the Policy Experts and the Program Offices matched.  Combining the total scores, 
the top five answers for the appropriate contract type for these battlefield contracts are 
rank ordered below according to frequency count: 
 1.  Cost Reimbursable  (40) 
 2.  It Depends  (30) 
 3.  Fixed Price  (28) 
 4.  CPAF  (10) 
 5.  N/A  (10) 
 
IQ 12-2. When drafting a battlefield contract, what contract type would be 
most suitable?  Why? 
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 87. 
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Table 87.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #12-2 
IQ 12-2. DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Contract Type - Why % 
3 Cost - Flexibility/Unknowns 75% 
2 Award Fee - Incentivizes the Contractor 50% 
1 Cost - Beginning 25% 
1 T&M - Flexibility 25% 
1 T&M - Beginning 25% 
1 Fixed Price - Requirements Defined/Later on in Conflict 25% 
1 Fixed Price - Minimize the Risk 25% 
1 Commercial - Nature of Acquisition 25% 
1 N/A 25% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  As mentioned in the IQ12-1, the 
majority of DoD Policy Experts stated that a cost reimbursable would be the most 
suitable contract type for these battlefield contracts.  This follow-on question asks the 
follow-up question, why?  The majority of DoD Policy Experts stated that the most 
suitable contract type is cost reimbursable because it is flexible and can deal with any 
unknowns that are presented on the battlefield.  For example, SME #4 stated, “I think 
because of the uncertainty, cost-type,” and SME #3 stated, “I definitely think cost 
reimbursement because you need that flexibility, you don’t want to tie the commander’s 
and contractor’s hands…the battlefield is just too liquid to let that happen.” 
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 88. 
 
 
 
 
 156
Table 88.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #12-2 
IQ 12-2. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Contract Type - Why % 
7 Cost - Flexibility/Unknowns 88% 
1 Fixed Price - Requirements Defined/Later on in Conflict 13% 
1 Mixed Contract - Cover Knowns and Unknowns 13% 
1 CPFF - Profit, Easy, Fast 13% 
0 Cost - Beginning 0% 
0 T&M - Flexibility 0% 
0 T&M - Beginning 0% 
0 Fixed Price - Minimize the Risk 0% 
0 Commercial - Nature of Acquisition 0% 
0 Award Fee - Incentivizes the Contractor 0% 
0 N/A 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  As mentioned before, the 
Contractor Policy Experts stated that the most suitable contract type for these battlefield 
contracts is cost reimbursable.  Again, the reasons provided by the Contractor Policy 
Experts for the selection of a cost reimbursable contract are because of its inherent 
flexibility and ability to handle the unknowns.  For example, SME #8 stated, “Obviously 
a cost reimbursement contract which gives the government and the contractor the greatest 
flexibility.”  Several other Contractor Policy Experts commented on the dynamic nature 
of the battlefield and the dynamic nature of requirements.  SME #9 stated, “Probably cost 
[reimbursement] for the most part because the situation is in such flux,” and SME #6 
stated cost reimbursement because “there is an unknown.”  SME #12 said that a cost 
reimbursement would be to the government’s advantage because of “the inability to 
define the tasks.”   Finally, other Contractor Policy Experts commented on the fact that 
fixed price was totally out of the question.  SME #10 stated, “I think there is no way you 
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can do a fixed price because of the requirement is typically ill defined,” and SME #5 
stated, “Definitely not fixed price.” 
Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 89. 
 
Table 89.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #12-2 
IQ 12-2. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Contract Type - Why % 
5 Cost - Flexibility/Unknowns 50% 
4 N/A 40% 
2 Fixed Price - Requirements Defined/Later on in Conflict 20% 
1 T&M - Flexibility 10% 
1 Fixed Price - Minimize the Risk 10% 
0 Cost - Beginning 0% 
0 T&M - Beginning 0% 
0 Commercial - Nature of Acquisition 0% 
0 Award Fee - Incentivizes the Contractor 0% 
0 Mixed Contract - Cover Knowns and Unknowns 0% 
0 CPFF - Profit, Easy, Fast 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Again, the majority of Army Policy 
Experts stated that the appropriate contract type is cost reimbursable for the reason of 
being flexible and being able to handle any unknown contingencies.  For example, SME 
#22 stated, “It is hard to imagine a firm fixed price in that type of environment, that’s for 
sure.”  SME #15 recommended a cost reimbursement contract as well, stating “you don’t 
know what you are going to be facing, you don’t know what you are getting in for, and 
you have to remain flexible.” 
 
 
 
 158
Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the are presented in Table 90. 
 
Table 90.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #12-2 
IQ 12-2. Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Contract Type - Why % 
18 Cost - Flexibility/Unknowns 58% 
15 It Depends on the Type/Scope of Work 48% 
11 Fixed Price - Requirements Defined/Later on in Conflict 35% 
4 T&M - Flexibility 13% 
3 Cost - Beginning 10% 
3 N/A 10% 
2 Fixed Price - Minimize the Risk 6% 
2 Award Fee - Incentivizes the Contractor 6% 
1 Commercial - Nature of Acquisition 3% 
1 Mixed Contract - Cover Knowns and Unknowns 3% 
0 T&M - Beginning 0% 
0 CPFF - Profit, Easy, Fast 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The Air Force Policy Experts stated 
that a cost reimbursement contract was most suitable because of its inherent flexibility.  
The theme continues as SME #30 stated, “It is such a high risk effort with so many 
unknowns that it would almost have to be a cost type effort.” 
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are presented 
in Table 91. 
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Table 91.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #12-2 
Times 
Reported Contract Type - Why % 
8 Cost - Flexibility/Unknowns 62% 
2 Fixed Price - Requirements Defined/Later on in Conflict 15% 
2 Fixed Price - Minimize the Risk 15% 
2 N/A 15% 
2 It Depends on the Type/Scope of Work 15% 
1 T&M - Flexibility 8% 
0 Cost - Beginning 0% 
0 T&M - Beginning 0% 
0 Commercial - Nature of Acquisition 0% 
0 Award Fee - Incentivizes the Contractor 0% 
0 Mixed Contract - Cover Knowns and Unknowns 0% 
0 CPFF - Profit, Easy, Fast 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Air Force Program 
Offices stated that a cost reimbursable contract was the most suitable type for battlefield 
contracts, and that this contract type was used because of its flexibility and ability to deal 
with unknown circumstances.  For example, SME #9 stated, “Cost plus because there are 
too many unknowns in the deployment side of things.”  PO #11 recommended a cost 
reimbursable contract “. . . mainly due to the chances that they will pick up and move 
from one location to another very quickly.” 
Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 92 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #12-2, the 
reason behind the selection of a specific contract type for these battlefield contracts.    
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Table 92.  IQ #12-2 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts       Total for All Program Offices 
F Contract Type - Why? %   F Contract Type - Why? % 
33 Cost - Flexibility/Unknowns 62%   8 Cost - Flexibility/Unknowns 62% 
15 
Fixed Price - Requirements 
Defined/Later on in Conflict 28%   2 
Fixed Price - Requirements Defined/Later 
on in Conflict 15% 
15 It Depends on the Type/Scope of Work 28%   2 Fixed Price - Minimize the Risk 15% 
8 N/A 15%   2 N/A 15% 
6 T&M - Flexibility 11%   2 It Depends on the Type/Scope of Work 15% 
4 Cost - Beginning 8%   1 T&M - Flexibility 8% 
4 Fixed Price - Minimize the Risk 8%   0 Cost - Beginning 0% 
4 Award Fee - Incentivizes the Contractor 8%   0 T&M - Beginning 0% 
2 Commercial - Nature of Acquisition 4%   0 Commercial - Nature of Acquisition 0% 
2 
Mixed Contract - Cover Knowns and 
Unknowns 4%   0 Award Fee - Incentivizes the Contractor 0% 
1 T&M - Beginning 2%   0 
Mixed Contract - Cover Knowns and 
Unknowns 0% 
1 CPFF - Profit, Easy, Fast 2%   0 CPFF - Profit, Easy, Fast 0% 
 
 
Table 93 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s most frequently identified codings for the identification of appropriate contract 
type and the reason behind their selection for these battlefield contracts. 
 
Table 93.  IQ #12-2 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Contract Type, Why? - 12-2         
Overall Policy Experts %   Program Offices % 
33 - Cost - Flexibility/Unknowns 62%   8 - Cost - Flexibility/Unknowns 62% 
15 - Fixed Price - Requirements Defined/Later on 
in Conflict 28%   
2 - Fixed Price - Requirements Defined/Later 
on in Conflict 15% 
15 - It Depends on the Type/Scope of Work 28%   2 - Fixed Price - Minimize the Risk 15% 
8 - N/A 15%   2 - N/A 15% 
6 - T&M - Flexibility 11%   2 - It Depends on the Type/Scope of Work 15% 
4 - Cost - Beginning 8%   1 - T&M - Flexibility 8% 
4 - Award Fee - Incentivizes the Contractor 8%     
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  A cost reimbursable contract 
seemed to be the most suitable contract type for these battlefield contracts.  The flexible 
nature of a cost contract and its ability to handle unknown circumstances was the primary 
reason for the selection of this contract type. 
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Combining the total scores, the top three answers for the reason behind the 
selection of an appropriate contract type for these battlefield contracts are rank ordered 
below according to frequency count: 
 1.  Cost Reimbursable – Flexibility/Unknowns  (41) 
 2.  It Depends on the Type/Scope of Work  (17) 
 3.  Fixed Price – Requirements Defined/Later on in Conflict  (17) 
 
IQ 13. If you could give the CO and PM any advice prior to acquiring the 
services of contractors on the battlefield, what would it be? 
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 All of these recommendations should be considered independently no matter 
where it originated from or how frequent of a response from the Policy Experts and 
Program Offices that it was.  Thus, these recommendations will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5.  However, Table 94 highlights the most frequently identified 
recommendations from the Policy Experts compared with the Program Offices. 
 
Table 94.  IQ #13 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Recommendations to CO  
and PM for COB Acq - 13        
Overall Policy Experts %  Program Offices % 
35 - Requirements Definition 66%  11 - Requirements Definition 85% 
31 – Talk with Ktr/open lines of comm 58%  
10 - Create Good IPT & Work together - Govt 
Team 77% 
22 - Prepare for Contingency Beforehand - Planning 42%  10 - Talk with Ktrr/Open Lines of Comm 77% 
21 - Acquisition Planning and Analysis of CLS 40%  
10 - Talk with your customer/Support the 
Warfighter 77% 
18 - CRC - Support Obligations - Prepare Contractor 34%  9 - Acquisition Planning and Analysis of CLS 69% 
17 - Create Good IPT & Work together - Govt Team 32%  9 - Clarify everyone's responsibilities 69% 
   
6 - Where is the System Going?  What is it 
like?  What's Available? 46% 
   
5 - CRC - Support Obligations - Prepare 
Contractor 38% 
   5 - Coordinate in Theater 38% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The pattern that emerged was that 
five recommendations from both the Policy Experts and the Program Offices matched.  
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Combining the total scores, the top five recommendations for Program Managers and 
Contracting Officers are rank ordered below according to frequency count: 
 1.  Requirements Definition  (46) 
 2.  Talk with Contractor/Open Lines of Communication  (41) 
 3.  Acquisition Planning and Analysis of CLS  (30) 
 4.  Create Good IPT and Work Together – Government Team  (27) 
 5.  CRC – Support Obligations – Prepare Contractor  (23) 
 
IQ 14. Historically, how have these contracts performed from start to 
finish (cost, schedule, performance, and responsiveness)? 
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 The four DoD Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 95. 
 
Table 95.  DoD Policy Experts – IQ #14 
IQ 14. DoD Personnel  
Times 
Reported Historical Performance % 
3 Overall - Very Well 75% 
1 Costs - Needs Improvement 25% 
1 Performance - Good 25% 
1 Responsiveness - Good 25% 
1 Some Problems 25% 
0 Don't Know 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The pattern that emerged from the 
DoD Personnel is that they stated that contract performance was overall executed Very 
Well.   
Results – Contractor Policy Experts. 
The eight Contractor Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 96. 
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Table 96.  Contractor Policy Experts – IQ #14 
IQ 14. Contractor Personnel  
Times 
Reported Historical Performance % 
7 Overall - Very Well 88% 
2 Some Problems 25% 
2 Cost - Good 25% 
1 Performance - Good 13% 
1 Don't Know 13% 
1 Responsiveness - Good 13% 
1 Schedule - Needs Improvement 13% 
1 Customer Satisfaction - Great 13% 
1 Customer Satisfaction - Needs Improvement 13% 
0 Costs - Needs Improvement 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Very Well had the highest 
frequency count for Contractor Policy Experts when describing the performance of these 
battlefield contracts.  For example, SME #5 stated, “I think we executed the contract 
pretty well,” SME #12 stated, “I would like to think we are doing a good job,” and SME 
#10 stated, “My perspective is that we have done extremely well.”     
Results – Army Policy Experts. 
The ten Army Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this question, and 
the results are presented in Table 97. 
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Table 97.  Army Policy Experts – IQ #14 
IQ 14. Army Personnel  
Times 
Reported Historical Performance % 
4 Overall - Very Well 40% 
4 Performance - Good 40% 
3 Costs - Needs Improvement 30% 
3 Responsiveness - Good 30% 
3 Some Problems 30% 
2 Don't Know 20% 
0 Cost - Good 0% 
0 Schedule - Needs Improvement 0% 
0 Customer Satisfaction - Great 0% 
0 Customer Satisfaction - Needs Improvement 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The majority of Army Policy 
Experts stated that overall these contracts have been executed Very Well.  However, the 
Army Policy Experts did report Some Problems at a fairly high frequency and highlighted 
the fact that cost control needs some improvement.  SME #15 stated, “Obviously costs go 
up the more hostile the environment,” and SME #21 stated, “I think cost is unknown yet.”  
However, several Army Policy Experts argue that cost is a tradeoff.  SME #17 stated, “I 
don’t think cost is necessarily an issue.  If your performance is satisfactory, you are 
getting what you need, then you are happy to pay whatever you negotiate.”  Also, SME 
#14 stated, “I think that performance is great and that the cost is always a tradeoff to 
performance.” 
Results – Air Force Policy Experts. 
The thirty-one Air Force Policy Experts provided an array of answers for this 
question, and the results are presented in Table 98. 
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Table 98.  Air Force Policy Experts – IQ #14 
IQ 14, Air Force Personnel  
Times 
Reported Historical Performance % 
16 Don't Know 52% 
9 Some Problems 29% 
8 Overall - Very Well 26% 
6 Costs - Needs Improvement 19% 
5 Responsiveness - Good 16% 
3 Performance - Good 10% 
2 Cost - Good 6% 
1 Customer Satisfaction - Great 3% 
0 Schedule - Needs Improvement 0% 
0 Customer Satisfaction - Needs Improvement 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The Air Force Policy Experts stated 
that they did not have any insight into the historical performance of these battlefield 
contracts.  However, it should be noted that the Air Force Policy Experts that did report 
historical performance, essentially deadlocked on their outlook with eight saying these 
contracts performed Very Well and nine reporting Some Problems.   
Also, the tradeoff of costs to performance was reported by several Air Force 
Policy Experts.  SME #42 stated that he thought performance was excellent, but he 
thought there was “a down-side to it, there is a potential for a lot of extra cost.”  SME #33 
stated, “The cost overruns are typically found when you have something in development 
or a new piece of equipment that is going to be strapped onto an existing platform.”  In 
these types of contracts, someone has to “make the call” as to whether performance or 
cost is the most important.  For example, SME #38 stated, “I guess bottom-line is, what 
we really care about is, were we able to support the warfighter in that instance.”  SME 
#50 stated, “Generally, I think people walk away from them satisfied.  They might end up 
costing over cost, but you know we used a cost type contract because we didn’t know 
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what the scope of this would be.”  Not only is the contract’s scope dynamic in these 
battlefield contracts, but the nature of the duty performed by these contractors raises their 
risks and ultimately the costs for the acquisition.  For example, SME #53 stated, “All I 
know is that it has got to be more expensive sending people in there because the 
contractor has to compensate their employees with hazardous duty pay.” 
Results – Air Force Program Offices. 
Thirteen Air Force Program Offices that use contractors on the battlefield were 
interviewed and provided an array of answers for this question.  The results are presented 
in Table 99. 
 
Table 99.  Air Force Program Offices – IQ #14 
Times 
Reported Historical Performance % 
11 Overall - Very Well 85% 
2 Don't Know 15% 
1 Costs - Needs Improvement 8% 
1 Performance - Good 8% 
1 Some Problems 8% 
1 Schedule - Real Good 8% 
0 Responsiveness - Good 0% 
0 Cost - Good 0% 
0 Schedule - Needs Improvement 0% 
0 Customer Satisfaction - Great 0% 
0 Customer Satisfaction - Needs Improvement 0% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The vast majority of Air Force 
Program Offices stated that these contracts have been executed Very Well.  PO #4 stated, 
“They have a good reputation, they have a good record with this particular system, I have 
no complaints,” and PO #10 stated, “Our contractor has given us excellent performance 
on cost, schedule, and performance.  They have been very responsive as well.”  The Air 
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Force Program Offices seemed very satisfied with the historical performance of these 
contracts.  For example, PO #7 stated, “They go the extra mile to meet the government’s 
schedule and to get things done on time.”   
Results – Policy Experts vs Program Offices. 
Table 100 is a side-by-side comparison of the descending accumulated frequency 
counts of the Policy Experts versus the Program Offices in regards to IQ #14, the 
historical performance of battlefield contracts.     
 
Table 100.  IQ #14 - Policy Experts vs Program Offices 
Total for All Policy Experts      Total for All Program Offices 
F Historical Performance %  F Historical Performance % 
22 Overall - Very Well 42%  11 Overall - Very Well 85% 
19 Don't Know 36%  2 Don't Know 15% 
15 Some Problems 28%  1 Costs - Needs Improvement 8% 
10 Costs - Needs Improvement 19%  1 Performance - Good 8% 
10 Responsiveness - Good 19%  1 Some Problems 8% 
9 Performance - Good 17%  1 Schedule - Real Good 8% 
4 Cost - Good 8%     
2 Customer Satisfaction - Great 4%     
1 Schedule - Needs Improvement 2%     
1 
Customer Satisfaction - Needs 
Improvement 2%     
 
 
Table 101 is a side-by-side comparison of the Policy Expert’s and the Program 
Office’s most frequently identified codings for the historical performance of these 
battlefield contracts. 
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Table 101.  IQ #14 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Historical Performance - 14        
Overall Policy Experts %  Program Offices % 
22 - Overall - Very Well 42%  11 - Overall - Very Well 85% 
19 - Don't Know 36%  2 - Don't Know 15% 
15 - Some Problems 28%  1 - Costs - Needs Improvement 8% 
10 - Costs - Needs Improvement 19%  1 - Performance - Good 8% 
10 - Responsiveness - Good 19%  1 - Some Problems 8% 
9 - Performance - Good 17%  1 - Schedule - Real Good 8% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Overall, these contracts have been 
performed Very Well according to the Policy Experts and Program Offices.  Although 
some people didn’t have insight into the performance of such contracts, a high frequency 
of people reported Some Problems, mostly associated with cost control.  Combining the 
total scores, the top four ratings for historical performance are rank ordered below 
according to frequency count: 
 1.  Overall – Very Well  (33) 
 2.  Don’t Know  (21) 
 3.  Some Problems  (16) 
 4.  Costs – Needs Improvement  (11) 
 
IQ 15. What are the acquisition “best practices” for acquiring and 
managing the services of systems contractors on the battlefield? 
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
 All of the best practices put forth from the Policy Experts and Program Offices 
should be considered independently no matter how frequent of a response that it was or 
where the response originated.  Thus, these best practices will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 5. Table 102 highlights the most frequently identified best practices from the 
Policy Experts compared with the Program Offices. 
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Table 102.  IQ #15 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Acquisition Best Practices - 15        
Overall Policy Experts %  Program Offices % 
27 - Good Communication 51%  10 - Good Communication 77% 
16 - Requirements Definition 30%  9 - Strong Team / IPT / Good People 69% 
14 - Strong Team / IPT / Good People 26%  5 - Requirements Definition 38% 
11 - Prior Planning 21%  
4 - Work Closely with the Contractor / 
Partner/Habitual Relationship 31% 
10 - Rapid Execution 19%  3 - Prior Planning 23% 
10 - Good contract language, Standardized 19%  3 - Contract Structure 23% 
   3 - Rapid Execution 23% 
   3 - Flexibility 23% 
   3 - Good contract language, Standardized 23% 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The pattern that emerged was that 
six of the top best practices from both the Policy Experts and the Program Offices 
matched.  Combining the total scores, the top six best practices for Program Managers 
and Contracting Officers are rank ordered below according to frequency count: 
 1.  Good Communication  (37) 
 2.  Strong Team / IPT / Good People  (23) 
 3.  Requirements Definition  (21)   
 4.  Prior Planning  (14) 
 5.  Rapid Execution (13) 
 6.  Good Contract Language, Standardized  (13) 
 
IQ 16. Is there anything else you would like to add?      
 
Results – DoD Policy Experts. 
All of these added comments should be considered independently of one another 
no matter from whom or from what organization the responses originated or how 
frequent of a response that it was.  Table 103 highlights the most frequent additional 
comments from the Policy Experts compared with the Program Offices. 
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Table 103.  IQ #16 - Highest Frequency Comparison 
Anything You Would Like to Add - 16      
Overall Policy Experts %  Program Offices % 
38 - N/A 72%  11 - N/A 85% 
10 - Very Important Issue 19%  1 - Very Important Issue 8% 
7 - Need Policy to Answer Questions 13%  1 - Small Business Step Needs Removed 8% 
5 - Need to move faster 9%    
2 - Using COB now more than ever 4%    
2 - Acq Planning - Effects of CLS 4%    
2 - Standardization is key! 4%    
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Most of the Policy Experts and 
Program Offices had nothing more to add at the end of the interview, with an associated 
response of N/A.  However, several highlighted the fact that this was a Very Important 
Issue and Policy has to be updated and/or modified.   
IQ 17. (Program Offices Only)  What is the most difficult part of having a 
contract for contractors on the battlefield? 
 
Results – All Policy Experts.   
 
All of these added comments should be considered independently of one another 
no matter from what organization the responses originated or how frequent of a response 
that it was.  Table 104 highlights the Program Office’s comments on the most difficult 
part of having a contract for contractors on the battlefield. 
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Table 104.  Frequency Analysis for Programs that use COB (IQ 17). 
 
Times 
Reported Most Difficult Part? % 
2 Not difficult at all 15% 
2 N/A 15% 
2 Coordination 15% 
2 Having the Right Clauses 15% 
1 Pay Rates 8% 
1 Contractor Deployment Length 8% 
1 Force Protection 8% 
1 Open Endedness of Everything 8% 
1 Incremental Funding 8% 
1 Contractor Selection 8% 
1 Integration of Contractor with Military 8% 
1 Contractor Responsiveness 8% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  Although a pattern or theme is not 
evidently clear among the program offices, each point is valid.  The Table does highlight 
the most frequently identified recommendations from the Program Offices.  Combining 
the total scores, the top four Program Office responses to this investigative question are 
rank ordered below according to frequency count: 
 1.  Coordination  (2) 
 2.  Having the Right Clauses  (2) 
 3.  N/A  (2)   
 4.  Not Difficult at All  (2) 
 
Although there were only two responses that recognized that the Having the Right 
Clauses was one of the most difficult parts of having a battlefield contract, this is a theme 
that has continued throughout this multiple case study analysis.  Contract structure and 
clear communications are critical in this type of acquisition.  Although there are twelve 
different codings for this example, they all appear to revolve around these themes.  For 
example, PO #7 stated that you must “have the right type of contract structure,” PO #12 
stated, “establishing these extra, or more clear contractual terms was difficult,” and PO 
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#11 stated, “Just trying to keep and make sure that we have the appropriate clauses in the 
contract.”  The difficulty of establishing clear expectations was also reported by another 
program office with a different coding of Open Endedness of Everything. Another 
Program Office talked about the ability to expedite contractor service on the battlefield, 
and asked the question, “can you push the contractor system enough legally” (PO #13, 
Air Force Interview, 2004).  Along this same line of communicating clear expectations 
and developing the right clauses and contract structure, several Program Offices 
discussed the troublesome issue of coordination.  PO #8 stated, “We just have to make 
sure that the coordination chain is there,” and PO #10 stated, “I think the most difficult 
thing is integrating that contractor with the active duty force and making those two 
different worlds communicate together.”   
IQ 18. (Program Offices Only)  Does the FAR and other policy support 
the use of contractors on the battlefield?  In other words, were you 
“blazing new paths” as you went, or was their/is their policy that 
you could use as guidance?  Please specify. 
 
Results – All Policy Experts.   
 
All of these added comments should be considered independently of one another 
no matter from what organization the responses originated or how frequent of a response 
that it was.  Table 105 highlights the Program Office’s comments on their 
characterization of the policy and guidance that is available to facilitate the acquisition of 
contractor support on the battlefield. 
 
 
 
 
 173
Table 105.  Frequency Analysis for Programs that use COB (IQ 18). 
 
Times 
Reported FAR/Policy Support COB? % 
6 No  46% 
5 Yes 38% 
4 Hard to Find 31% 
2 N/A 15% 
1 Travel Regs 8% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The Table highlights the most 
frequently identified responses from the Program Offices.  The top three Program Office 
responses to this investigative question are rank ordered below according to frequency 
count: 
 1.  No  (6) 
 2.  Yes  (5) 
 3.  Hard to Find  (4)   
 
There is definitely a theme generated from the Program Offices in response to this 
question.  The highest frequency response was No, and Yes was next.  However, several 
of the individuals that stated Yes also stated that this policy was difficult to find.  There 
appears to be a problem with the acquisition guidance and policy that is already 
established.  For example, PO #2 stated, “I don’t know of any one place all that stuff is,” 
PO #5 stated, “The information is all over the place,” and PO #12 stated, “They need to 
have somebody up at AQ on the staff gathering all of the guidance.”  Another program 
office stated that the clauses might need some updating and/or revising after lessons 
learned are collected. 
IQ 19. (Program Offices Only)  Did you model your battlefield contract 
off of any other program’s contract?  If so, why and what program 
and why? 
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Results – All Policy Experts.   
 
Table 106 highlights the Program Office’s responses on their use of other 
program’s documents and/or communication with other programs that use contractors on 
the battlefield. 
 
Table 106.  Frequency Analysis for Programs that use COB (IQ 18). 
 
Times 
Reported Model off of or talk with other programs? % 
9 No 69% 
3 Yes 23% 
1 N/A 8% 
 
 
Analysis and Patterns that Emerged.  The Table highlights the most 
frequently identified responses from the Program Offices.  The top three Program Office 
responses to this investigative question are rank ordered below according to frequency 
count: 
 1.  No  (9) 
 2.  Yes  (3) 
 3.  N/A  (1)   
 
There is definitely a theme generated from the Program Offices in response to this 
question.  The highest frequency response was No.  For example, PO#12 stated, “We 
kind of did our own research and ran with it,” and PO #4 stated that programs “. . . don’t 
hear everything that is going on.”  There appears to be a lack of communication and 
coordination in the acquisition corps about the topic of contractors on the battlefield.    
Chapter Summary 
This chapter described the data collected from the interviews with the various 
case study groups.  Results of the content analysis and pattern matching were presented, 
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and emerging themes and patterns were documented from the various case study groups, 
DoD Policy Experts, Contractor Policy Experts, Army Policy Experts, Air Force Policy 
Experts, and Air Force Program Offices.  These themes were compared, contrasted, and 
grouped in Chapter IV.  Overall, there seem to be many problems and lots of confusion 
associated with the acquisition of contractors on the battlefield.  Chapter V analyzes the 
results in more detail as they relate to the overall research questions, offers some best 
practices and lessons learned in this area of acquisition, draws tentative conclusions, 
discusses limitations to the research, and suggests recommendations for future research.  
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V.  Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
 
Chapter Overview 
 The purpose of this research Chapter IV provided the data collection and analyzed 
the results of the interviews with the subject matter experts in the various case study 
groups.  Chapter V draws conclusions from the data analysis and makes 
recommendations to Air Force acquisition professionals with regards to acquiring the 
services of contractors on the battlefield.  As Patton (1990) observed: 
It is important to understand that the interpretive explanation of qualitative 
analysis does not yield knowledge in the same sense as quantitative explanation.  
The emphasis is on illumination, understanding, and extrapolation rather than 
causal determination, prediction, and generalization. 
 
Chapter V draws conclusions, using the data analysis from the investigative questions to 
answer this study’s overall research question.  Next, implications for the Air Force 
Acquisition Professional are highlighted as best practices and lessons learned are 
discussed.  This study concludes with a brief discussion on the limitations of this 
research, recommendations for future research, and a final summary.  
 
Conclusions & Recommendations 
 The investigative questions were mapped to each research question in Chapter III.  
This section answers the research questions using the data collected from the interviews 
and the content analysis and pattern matching executed in Chapter IV. 
Research Question 1 asked (Policy Experts Only) “What Air Force programs have used 
or are using contractors on the battlefield to support their weapon systems?”  This 
question was answered through the following investigative question. 
 
IQ 1:  What programs, if any, are you aware of that use contractors on the battlefield? 
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RQ 1 - Conclusions. 
 
 Over forty different programs and/or services that used contractors on the 
battlefield were highlighted by the Policy Experts.  Contractors on the battlefield are used 
by a diverse group of program offices, across the services, providing different support, on 
various weapon systems with different associated missions, in various stages of their 
acquisition lifecycles.  Some of the programs appear to be well known, while others are 
not well known.  The use of contractors on the battlefield within the Air Force is 
plentiful; however, knowledge in this area among Policy Experts seems to be 
compartmentalized.     
RQ 1 - Recommendations. 
 
 I would recommend that the various program offices, policy experts, contractor 
personnel, and warfighters that use these systems meet on an annual basis to share 
experiences, lessons learned, and best practices in this area of acquisition.  I would also 
recommend that an all-encompassing Air Force specific website as well as a DoD-wide 
website be created to share this type of information.  SAF/AQ and AFMC have portals 
allotted to warfighter contracts, but they seem to be missing a critical piece.  Lessons 
learned, best practices, and a listing of the programs (with POC information) that use 
contractors on the battlefield are simply not captured.  These websites provide a splatter 
of policy information and disjointed guidance.    
Research Question 2 asked “What support obligations do the government and the 
contractor have prior to deployment and during deployment?”  This question was 
answered through a series of investigative question. 
 
IQ 2:  What support obligations do the USG and the contractor have prior to and during 
deployment? 
 
 
 178
RQ 2 (IQ 2) - Conclusions. 
 Support obligations are different, on different contracts and different tasks within 
the same program, and from program to program and service to service.  Many of the 
Policy Experts and Program Offices had very different opinions on the type and quantity 
of support that the government has provided or should be providing to these battlefield 
contractors.  There appeared to be confusion on this issue as well as where exactly to 
address these support obligations in the contract, but a theme emerged that these support 
obligations must be carefully specified somewhere in the battlefield contracts.   
IQ 3:  How has the AF handled these obligations in the past?  Please explain. 
RQ 2 (IQ 3) - Conclusions. 
 There appears to be an ad-hoc approach taken by programs using contractors on 
the battlefield, ultimately leading to problems and confusion on behalf of the program 
offices, contractors, and theater commanders.  Joint guidance, education, and training 
seem to be lacking in this area and programs and contractors alike do a poor job 
anticipating support requirements for deploying contractor personnel.  These contracts 
lack the detail that is needed to clearly communicate obligations to both the government 
and the contractor.  Several Program Offices stated that they were removed from 
handling the support obligations, and confusion was the theme for this investigative 
question.   
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IQ 4:  What legal implications are present when hiring contractors on the battlefield? 
RQ 2 (IQ 4) - Conclusions. 
 There appears to be many severe legal implications when acquiring the services of 
contractors on the battlefield.  Furthermore, liability issues, local laws and discipline, and 
contractor status all emerged as themes within this investigative question.  Also, the 
contract appears to be the best place to capture and address any legal implications that 
might come about on the battlefield, and it looks as though these contracts are not written 
in a way that facilitates this issue.  There appears to be confusion and a non-standardized 
approach with regards to these issues.   
IQ 5:  How have we addressed these legal implications in the past? 
RQ 2 (IQ 5) - Conclusions. 
 The lack of collected, all-encompassing guidance and lack of contract language 
addressing these legal implications appears to be causing some problems and confusion.  
There seems to be no all-encompassing document to help acquisition professionals learn 
about the issues and properly address them in their contracts.  Most of the acquisition 
professionals did not know exactly how they were handling the legal implications, and 
confusion surrounded this issue.   
IQ 6:  What other recommendations do you have to address these implications? 
RQ 2 (IQ 6) - Conclusions. 
 There appears to be a lack of solid DoD guidance and policy addressing support 
obligations and legal implications for acquiring the services of contractors on the 
battlefield.  Also, standardization and consistency are also lacking within each service 
and across the various services for specific contract language to address support 
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obligations and the legal implications.  It appears that that a clearly written, thorough 
contract that is understood by all parties would rectify problems in this area.  The contract 
requirements must be clearly addressed, defined, and clarified. 
RQ 2 Recommendations. 
 
 First, standardization in the way the Air Force, or DoD for that matter, addresses 
its support obligations and legal implications is critical.  I recommend that Special H 
Clauses be drafted and made part of these battlefield contracts.  A standardized clause 
should be drafted for battlefield support obligations.  Furthermore, this clause can be in 
outline form with “fill-ins” required, because as previously mentioned, support 
obligations change depending on the mission and location of the support.  As far as the 
legal implications, I also would recommend that an additional Special H Clause be 
drafted to include in these battlefield contracts.  This clause should reference the specific 
SOFA and MEJA 2000, while pointing out that local laws and theater specific laws must 
be formally followed.  Finally, this second H Clause addressing legal implications should 
clearly state that if there are discipline problems in the theater of operations, that 
contractor personnel can be removed from the area of operation and sent back to 
CONUS.  These H Clauses should be made available to COs and PMs as part of the 
website mentioned previously. 
 Joint guidance is also a recommendation; however, currently a Draft DFARS 
Clause and DODI are being worked.  This should help alleviate some of the confusion 
among the services and contractor personnel working for the different services on the 
battlefield.   
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Also, education and training are critical for the COs and PMs in addressing legal 
and support obligations.  I recommend that DAU develop an on-line course for these 
individuals involved in acquiring the services of contractors on the battlefield.  This 
course should address legal implications and support obligations and delineate how these 
items should be clearly addressed in the battlefield contracts.  
Finally, communication of expectations is critical for these battlefield contracts.  
The Special H Clauses should clarify these support obligations.  One recommendation 
that was provided by a Policy Expert was to have a pre-award conference addressing the 
legal implications and support obligations.  However, I would also suggest having a post-
award conference and detailing this information.  At this conference, I would have the 
CRC, Det, or organization responsible for equipping and/or deploying the contractor 
personnel, involved in this conference and brief their expectations and policies.   
Research Question 3 asked “What contractual language, clauses, supplements, and/or 
documentation are required to effectively structure contracts with defense contractors on 
the battlefield?  This Research Question was broken down into three separate, subsidiary 
questions. 
 
Subsidiary Question 3a asked “What attachments to the contracts have been used 
to provide support and training to defense contractors on the battlefield?”  This 
question was answered through the following three investigative questions. 
 
IQ 7-1:  From a contractual standpoint, please explain how standard FAR Clauses are 
used in a battlefield contract. 
 
RQ 3a (IQ 7-1) - Conclusions. 
 
 The majority of the Policy Experts and Program Offices were not aware of, or 
could not recall any specific battlefield clauses.  Many individuals were cognizant of the 
fact that there were several battlefield, overseas clauses that needed to be made part of 
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these contracts.  The Defense Base Act and War Hazards Compensation clause were the 
two clauses that are critical for these contracts, and Capture and Detention and Anti-
Terrorism Force Protection Policy are as well. 
RQ 3a (IQ 7-1) - Recommendations. 
 
 Training and education are very important.  Air Force COs must not only realize 
that these contracts are special and require specific FAR Clauses, but they must know 
what these clauses are.  One Policy Expert provided me with a list of specific clauses that 
need to be placed in these overseas contracts.  This all-encompassing list of clauses 
should be considered by COs who are using or contemplating the use of contractors on 
the battlefield, and this list should be made available to COs on the website that was 
previously mentioned.  The list of clauses is as follows: 
 FAR Clauses  
52.203-5 Covenant Against Contingent Fees 
52.203-7 Anti-Kickback Procedures 
52.203-8 Cancellation, Recission and Recovery of Funds for Illegal 
or Improper Activity 
52.222-29 Notification of Visa Denial 
52.228-3 Workers’ Compensation Insurance (Defense Base Act) 
52.228-4 Workers’ Compensation and War-Hazard Insurance 
Overseas 
 DFARS Clauses 
252.209-7001 Disclosure of Ownership or Control by the Government of 
a Terrorist Country 
252.209-7002 Disclosure of Ownership or Control by a Foreign 
Government 
252.209-7004 Subcontracting with Firms That Are Owned or Controlled 
by the Government of a Terrorist Country 
252.212-7000 Offeror Representations and Certifications – Commercial 
Items 
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252.216-7003 Economic Price Adjustment – Wage Rates or Material 
Prices Controlled by the Government of a Terrorist 
Government 
252.217-7000 Exercise of Option to Fulfill FMS Commitments 
252.222-7002 Compliance with Local Labor Laws (Overseas) 
252.222-7004 Compliance with Spanish Social Security Laws and 
Regulations 
[Note:  The clauses from 252.225-7000 to 7043 are always to be 
considered; use as applicable.  The next five clauses below must be in 
the contract unless otherwise excepted] 
252.225-7017 Prohibition on Award to Companies Owned by the 
People’s Republic of China (FEB 2000) 
252.225-7026 Reporting of Contract Performance Outside the United 
States (JUN 2000) 
252.225-7027 Restriction on Contingent Fees for Foreign Military Sales 
(MAR 1998) 
252.225-7028 Exclusionary Policies & Practices of Foreign Governments 
(DEC 1991) 
252.225-7031 Secondary Arab Boycott of Israel (JUN 1992) 
252.225-7032 Waiver of United Kingdom Levies (applies when U.K. 
firms participate) 
252.228-7000 Reimbursement for War-Hazard Losses (only when FAR 
52.228-4 is used) 
252.228-7003 Capture and Detention 
252.228-7006 Compliance with Spanish Laws and Insurance 
[Note:  Include the appropriate tax clause(s) from 252.229-7000 to 
7010 as applicable] 
252.232-7002 Progress Payments for Foreign Military Sales Acquisitions 
252.232-7008 Assignment of Claims (Overseas) 
252.233-7001 Choice of Law (Overseas) 
252.236-7010 Overseas Military Construction – Preference for U.S. Firms 
252.236-7011 Overseas A&E Services – Restrictions to U.S. Firms 
252.246-7002 Warranty of Construction (Germany) 
252.247-7023 Transportation of Supplies by Seas 
252.249-7002 Notification of Anticipated Contract Termination or 
Reduction 
 AFFARS Clause 
5252.225-9000 Evidence of Shipment on FMS Contracts 
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IQ 7-2:  From a contractual standpoint, please characterize the nature of these 
battlefield SOWs. 
 
RQ 3a (IQ 7-2) - Conclusions. 
 It appears that battlefield SOWs should be written in a general fashion to allow 
for flexibility.  However, the way in which the SOWs are written for this battlefield 
support is really dependent on the risk, mission/requirements, and location of the 
contractors on the battlefield.  The program offices, contractors, and theater commanders 
all need to be able to adapt to the dynamic battlefield environment and the SOWs need to 
be as flexible as possible. 
RQ 3a (IQ 7-2) - Recommendations. 
 It is interesting to note that in RQ 2, the support requirements and legal 
implications need to be clearly understood by all parties involved and clearly captured in 
the contract.  The answer to RQ 3 is that the SOW, the requirements definition, need to 
be captured fully as well.  However, I recommend that the structure of these battlefield 
SOWs be changed.  I recommend that the known requirements be handled and captured 
in the SOW just as they would in a CONUS SOW.  I also recommend that Reserved 
Paragraph Headings be placed in the SOW for requirements that might need to be met in 
the future so that the acquisition is properly scoped and the contract and requirements 
documents can be easily modified if need be.   
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IQ 8:  What attachments to the contracts have been used to provide support and training 
to defense contractors on the battlefield? 
 
RQ 3a (IQ 8) – Conclusions. 
 A lot of people did not actually know where the support and training requirements 
should be captured in the contract.  Of the individuals that knew, the majority stated that 
the SOW was the best place.   
RQ 3a (IQ 8) - Recommendations. 
 I recommend that the support and training requirements be captured in the 
contract.  As previously mentioned, the support requirements should be captured with a 
Special H Clause and then briefly talked about in the SOW (which references the H 
Clause).  I recommend that training requirements be stipulated in an H Clause as well, 
briefly explained in the SOW, and referenced back to the H Clause.  I also recommend 
that the Air Force develop a consistent policy on training requirements and equipment.  
In other words, the Air Force will provide all contractors on the battlefield their chemical 
protective gear and training, or they will not.  But it has to be consistent across the board 
to all contractors in all locations. 
Subsidiary Question 3b asked “How have past contracts been structured and/or 
negotiated to acquire the services of defense contractors on the battlefield?  This 
question was answered through the following two investigative questions. 
 
IQ 9-1:  How have past contracts been structured to acquire the services of defense 
contractors on the battlefield? 
 
RQ 3b (IQ 9-1) - Conclusions. 
 Most of the Policy Experts did not know and could not recommend a particular 
contract structure.  However, the BOA was the contract structure most frequently selected 
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by both Policy Experts and Program Offices and the other recommendation for these 
battlefield contracts was to issue a separate contract all together. 
RQ 3b (IQ 9-1) - Recommendations. 
 This researcher cannot recommend that a BOA should be used in all instances.  
The contract structure really depends on the nature of the program office, mission 
requirements, risk, cost structure, etc..  However, I recommend that these battlefield 
acquisitions or support actions be segregated from other program activities.  This 
segregation will not only give the program office better insights into cost and 
performance, but it will also keep the contractual vehicle flexible. 
IQ 9-2:  How have past contracts been negotiated to acquire the services of defense 
contractors on the battlefield? 
 
RQ 3b (IQ 9-2) - Conclusions. 
 The negotiations for battlefield support appear to be more difficult and/or 
complex due to the expedient nature, additional requirements, clauses, support 
obligations, and legal implications involved with these contracts.   
RQ 3b (IQ 9-2) - Recommendations. 
 There are several recommendations that I have to address the difficult nature of 
these contracts.  First, education and training of Air Force COs is a must in this area.  The 
majority of our weapon systems and developmental systems use some type of battlefield 
support.  The nuances of battlefield contractors certainly call for training, whether it be an 
on-line course or a one week DAU site course.  Second, standardization needs to be 
institutionalized.  Section H Clauses, Regulations, FAR Clauses need to be developed 
and an all-encompassing website with lessons learned, best practices, checklists of 
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support obligations, and samples of good contracts need to be captured so that people do 
not have to “re-invent the wheel,” and scrounge around for policy and guidance.   
Subsidiary Question 3c asked “What attachments to the contracts have been used 
to clarify defense contractors’ roles and responsibilities on the battlefield?”  This 
question was answered through the following investigative question. 
 
IQ 10:  What attachments to the contracts have been used to clarify defense contractors’ 
roles and responsibilities on the battlefield?  In other words, who does/should the 
contractor report to in the field? 
 
RQ 3c (IQ 10) - Conclusions. 
 The Contracting Officer, COTR, and ACO were the highest selected POCs for 
contractors on the battlefield.  However, the nature and complexity of this multiple 
interface chain of command has and will continue to cause problems for the contractor 
and government. 
RQ 3c (IQ 10) - Recommendations. 
 First, the chain of command or reporting structure for the battlefield contractor, 
whatever it is, should be stipulated in the contract in another H Clause.  For instance, the 
H Clause could read: 
H-XXX  The contractor shall report back through the ACO’s office on any 
contractual issues.  
 ACO Location: Street, City, Country 
 ACO Telephone Numbers:  Office, Cell 
 ACO E-mail Address:  
 
In other words, the guidance for the contractor should be in the contract and should be 
very specific. 
 Second, I recommend that the program offices communicate more frequently with 
the warfighting community in the field.  More warfighters that are deployed with the 
weapon systems and the contractors should be properly trained and designated COTRs 
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and act as a liaison between the contractor, warfighter, theater commander, and 
acquisition community.  There appears to be a lack of COTRs as stipulated by the Policy 
Experts and Program Offices. 
Research Question 5 asked “Historically, how have these contracts performed from start 
to finish (cost, schedule, performance, and responsiveness)?”  This question was 
answered through the following investigative question. 
 
IQ 14:  Historically, how have these contracts performed from start to finish (cost, 
schedule, performance, and responsiveness)? 
 
RQ 5 (IQ 14) - Conclusions. 
 Overall, these battlefield contract have been performed very well according to the 
Policy Experts and Program Offices.  However, some problems were reported and the 
cost performance seemed to be the category of most concern.  There appears to be a 
significant tradeoff between performance and cost in these types of contracts. 
RQ 5 (IQ 14) - Recommendations. 
I have several recommendations for addressing this cost ~ performance tradeoff 
that is present in battlefield contracts.  First, the acquisition community, contractors, 
warfighters, and pentagon staff must be in constant contact from the onset of such 
acquisitions.  An accurate requirements definition must be spelled-out as best as these 
parties can and a risk management plan must be developed, capturing any and all possible 
contingencies.  Second, a cost estimate must be developed and these contingencies must 
be taken into account.  Third, if approved, the program offices must receive full funding 
for their effort.  As PO #5 stated,  
No one knew how long it was going to last, so we would get 
funded one month at a time.  Every month you are doing a funding 
action to incrementally fund your contract…knowing that you have 
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to give your contractor a 30 day notice or they are coming home.  
(Air Force Interview, 2004). 
 
 
Implications for the Air Force Acquisition Professional 
Research Question 4 asked “What are the lessons learned from these programs using 
contractors on the battlefield?  This question was answered through a series of 
investigative questions. 
 
IQ 11:  What are the lessons learned from these programs using contractors on the 
battlefield? 
 
RQ 4 (IQ 11) - Conclusions. 
 One of the lessons learned was that Air Force programs that use contractors on the 
battlefield do not capture lessons learned, and/or if they do, no one seems to know where 
to look for them.  With that being said, the accumulated lessons learned from the Policy 
Experts and Program Offices that were interviewed, are captured under the 
recommendations heading in Table 107.  The lessons learned stand by themselves and are 
presented in rank order according to their combined frequency count. 
RQ 4 (IQ 11) - Recommendations. 
 38 Lessons Learned were collected and as previously stated, all of them have 
merit and can prove useful to the acquisition professional and Air Force program office 
that is contemplating using contractors on the battlefield or already is using contractors 
on the battlefield.  These lessons learned are knowledge that should be shared within the 
Air Force and across the DoD.  The Lessons Learned are presented in order of highest 
frequency count in Table 107. 
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Table 107.  IQ #11 – Accumulated Lessons Learned 
Lesson Learned F % 
Clear Communication 29 44% 
Requirements Definition 27 41% 
Good Acquisition Planning with All Parties  23 35% 
Theater Coordination 18 27% 
Better support to the contractor - Understand our Obligations 18 27% 
Think of everyone as a team - Contractor & Govt 17 26% 
Don't have any lessons learned/Need to Capture Them 14 21% 
A good contract 14 21% 
Understand/Integrate Contractors into our Force Structure 13 20% 
Have a contingency Process in place - Anticipate Need to Deploy - Have Kt Ready and T&Cs 12 18% 
Inform the Ktr personnel, provide them info on job and area 10 15% 
Flexibility 9 14% 
Education & Training & Exercises 9 14% 
Single POC for Contracting In Theater 8 12% 
CONUS COs  Need To Understand These Contracts 8 12% 
N/A 7 11% 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION 7 11% 
Contractor Accountability 6 9% 
ACO Support 4 6% 
Share Information From Other Agencies/Services 3 5% 
Contractors are patriotic and do a great job 3 5% 
Force Protection Important 3 5% 
Transportation in and out of country 3 5% 
Speed is King 3 5% 
Risks associated with other program requirements 3 5% 
Policy Needs to Catch up (Liability) 2 3% 
Better Job with Visas 2 3% 
Consistency Across Services 2 3% 
Train Combatant Commander in Acquisition 2 3% 
Keep Up Quality Assurance 2 3% 
Incentive Pay For Contractors 2 3% 
Need a Central Repository for Guidance 2 3% 
Lack of Manpower that cannot support Schedule 1 2% 
SOFA - Help 1 2% 
Programming of Funds 1 2% 
Take Ownership of Prototype 1 2% 
Re-think Outsourcing 1 2% 
Different Uniform for Ktrs 1 2% 
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IQ 12-1 and 12-2:  When drafting a battlefield contract, what contract type would be 
most suitable and why? 
 
RQ 4 (IQ 12-1 and IQ 12-2) - Conclusions. 
 Cost Reimbursable, It Depends, and Fixed Price were the responses to this 
investigative question with the highest frequencies.  The majority of the program offices 
did use a cost reimbursable type contract, however.  The reasons provided by the Policy 
Experts and Program Offices for choosing this type of contract were because of its 
inherent flexibility and ability to handle the unknowns. 
RQ 4 (IQ 12-1 and IQ 12-2) - Recommendations. 
 The only recommendation I have for choosing a contract type for these battlefield 
contracts is that it is situational-dependent:  no one type of contract should be mandated.  
Cost reimbursable appears to be the appropriate choice for contracts where contractors 
are in a volatile battlefield environment, where circumstances and requirements are 
dynamic.  As circumstances settle down, and the acquisition and area of operation moves 
into the sustainment phase, one should look at changing the contract to a fixed price type, 
shifting more of the risk to the contractor, and further developing the definition of 
requirements.   
IQ  13:  If you could give the CO and PM any advice prior to acquiring the services of 
contractors on the battlefield, what would it be? 
 
RQ 4 (IQ 13) - Conclusions. 
 
The accumulated recommendations from the Policy Experts and Program Offices 
that were interviewed are presented in Table 108.  These recommendations stand by 
themselves and are presented in rank order according to their combined frequency count. 
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RQ 4 (IQ 13) - Recommendations. 
 
 26 Recommendations were collected and as previously stated, all of them have 
merit and can prove useful to the acquisition professional and Air Force program office 
that is contemplating using contractors on the battlefield or who already are using 
contractors on the battlefield.  These recommendations are knowledge that should be 
shared within the Air Force and across the DoD.  The Recommendations are presented in 
order of highest frequency count in Table 108. 
 
Table 108.  IQ #13 – Accumulated Recommendations 
Recommendations to CO and PM for COB Acq. F % 
Requirements Definition 46 70% 
Talk with Contractor/Open Lines of Communication 41 62% 
Acquisition Planning and Analysis of CLS 30 45% 
Create Good IPT & Work together - Govt Team 27 41% 
Prepare for Contingency Beforehand - Planning 23 35% 
CONUS Replacement Center - Support Obligations - Prepare Contractor 23 35% 
Clarify everyone's responsibilities 18 27% 
Talk with your customer/Support the Warfighter 18 27% 
Where is the System Going?  What is it like?  What's Available? 17 26% 
Coordinate in Theater 17 26% 
Put in the right clauses 11 17% 
Review Policy Out there on COB/Research  9 14% 
Talk to People who have done it - Review Lessons Learned 8 12% 
Work the Money Issue 6 9% 
Define Risks 6 9% 
Transportation - TPFD 6 9% 
Get lawyers involved right away 5 8% 
Need a ROM - Agreement on ROM 4 6% 
Sole Source 3 5% 
Contracting Vehicle Selection/Have at least a CLIN for COB 3 5% 
Invoke Crisis Planning 3 5% 
Look around at other services for help as well 3 5% 
Contractor Oversight In Theater & Accountability 2 3% 
Mitigate Risks 2 3% 
Best Value Award 1 2% 
Scrutinize Contractor's Compensation Policies 1 2% 
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Research Question 6 asked “What are the acquisition “best practices” for acquiring and 
managing the services of systems contractors on the battlefield?  This question was 
answered through a series of investigative questions. 
 
IQ 15:  What are the acquisition “best practices” for acquiring and managing the 
services of systems contractors on the battlefield? 
 
RQ 6 (IQ 15) - Conclusions. 
 
The accumulated Best Practices from the Policy Experts and Program Offices that 
were interviewed are presented in Table 109.  These Best Practices stand by themselves 
and are presented in order of highest frequency. 
RQ 6 (IQ 15) - Recommendations. 
 
29 Best Practices were collected and as previously stated, all of them have merit 
and can prove useful to the acquisition professional and Air Force program office that is 
contemplating using contractors on the battlefield or who already are using contractors on 
the battlefield.  These Best Practices are knowledge that should be shared within the Air 
Force and across the DoD.  The Best Practices are presented in order of highest frequency 
count in Table 109. 
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Table 109.  IQ #15 – Accumulated Recommendations 
Acquisition Best Practices F % 
Good Communication 37 56% 
Strong Team / IPT / Good People 23 35% 
Requirements Definition 21 32% 
Prior Planning 14 21% 
Rapid Execution 13 20% 
Work Closely with the Contractor / Partner/Habitual Relationship 12 18% 
Clear Guidelines for Contractors/Guidance/Policy 12 18% 
Contract Structure 11 17% 
Flexibility 10 15% 
Coordinate Forward to the Theater - Find POC, Learn about Environment 9 14% 
Contracting Single POC 8 12% 
Education/Training/Read about Subject 6 9% 
Make sure system is supportable 6 9% 
Contractor Accountability 4 6% 
Good contract language, Standardized 4 6% 
Integrity of Award Fee Process 4 6% 
Track Costs Well 3 5% 
Outstanding Acquisition Strategy Plans & Source Selection Process 3 5% 
Funding is There 2 3% 
Information Technology 2 3% 
Reachback 2 3% 
Documentation 2 3% 
Move from Contingency-Sustainment quickly 1 2% 
See what others have done/ACEs/Best Practices/Lessons Learned 1 2% 
Leverage Commercial Sector Capabilities 1 2% 
Clarify Force Protection 1 2% 
CCB Process 1 2% 
Support the Warfighter 1 2% 
Good Sub-K Management 1 2% 
 
IQ  16:  Is there anything else you would like to add?      
 
RQ 6 (IQ 16) - Conclusions. 
Although there was a limited amount of additional comments at the end of the 
interviews from the interviewees, the additional comments are presented in Table 110.   
RQ 6 (IQ 16) - Recommendations. 
11 additional codings of comments were collected and all of them have merit and 
can prove useful to the acquisition professional and Air Force program office that is 
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contemplating using contractors on the battlefield or who already are using contractors on 
the battlefield.  These Additional Comments provide insight into further lessons learned, 
best practices, and recommendations in this area of battlefield acquisition and this 
knowledge should be shared within the Air Force and across the DoD.  The Additional 
Comments are presented in order of highest frequency count in Table 110. 
 
 Table 110.  IQ #16 – Accumulated Recommendations 
Anything You Would Like to Add F % 
N/A 49 74% 
Very Important Issue 11 17% 
Need Policy to Answer Questions 7 11% 
Need to move faster 5 8% 
Using COB now more than ever 2 3% 
Acq Planning - Effects of CLS 2 3% 
Standardization is key! 2 3% 
The People Factor 1 2% 
Train/Educate Combatant Cmr is Acq 1 2% 
Sponsored Reserve 1 2% 
Look at Army  1 2% 
Small Business Step Needs Removed 1 2% 
 
 
Limitations of the Research 
There are two major limitations to this research – the researcher himself and the 
case study methodology selected for this study. 
The first limitation of this research came from the researcher himself.  The 
researcher had eight years of contracting experience and was involved with acquiring 
spare parts, commodities, services, construction, and major weapon systems.  The 
researcher’s last assignment was at Global Hawk, where he worked on the battlefield 
contract for Operation Enduring Freedom.  However, the researcher presented and 
analyzed data from over 53 SMEs and 13 Program Offices.  This limitation and/or bias 
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was alleviated through the thorough analysis and presentation of all data, although coding 
might have been skewed due to personal experiences in the field. 
 The second limitation is the case study design which has certain limitations when 
attempting to generalize conclusions and recommendations.  The SMEs that were 
interviewed all had different experience levels which affected the data.  The Program 
Offices all supported different weapon systems, with different missions, in different parts 
of their life cycle.  Furthermore, the Policy Expert case study groups were not comprised 
of equal amount of SMEs, with DoD comprised of only four Policy Experts and the Air 
Force group comprised of 31 Policy Experts.  Although intentional, this definitely had an 
effect on the outcomes of this research, as the Air Force Policy Experts opinions were 
more heavily weighted than the other Policy Experts.   
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 The study of the use contractors on the battlefield from an acquisition, systems 
contracting perspective, is relatively new.  Also, there are several recommendations for 
future study based off of this study’s data, conclusions, and recommendations.  Future 
researchers should consider the following recommendations for future study: 
• A more detailed study of Air Force program offices and their contractual 
documents, using a questionnaire that would provide for more responses. 
 
• A study comparing and contrasting Army programs versus Air Force programs 
that use contractors on the battlefield. 
 
• A study that seeks the warfighter’s opinion and compares it with the program 
office and contractor opinions. 
 
• A study of the policy and laws that have been established and their overall effects 
on battlefield acquisition. 
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• A study of the Draft DODI and the Draft DFARS Clause and comparison to the 
results and conclusions of this study, with recommendations for modification to 
that clause and joint policy. 
 
• A study that analyzes best practices, lessons learned, and recommendations from 
the three main categories of contractors on the battlefield:  theater support, 
external support, and systems contractors. 
 
• Also, other information was collected at the end of this investigation that would 
be excellent areas for future study.  These documents include the Draft DFARS 
Clause, Draft DODI, General Counsel recommendations, attorney research paper 
on battlefield clauses, attorney provided set of standard overseas/battlefield 
clauses, a full Army report on the accountability of contractors on the battlefield 
from Operation Iraqi Freedom, very recent policy memos regarding contractors 
on the battlefield, and a Draft Army report of case study research concerning 
Army weapon system platforms and the standardization of battlefield acquisition 
within those cases.  The researcher will hold onto this information for possible 
future study. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 Contractors have been used to support our warfighters and weapon systems for 
hundreds of years.  However, preliminary results of this exploratory study tentatively 
provide some recognition that there are problems in this area of acquisition.  This initial 
analysis and study of the current battlefield acquisition process and offered conclusions, 
recommendations, lessons learned, and best practices to be shared throughout the Air 
Force acquisition corps and DoD.  There are limitations to this investigation; however, 
the underlying premise of this research was to help the acquisition professional in their 
ultimate role of providing support to the warfighter.  There is a critical need for future 
research in this acquisition area not only for the Air Force, but across the DoD.  Future 
research in this area could contract the knowledge gap in this area and focus on specific 
acquisition problems, potentially creating a boilerplate contract and/or acquisition plan. 
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Glossary of Technical Terms 
ACE – Acquisition Center of Excellence 
ACO – Administrative Contracting Officer 
AFARS – Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
AFCAP – Air Force Civilian Augmentation Program 
AFFARS – Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement 
AFMC – Air Force Materiel Command 
ASC – Aeronautical Systems Center 
AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control System 
BOA – Basic Ordering Agreement 
BX – Base Exchange 
CAF – Civilians Accompanying the Force 
C&C – Command and Control 
CCB – Configuration Control Board 
CCO – Contingency Contracting Officer 
CLIN – Contract Line Item Number 
CLS – Contractor Logistics Support 
CO – Contracting Officer 
COB – Contractors on the Battlefield 
CONCAP – Emergency CONstruction CAPabilities Contract 
CONUS – Continental United States 
COR – Contracting Officer’s Representative 
COTR – Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative 
 
 199
CPA – Coalition Provisional Authority 
CPAF – Cost Plus Award Fee 
CPIF – Cost Plus Incentive Fee 
CPFF – Cost Plus Fixed Fee 
CRC – CONUS Replacement Center 
DAU – Defense Acquisition University 
DCGS – Distributed Common Ground System 
DCMA – Defense Contract Management Agency 
DFARS – Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement 
DoD – Department of Defense 
DODI – Department of Defense Instruction 
FAR – Federal Acquisition Regulations 
FPAS – Force Protection Airborne Surveillance 
FPIF – Fixed Price Incentive Fee 
FSR – Field Service Representatives 
GFE – Government Furnished Equipment 
IDIQ – Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity 
IEU – Individual Equipment Issue 
IPT – Integrated Product Team 
IQ – Investigative Question 
JAG – Judge Advocate General 
JFTR – Joint Federal Travel Regulation 
JSTARS – Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
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JV – Joint Vision 
KO – Contracting Officer 
LOAC – Law of Armed Conflict 
LOGCAP – Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
LOI – Letter of Introduction 
MEJA – Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 
MOA – Memorandum of Agreement 
MOU – Memorandum of Understanding 
N/A – Non-applicable 
NTE – Not-to-exceed 
ODC – Other Direct Costs 
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom 
OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom 
PM – Program Manager 
PO – Program Office 
POC – Point of Contact 
QA – Quality Assurance 
QAE – Quality Assurance Evaluator 
QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review  
RIE – Restore Iraqi Electricity 
RIO – Restore Iraqi Oil 
ROM – Rough Order of Magnitude 
RQ – Research Question 
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SAF/AQC – Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 
SME – Subject Matter Expert 
SOFA – Status of Forces Agreement 
SOW – Statement of Work 
SPO – System Program Office 
T&M – Time and Materials 
TPFDL – Time Phased Force Deployment List 
TOW – Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided Missile 
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UCA – Undefinitized Contract Action 
USAF – United States Air Force 
USAID – United States Agency for International Development 
USG – United States Government 
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